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Abstract 
This dissertation is a thematic response to the films of Bela Tarr’s “second-period”, from 
Damnation to The Turin Horse; and to claims made in the director’s discourse concerning the 
departure of his cinema from “story” and toward “metacommunication.” By this, Tarr refers to a 
motion away from the exigency of conventional narrative economy and toward an expressive 
realisation of the materiality of time, atmosphere and milieu. With reference to the philosophical 
discourse on Stimmung, or “mood,” I will argue that the disposition toward these paranarrative 
elements constitutes a medium of experience that conditions an attunement to the affective 
presence of the world. The appeal of Stimmung - which displaces the difference between 
“subject” and “object” - will orient our engagement with the “cosmic perspective” of these films 
and the “poetic experience” it implies. This displacement takes place with regard to a “free-
indirect subjectivity,” an autonomous camera-consciousness that draws together subjects and 
environment into an experiential “state of being”, or “being-with”. Paradoxically, this inclination 
away from “story” becomes more profound with the entry of the writer Krasznahorkai into the 
circle of Tarr’s collaborators. The writer’s work represents a pretext and philosophical 
background to these films, which will be explicated with particular reference to Benjamin and 
Heidegger. Meanwhile, Tarr’s medium essentialist view rejects interpretation, situating his 
antipathy to “story” with reference to “metaphysical things” – theory and ideology, symbol and 
allegory – and suggesting that our “dignity” has been progressively diminished by the being-in-
language of historical man. Accordingly, corruption by language is a thematic element of these 
films, in which the breakdown of meaning and its communicability takes on the apocalyptic 
dimensions of a cosmic disharmony. This will be read through Agamben’s discourse on gesture, 
ethics, and “messianic” time. 
viii 
 
List of Illustrations 
Figure          Page 
 
1.1 - 1.9 Entrance - Damnation      pp.41-43 
2  Karrer’s rain-soaked espionage - Damnation   p.49 
3.1 - 3.8 Establishing shot - The Man from London   pp.52-54 
4  Karrer muses on “story” - Damnation    p. 68 
5  The Singer - Damnation      p. 70 
6.1-6.2  A revelation – Satantango     pp.122-125 
7.1-7.8  Bells of heaven – Satantango     pp.128-130 
8.1-8.10 Free indirect being-with – Satantango    pp.141-144 
9.1-9.9  Eszter’s treatise– Werckmeister Harmonies    pp.177-179 
10  Janos and the Leviathan – Werckmeister Harmonies  p.186 
11.1-11.3 A wordless passage – Werckmeister Harmonies   p.195 
12.1-12.3 The silent horde – Werckmeister Harmonies   p.196 
13.1-13.3 Destruction and discovery – Werckmeister Harmonies  p.209 
14.1-14.5 “What must be seen” – Werckmeister Harmonies  pp.210-211 
15.1-15.9 Cosmic choreography – Werckmeister Harmonies  pp.241-243 
16.1-16.12 “What happened to the horse…” – The Turin Horse  pp.249-253 
17.1-17.4 Entrance to dwelling – The Turin Horse    pp.257-258 
18.1-18.3 Rhythm of life  – The Turin Horse    p.271   
19  “We have to eat…” – The Turin Horse    p.272 
20.1-20.3 “He just goes into nature…” – Damnation   p.282 
1 
 
Introduction to Béla Tarr 
This thesis critically examines the mode of experience that is invoked by the cinema of 
the Hungarian auteur Béla Tarr, and the way that this cinematic experience is 
represented by the director in commentary and interviews. More specifically, it centres 
on a thematic reading of the affective atmosphere and temporality of the five films made 
from Damnation (1987) to The Turin Horse (2011). This is a period that has been referred 
to as the director’s “mature films,”1 or simply “the Tarr style.”2 The attainment of this 
style follows Tarr’s development from documentary realism, via a peculiar chamber 
drama, to a signature aesthetic that has attained a special reverence among cinephiles, if 
not a place in the pantheon of great art cinema directors, as Jonathon Rosenbaum 
claimed as early as 1996.3 The film widely considered to be the magnum opus of this 
oeuvre, Satantango (1994), infamously runs for over 7 hours, and is emblematic of the 
central significance of Tarr’s representation of lived-time, which is evinced through a 
proliferation of cinematic “dead time.” It is for this reason that the corpus of films under 
consideration is commonly characterised as part of the movement of “Slow” or 
“Contemplative” Cinema. 
However, this is a context in which Tarr’s singular style is idiosyncratic, even 
where the director is among the more influential names associated with this “cinema of 
                                                          
1 Jacques Rancière, Béla Tarr, The Time After, trans. Erik Beranek (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013), p.24. 
2 András Bálint Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr: The Circle Closes (London & New York: Wallflower Press, 
2013), p.1. 
3 Jonathan Rosenbaum, “A Place in the Pantheon: Films by Béla Tarr” from the Chicago Reader (May 9, 
1996), www.jonathanrosenbaum.net/1995/05/a-place-in-the-pantheon/ (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
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slowness.”4 The formal strategies that characterise Slow Cinema are legibly descended 
from the realist tradition in post-war modernism, sharing in an emphasis on the capacity 
of the cinema to preserve phenomenal continuity and observe social reality. But Tarr’s 
films present a milieu that is made systematically uncanny and estranged in a way that 
departs from the ostensive “transparency” of realism (for which he expresses disdain).5 
András Bálint Kovács identifies this milieu as “a universal image about the world,”6 while 
Jacques Rancière regards it as a mediation of the historical and the mythological.7 I will 
retain Tarr’s terminology in order to identify what he calls the “cosmic” condition of this 
environment, but position it in relation to the influence of the writer László 
Krasznahorkai. Tarr downplays this influence with reference to a medium essentialist 
view of film;8 a view that, contradictorily, appears to gesture toward the basic tenets of 
realism.  
The singularity and formal consistency of Tarr’s aesthetic, as well as its internal 
incongruities, thus open a fertile ground from which to contemplate cinematic form and 
expression more generally. Tarr seeks to present a mode of perception and attunement 
to certain qualities of existence, experience and material presence. “States of being” are 
realized by a mobile gaze that seeks to position the spectator “inside and outside at the 
                                                          
4 Michael Ciment, “The State of Cinema,” address speech at the 46th San Francisco International Film 
Festival (2003), available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040307143900/http://www.sffs.org:80/fest03/special/state.html (Accessed 
January 30, 2018). 
5 Béla Tarr, interview by Geoff Andrew in Sight and Sound 17, no.7 (July, 2007), p.19. 
6 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.174. 
7 Jacques Rancière, “Béla Tarr: The Poetics and Politics of Fiction” in Slow Cinema, eds. Tiago de Luca and 
Nuno Barradas Jorge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p.246. 
8 Béla Tarr, interview by Jonathon Romney, BFI Southbank Events, March 15, 2001, recording held at BFI 
National Archive, London. 
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same time.”9 This peculiar disposition resonates strongly within a philosophical discourse 
that sees mood as a structure of experience which is neither “internal” nor “external,” 
neither “subjective” nor “objective,” but a medium which unseats such distinctions. This 
erasure of binary oppositions will orient my discussion of the anti-metaphysical 
worldview behind Tarr’s cinema, the encounter with a state of being that it presents, and 
the central concept of “dignity” toward which its ethos is directed.  
 
A Slow Cinema 
In Slow Cinema, narrative action is withdrawn into rhythms of everydayness, repetition 
and endurance. It is an art cinema that demands the concentration of the viewer, in 
addition to the expenditure of their time. The minimal and mundane are offered for 
contemplation, within durations that distend the relationship between the form and 
function of images. These strategies are most explicitly formed in opposition to the 
formal economy of Classical and Post-Classical Hollywood convention. But the Slow 
movement is often considered, by extension, in contradistinction to the models of 
temporal efficiency that characterise the technological worldview of modernity. This is 
particularly the case with regard to a contemporary globalised neoliberal capitalism, as 
well as the pervasive homogeneity, or hegemony, of the time under which it operates.10 
                                                          
9 Béla Tarr, “Temptation Harbour: On the Contrasts at Work in “The Man from London”” in Sight and Sound 
19, no.1 (January 2009), p.55. 
10 Lutz Koepnick, On Slowness: Toward an Aesthetic of the Contemporary (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2014), p.2. 
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This distinction also reflects the dispersed (or globalised) centres of Slow Cinema’s 
production. These range from across Asia, Latin America, and Southern and Eastern 
Europe, forming a common response to the affect (and after-effects) of globalisation and 
modernisation, with respect to peripheral locations and marginalised peoples.11 The 
aesthetic strategies of Slow Cinema thus speak to a politics of representation which 
expand beyond national cinematic models, even where focus does not extend beyond 
the local. Against a global time that circulates and accelerates beneath the sign of capital, 
it poses the experience and significance of “other” modes of temporality and experience. 
These strategies can more readily be identified with critical discourses on post-war art 
cinema, such as in the Deleuzian “time-image,”12 but even more particularly with the 
tradition of realism as it emerges through Andre Bazin’s reading of Italian neorealism.13 
Indeed, slow cinema can be viewed as an intensified engagement with the techniques 
that Bazin associates with a “realist” aesthetic: depth of focus, long-takes and sequence 
shots; non-professional actors and location shooting. These techniques are almost 
entirely characteristic of the “Tarr style.” The ambient density of scenarios in this oeuvre 
are realised through often “extreme” long-takes, regularly running up to 11 minutes in 
length. Choreographed mobile sequence shots work to open situations as sites of survey, 
rendering them as absorptive milieus, whose bond with narrative causality is stretched 
                                                          
11 Matthew Flanagan, “’Slow Cinema’: Temporality and Style in Contemporary Art and Experimental Film,” 
(PhD thesis, University of Exeter, 2012), p.118. https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/4432 
(Accessed January 30, 2018). 
12 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Robert Galeta (London & New York: 
Continuum, 2011). 
13 See Andre Bazin, “An Aesthetic of Reality: Cinematic Realism and the Italian School of Liberation” in What 
is Cinema? Vol. 2, ed. & trans. Hugh Gray (Berkley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 
1972), pp.16-40. 
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and loosened. Conventional structural emphasis on clarity of character motivation, action 
and causal dialogue is distended, and emphasis placed instead on the materiality of those 
locations, atmospheres and durations from which they are shown to emerge, or in which 
they transpire. The camera seeks out and brings forth the elemental textures that make 
up these environments, whether material, climactic, or sonic, as a means to encounter 
their affective presence. 
At the same time, these presences are encountered within a foreboding 
monochrome chiaroscuro and a pervasive atmosphere of entropy and ennui that is 
equally characteristic of Tarr’s cinema. They are set in small towns or rural collectives 
that appear to have been cast adrift from the surrounding world, and which are 
presented in the throes of irremediable social dissolution and a corresponding natural 
decay. These microcosms are at once emblematic of the broader geopolitical context of 
Slow Cinema and yet far too stylised to refer to it directly. Tarr’s are estranged and 
uncanny worlds, situated at the edge of a crisis of meaning and its communication, which 
are held under the sway of a corruption that is progressively revealed to be cosmic in its 
dimensions, and not simply social, as in the neorealist tradition. Those that inhabit this 
universe are shown to be mired in a pervasive spiritual poverty which is reflected 
throughout their environment, the material presence of which is meticulously observed 
in the probing and coursing of an embodied camera. The director regularly admits that he 
considers the landscapes, climate and temporality of which his films’ worlds consist to be 
protagonists with an equal force to the human subjects that inhabit them. As a measure 
of this free-indirect equivalence between subjects and their situation in a world, Tarr’s 
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long-takes work to animate an inanimate object-world through movement and studied 
observation. The camera regularly traverses blockages, entering and emerging from 
columns of shadow, scanning the surfaces of buildings as well as people, and placing 
peculiar regard upon the natural-historical decay of the physical environment. Through 
this substantive cinematic gaze, the act of perception becomes self-reflexive. In the 
process, this observation becomes an event in itself, enabling Tarr to frame phenomenal 
experience as a thematic concern of these films. Narrative, he says, is of lesser concern 
than this particular mode of representation, and the experience of time and situation 
toward which it inclines. The director speaks of his cinema as a “circular dance” and in 
relation to a certain rhythm that is achieved by a distancing from “story.”14 This is a 
disposition that is underscored by the cinematic “dead-time” which accumulates through 
recurrent images of walking, watching, and waiting; and not least in the drunken, circling 
and stumbling dances that take place repeatedly in the diegesis. These films are often 
described for their apocalyptic quality, representing an end-time that is drawn into 
endurance through an oftentimes glacial temporality. The looming threat of cataclysm is 
consummated in Tarr’s final film, a matchlessly bleak representation of 6 days of de-
creation, which concludes with a final exit of light from an already dark and desolate 
stage. More than exercises in absurd nihilism, however, Tarr’s films are widely considered 
to be profoundly contemplative experiences of time and world, emphatically aesthetic 
                                                          
14 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
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feats, however dark and estranging these may be. The director, for one, believes that 
they are (presumably pitch dark) comedies, barring the final instalment. 
 
Praxis and Production 
In looking at the Slow Cinema of Béla Tarr, however, it is important first of all to establish 
that we are talking not only of Tarr, but of a creative ensemble of which he is the 
figurehead. It is to the director’s credit that a broad recognition of this circle follows from 
his own insistence on acknowledging the collaborative nature of his work, which he tends 
to speak about in the collective “we.” This “we” refers, in the first place, to Ágnes 
Hranitzky, his wife, who is named as both editor and co-author or -director of all but the 
first of “his” films; even at that early stage, Hranitzky was listed among the crew for 
Family Nest (1977). In the course of the following 34 years of feature film-making, which 
reached a declared conclusion with The Turin Horse (2011), several other significant 
collaborators were to join (as well as depart). Mihály Víg composed music for every film 
from Almanac of Fall (1985) onwards, and Gyula Pauer entered as the set designer at the 
same time, remaining involved in various capacities until The Man from London (2007). 
Each also joined the ensemble of actors - both professional and, more often, not - whose 
“presence” and “life experience” the director calls upon to give figure to certain states of 
being. Víg memorably played the role of Irimias in Satantango, while Pauer alternates in 
occupation between set designer and Tarr’s barman of choice (playing this role in 
Damnation, Werckmeister Harmonies (2000), and The Man from London). But, in a way 
8 
 
that partially undermines the elevated status afforded by Tarr to his associates, the 
director strongly asserts that this body of work is not to be dissected into periods. In a 
slippage from the collective ideal, the director (jokingly) implores “please, don’t split my 
life!,” and asserts that “the form is always changing, but I’m always thinking about poor 
people and human society and the human condition, as in my first movie.”15 This oeuvre 
is, he says, a continuous development of style and concepts that had been present from 
his earliest productions onwards – the same movie, but “deeper,” “purer,” “simpler.”16 
Rather than with regard to any determinate division between stylistic registers – such as 
might occur with the addition of new contributors or ideas – Tarr suggests that this 
development follows a maturation in his consideration of the “problems” addressed by 
these films.  The issues to which Tarr responds are the same, but viewed from different 
perspectives. “Social” problems are considered, at first, in themselves, then as 
“ontological” in nature, then as part of a “cosmic” condition.17 The progression through 
these frames of orientation is a recurrent description offered by the director, which will 
form a central point of reference for this thesis. Specifically, it is with the last stage of 
Tarr’s development – into its cosmic register – that my argument is explicitly concerned. I 
take this stage to overlap, substantially if not entirely, with the corpus of films that begins 
with Damnation and reaches its conclusion with The Turin Horse. Equally central to the 
                                                          
15 Béla Tarr, interview by Fionn Meade, July 1, 2007, https://bombmagazine.org/articles/béla-tarr/ 
(Accessed January 30, 2018). 
16 Béla Tarr, “Pure and Simple,” interview by Vladan Petkovic, March 4, 2011, 
http://cineuropa.org/it.aspx?t=interview&l=en&did=198131. (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
17 Béla Tarr, “The Turin Horse,” interview by Virginie Selavy, Feb. 4, 2012, 
http://www.electricsheepmagazine.co.uk/features/2012/06/04/the-turin-horse-interview-with-bela-tarr/ 
(Accessed January 30, 2018). 
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claims of this thesis, this second period of the director’s oeuvre begins with the entrance 
of Krasznahorkai into the Tarr circle. The writer completes a quartet of core collaborators 
(with the co-directors, and Víg) that formalises the thematic and stylistic register – the 
cosmic dimension - of the director’s remaining five feature films. As is customary in such 
cases, however, Tarr’s name will stand in as a placeholder marking the centre of this 
circle. 
 
Reading Tarr 
The difficulties in delineating the borders of Tarr’s jurisdiction and categorising its 
outcomes are evident in the most comprehensive analysis of this cinema to date, András 
Bálint Kovács’ The Cinema of Béla Tarr: The Circle Closes. Kovács is a close friend of the 
director and Hranitzky, a relationship through which he has been privy to valuable insight 
into the operations of the Tarr circle.18 He unequivocally declares the central role of 
Hranitzky as co-director (without, however, being able to define it exactly),19 and 
identifies the significant influence of Pauer, whose 1970’s “Pseudo-Art” movement had 
apparently inspired a postmodern self-reflexivity in Tarr’s efforts to create “the feeling of 
reality in an artificially created pseudo-world.”20 Kovács places this discovery at the 
centre of the director’s progression from documentary realism, through a period of 
                                                          
18 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.vii.  
19 Ibid. pp.19-20. 
20 András Bálint Kovács, “The World According to Béla Tarr,” 2008, 
www.kinokultura.com/specials/7/kovacs.shtml (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
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selective experimental stylisation, by the conclusion of which the “the Tarr style” is 
discovered and developed until its eventual completion;21 that is, the social, the 
ontological, and then the cosmic. Along the same trajectory, Kovács regards this 
development of “the Tarr style” to represent an increasingly personal expression of the 
world on the part of the director. Kovács seeks to demonstrate what he calls “the 
permutation principle,” which, in alignment with the director’s self-conception, observes 
that the elements comprising the mature “Tarr style” had been in evidence since Family 
Nest.22 This “permutation” is, according to Kovács, a matter of the disposition of formal 
strategies borrowed from the corpus of cinematic modernism: from Jancsó and 
Cassavetes to Antonioni, Fassbinder and Tarkovsky.23 Kovács also situates Tarr’s body of 
work within currents in Hungarian avant-garde art and cinema of the 1980s, specifically in 
terms of absurd or expressive stylisation.24 At the same time, Kovács asserts that “there is 
nothing ‘Hungarian’ in Béla Tarr, and no Hungarian cultural or cinematic tradition would 
help in appreciating or understanding his particular cinematic universe.”25 Tarr is seen, in 
this way, as a universalised modernist-postmodernist, who systematically appropriates 
and re-configures those pre-existing artistic strategies that can best give form to a 
personal vision of the world – a world at once highly realistic and highly stylised, both 
localisable and decontextualised. Kovács channels these insights toward a discussion of 
the basic narrative-thematic system of Tarr’s cinema. He characterises this system in 
                                                          
21 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.40. 
22 Ibid. p.1. 
23 Ibid. pp.51-55. 
24 Ibid. pp.79-81. 
25 Ibid. p.97. 
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terms of the characters’ “entrapment” in hopeless existential situations, the absurdity of 
which are revealed through a circular narration (of return and/or non-progression) in 
which the viewer becomes implicated.26 It is with regards to the circular form of 
narrative, and its intimation of an apparently “Nietzschean” cyclical time-concept, that 
Kovács most clearly credits the contribution of the writer, Krasznahorkai.27 Kovács offers 
a rigorous formal analysis to demonstrate the gradual development of Tarr’s personal 
vision in quantitative terms. The incremental increase in the average length of shots in 
Tarr’s films, and a corresponding decrease in time devoted to dialogue,28 are both 
noteworthy, although the director himself strongly disputes their value. Tarr says he got 
no further in the book (roughly halfway) than Kovács’ cinemetric graphs, which he calls 
“strange shit.”29  
This line exemplifies the brusque, oftentimes dismissive tenor of the director’s 
discourse. Tarr is keen to stress that “metaphysics,” philosophy – or, indeed, analytical 
measure – has no place in this cinema. Instead, he directs viewers to “trust your eyes: 
everything is very clear and very simple. Watch. That’s important. Don’t think about it too 
much.”30  Speaking of Kovács’ study, the director states preference for Jacques Rancière’s 
slim essay-book, The Time After, directly after he calls Kovács’ volume “very long.”31 
                                                          
26 Ibid. p.100. 
27 Kovács, “The World According to Béla Tarr.”  
28 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.142. 
29 Béla Tarr, “”Be More Radical Than Me!”: A Conversation with Béla Tarr,” interview by Martin Kudlac, July 
18, 2016, https://mubi.com/notebook/posts/be-more-radical-than-me-a-conversation-with-bela-tarr 
(Accessed January 30, 2018). 
30 Béla Tarr, interview by Phil Ballard, “In Search of Truth: Béla Tarr interviewed” for Kinoeye 4, no.2 
(March, 2004), www.kinoeye.org.04/02/ballard02.php (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
31 Tarr, interview by Kudlac (2016). 
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Where the current study more frequently refers to Kovács as a source of information, 
and is closer to it in scale, my argument will stake a space closer - in substance more than 
style - to Rancière’s reading. Nadin Mai, who runs the excellent website “The Arts of Slow 
Cinema,” characterises the difference between these two major studies of Tarr according 
to Kovács’ quantitative dissection of the films, against Rancière’s poetic engagement of 
their “quality” and “atmosphere.”32 This engagement is extended beyond the 81 (petite) 
pages of The Time After in a shorter essay that is included in a collection on the subject of 
“Slow Cinema,” and which builds on the ideas of the earlier discussion.33 Rather than as a 
categorical study of Tarr’s oeuvre, Rancière pursues a critical explication of the way that 
these films’ “radical materialism” represents a relationship between politics and 
aesthetics, in an extension of the philosophers broader discourse on this relationship.34 
He looks, in the first place, to the particular (“post-historical”) context of Tarr’s work. 
Rancière situates the director’s films in a transition between historical narratives and 
their corresponding representations of time. He regards them as dealing in “the 
disenchantment regarding the capitalist promise following the collapse of the socialist 
one.”35 This disenchantment responds to the “post-historical” narrative of globalised 
capitalism, which corresponds to “the morose, uniform time of those who no longer 
believe in anything.”36 In the second place, and as an outcome of this context, Rancière 
                                                          
32 Nadin Mai, “Review: Béla Tarr, The Time After – Jacques Rancière,” May 23, 2014, 
https://theartsofslowcinema.com/2014/05/23/review-bela-tarr-the-time-after-jacques-ranciere/ (Accessed 
January 30, 2018). 
33 Rancière, “Béla Tarr: The Poetics and Politics of Fiction,”pp.245-260. 
34 See Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rockhill 
(London; New York: Continuum, 2004). 
35 Rancière, “Béla Tarr: The Poetics and Politics of Fiction,” pp.246. 
36 Rancière, The Time After, p.9. 
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seeks to define “cinema’s proper task” with relation to the form of realism that is 
exemplified by Tarr’s rejection of narrative exigency in favour of a “materialist poetics,” in 
which the experience of time is a central issue.37 In the case of both politics and 
aesthetics, Rancière refers to a gap between the constructed time of narrative and the 
lived time of experience, which he aligns with a corresponding tension between “story” 
and “situation,” and, by this turn, with the distinction between literature and cinema.38 
This echoes a central line in Tarr’s discourse, which my discussion will also interrogate. 
Like Rancière, the director distinguishes between cinema and literature in the generalised 
terms of medium specificity, claiming that film “as a genre” is “primitive” and “concrete,” 
(or, in the philosopher’s terms, sensible and material).39 The director most often 
describes this specificity in terms of a cinematic “language” distinct from literary or 
philosophical proposition. Moreover, Tarr gestures toward the correspondence between 
history, time and narrative that frames Rancière’s study. A repeated phrase in interviews 
with Tarr concerns the repetition of the “same old story, since the Old Testament.”40 The 
director associates this form of “story” with linear narrative (and its resolution), and with 
a chronological conception of time. Tarr prefers “stories” in the plural, which he takes to 
emanate from the material presence of phenomenal reality, and which he likes to refer 
as “metacommunications.”41 It is toward the meaningful presence of landscape, 
environment, faces and bodies that Tarr’s cinema of slowness is oriented, in a way that 
                                                          
37 Ibid. p.49. 
38 Ibid. pp.6-7. 
39 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
40 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
41 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
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will orient my examination of these films.  
 
A Cinema of Poetic Presence 
As with Rancière (and, to a lesser extent, Kovács), this dissertation finds Tarr’s treatment 
of story to be fundamental to the expression of time and materiality in his cinema. 
Against the other studies, however, I take Tarr’s distinction of his cinematic language 
from that which is verbally constituted to be at once instructive and rhetorical in nature. 
The “mature” style through which Tarr achieves this particular distance from “story” 
becomes especially apparent from the point at which Krasznahorkai enters into this 
collaboration, and after a period in which the director had first encountered the writer’s 
work.42 Both Satantango and Werckmeister Harmonies are “adaptations” of 
Krasznahorkai novels (or parts thereof), while The Turin Horse was inspired by one of the 
writer’s essays, and its “screenplay” written by him. Krasznahorkai also developed, with 
Tarr, the script and screenplay for both Damnation and The Man from London; the latter 
adapted from a novel by Georges Simenon, the only “story” in which Krasznahorkai had 
no hand in creation. Another short film, The Last Boat, is based on two short stories from 
the writer.43 Furthermore, dialogue in Tarr’s cinema – and particularly where it tends 
toward digressive speech or pseudo-philosophical excursion, as it often does – has either 
an inimitably Krasznahorkian quality, or is lifted directly from his prose. With verbalisation 
                                                          
42 Tarr, interview by Petkovic (2011). 
43 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.178. 
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so reduced in these films, a special gravity pertains to the appearance of these tracts of 
discourse. The central monologue in Tarr’s near-speechless final film is a forceful example 
of this dynamic. It is intriguing, therefore, how little attention is afforded to the writer’s 
influence by either of Kovács or Rancière. While Kovács does credit Krasznahorkai with 
the introduction of a circular narrative form and time-concept, as stated above, a greater 
significance is accorded, for instance, to the postmodern “pseudo-realistic” aesthetic of 
Pauer. Even where referring to “the shift to highly literary, artificial dialogue” and its 
“very serious consequences regarding the entire stylistic universe of Tarr’s films,” he does 
so with credit to the director rather than the writer, and pays little attention to the 
dialogue itself; only to the uncanny, “pseudo reality” it effects.44 Where Kovács is 
specifically interested in the “vision” of the director in his formalist auteur study, he does 
little to admit the central role of Krasznahorkai in the forming of this perspective. 
Rancière does not undervalue Krasznahorkai’s influence quite so much, but neither does 
he explicitly engage with the writer’s work in his condensed discussions. He repeatedly 
casts Krasznahorkai as “Schopenhauerian,”45 as shorthand for the disillusioned pessimism 
that his stories of false prophets and their false promises imply, and posits these 
narratives against the situations that Tarr extracts from them as the framework for a 
discussion of filmic realism.46 It is perhaps reasonable to concentrate on the explicitly 
cinematic elements of Tarr’s deliberated realisation of a phenomenal world, constituted 
through material and temporal elements. This is especially the case in that the director 
                                                          
44 Ibid. pp.48-49. 
45 Rancière, The Time After, p.31. 
46 Ibid., pp.6-7 
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regularly orients his interlocutors in this direction, and away from any conceptual or 
symbolic understanding of these films; and more so where he commonly frames this 
distinction with explicit reference to Krasznahorkai. A recently published study of Tarr’s 
cinema from Thorsten Botz-Bornstein does appear to admit the influence of 
Krasznahorkai, and to the perspective of melancholy therein. Its focus, however, is on 
Tarr as an exemplar of an “organic cinema” that Botz-Bornstein reads through the 
concept of the organic in architecture and philosophy.47 
Where the director is keen to stress the entirely practical nature of his work - and, 
by extension, the “concrete,” “primitive,” practical nature of cinema itself - the writer 
conceives of his role as lending not only narratives or situations, but “background 
atmosphere” and “philosophical background” to Tarr’s poetics.48 But positioning 
Krasznahorkai as a central figure in the development of these poetics does not diminish 
the role of Tarr. Instead, I will argue that a more enriching sense of the director’s 
“cosmic” perspective can be explicated with reference to ideas in Krasznahorkai’s prose 
writing. In his Satantango and The Melancholy of Resistance, the writer animates 
inanimate nature and draws an equivalence between environment and existence, 
represented as a climactic correspondence between subjects and their experience of the 
world. Throughout Krasznahorkai’s writings and discourse, he gives shape to the notion 
of a “cosmic” commerce within which these affects circulate, forms a melancholic 
                                                          
47 See Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, Organic Cinema: Film, Architecture, and the Work of Béla Tarr (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2017). 
48 László Krasznahorkai, “Against the Brutal, Against the Bad,” interview by James Hopkins, http://www.lit-
across-frontiers.org/transcript/interview-with-laszlo-kraznahorkai/ (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
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perspective of time, history, and “human nature,” and also provides an edifying 
philosophy of aesthetic experience and truth. Krasznahorkai’s speaking of a background 
that is both philosophical and atmospheric, as well as Tarr’s denial of such a background, 
are mutually instructive in this sense. Concepts that can be traced from Krasznahorkai are 
realised and materialised by Tarr in a way that is self-consciously cinematic and, more 
than this, substantially poetic in nature.  
Indeed, in the chapters that follow, Tarr’s cinematic attunement to time, 
materiality, and milieu will be viewed as a mode of poetic experience, which reveals the 
significance of the material stuff of everydayness in an uncanny or extraordinary manner. 
It is an experience oriented toward the encounter with things as such, as material 
presences. It is here that Tarr’s notion of cinematic primitivism and metacommunication 
will be situated, as well as his disenchantment with those forms of knowledge that are 
represented and transmitted through verbal expression. The director’s disassociation of 
his cinema from “story,” and from “philosophical or metaphysical things,” is to be viewed 
as an outcome of the privilege afforded to the encounter with phenomenal presence in 
advance of the interpretation of re-presented meaning. This is an ethics formed against 
the inherent anthropocentrism of the modern, empirical worldview, and its foundation in 
the Cartesian dualism that separates subject from object, essence from substance, and 
the human intellect from sensory being or creaturely life. The separation of meaning 
from material can be placed among the binary oppositions that structure this worldview, 
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which Tarr implies to be a threat to human dignity,49 and which the melancholic 
perspective of his cinema seeks to destabilise. Indeed, the status of the camera in Tarr 
speaks to this notion, in that it mediates between subjects and their environment in a 
way that aligns to neither “subjective” nor “objective” points of view. Rather than 
gesturing toward a premodern primitivism, however, Tarr’s concern with presence is a 
concern with the present. The apocalyptic quality of this cinema – which is, again, a 
recognisable inheritance from Krasznahorkai50 - can be regarded in this relation, and 
given the proper name of a “time of the end,” or messianic time. This is the time in which 
we no longer defer toward a narrative teleology of historical progress or divine 
providence, but instead “truly grasp the present,”51 the now, as if the end had already 
arrived. 
 
Structure 
The first chapter constructs a framework for encountering the material environment and 
affective atmosphere of Tarr’s second period films. It looks to the way that the spectator 
is displaced into the uncanny world of Damnation, as a model for the enduring mode of 
disposition that is realised by this cinema. I will draw on the German language concept of 
                                                          
49 Béla Tarr, “Listening to the World: A Conversation with Béla Tarr,” interview by Matt Levine and Jeremy 
Meckler, March 20, 2012, https://walkerart.org/magazine/bela-tarr-turin-horse (Accessed January 30, 
2018). 
50 As an example, Susan Sontag’s label of “the contemporary Hungarian master of Apocalypse” is 
prominently displayed on the covers of both Satantango and The Melancholy of Resistance. 
51 Giorgio Agamben on Walter Benjamin’s concept of messianic time, cited in Leland de la Durantaye, 
“Homo Profanus: Giorgio Agamben’s Profane Philosophy” in Boundary 2 35, no.3 (Fall 2008), p.47. 
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mood, Stimmung, in order to read the paranarrative expression of Tarr’s cinematic 
environments.  
The prominent position of Stimmung within the writings of Martin Heidegger and 
Walter Benjamin will orient a discussion of this idea of mood, and initiate a running 
engagement with the two thinkers throughout this dissertation. Running in parallel, and 
joining them together, is the philosophy of Agamben, which is deeply influenced by both 
thinkers. Agamben offers a lens through which to consider Heidegger’s poetic truth and 
Benjamin’s messianic nihilism, in addition to his own significant work on political ontology 
and aesthetics. 
The second and third chapter will work in tandem to explicate the issue of Tarr’s 
cinematic language. Each responds to the terminology that the director employs to 
distinguish between his filmic expression and that of Krasznahorkai’s prose. In each 
instance, the core concepts through which the director constructs this distinction will be 
developed in reference to, and revaluation of, two seminal voices from the history of film 
theory. Pier Paolo Pasolini’s theory of poetry and “free indirect subjectivity” will orient 
the notion of cinema’s “primitive language” in the second chapter, while Andre Bazin’s 
discourse on realism will open an encounter with the concept of (“concrete”) presence in 
chapter three. 
The final chapter will draw together concepts from the previous three into an 
exposition of the ideas of rhythm and gesture. The formal, structural qualities of rhythm 
are regarded as the disposition of those elements that animate the being and 
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“mattering” of an artwork. The explication of this idea will centre on a reading of Tarr’s 
final film, The Turin Horse, and especially with reference to the role of music in 
establishing a “common ground” between human and animal. 
It is on the ground of this common place, or ethos, that Tarr stakes the central 
value of his work. The director refers to it as “dignity,” in a recalibration of the central 
premise of Humanism. Tarr’s peculiar approach to the idea, however, unseats the human 
from the centre of the universe in order to realise a cosmic perspective of time, 
materiality, and their affect on human being-in-the-world. The absurd narratives and 
estranging environments of these films appear to be of a morbidly nihilistic character, 
but, as the director himself has suggested, “the more desperate we are, the more hope 
there is.”52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Béla Tarr, “The More Desperate We are, the More Hope There Is,” interview by Robert Chilcott in Vertigo 
3, no.7 (Autumn 2007), p.11. 
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1. “A Peculiar Remaining, Enduring”: Stimmung and the message of milieu. 
 
The style of Béla Tarr is immediately recognisable, and particularly after the turn to its 
“second-period.” With Damnation – and with the core creative ensemble that remains in 
collaboration from this film until the director’s last – a signature aesthetic is formalised. 
Specifically, Tarr’s cinema becomes characterised by a stark minimalism rendered in 
foreboding monochrome and a doom-laden atmosphere, which is encountered within a 
complex choreography of lengthy sequence-shots. It is an unblinking formal engagement 
with situations and durations of existential deprivation, isolation and disquietude, one in 
which the exigencies of conventional narration are dispersed within a renewed focus on 
temporality, materiality and environmental presence. With respect to their treatment of 
time in particular, all of those films succeeding Damnation are commonly classified as 
belonging to the contemporary movement of Slow or Contemplative cinema. This is a 
context in which they are at once seminal and idiosyncratic in style. Where Tarr’s cinema 
shares in a Slow deferral of narrative causality within an emphasis on the integrity of 
lived-time and perception, the evocation of mood and the poetic quality of images, the 
world it presents is at once immersive and estranging. Tarr’s long-takes deliberate within 
degraded physical environments that are pervaded by a constancy of inclement weather 
and an atmosphere of entropy and ennui. The camera seeks to disclose an affectively-
charged milieu in which viewers become displaced, attuned to the expressive qualities of 
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temporality and material presence. Where a mode of perceptual “attunement” and the 
poetic evocation of phenomenal experience are recognisable features of Slow Cinema, 
Tarr‘s intensive approach to these qualities is suggestive of a particular philosophical 
discourse on the German concept of Stimmung, or “mood.” Indeed, considering 
cinematic experience in terms of Stimmung orients a phenomenological perspective on 
the way that viewers are positioned in relation to the affective disposition of a filmic 
world. For Stimmung denotes a dynamic resonance between the human and its 
surrounding world that is associated with physical environment and climate as well as 
musical tone. In this way, it connotes an enveloping, atmospheric quality of experience. 
Often translated as “attunement,” mood-as-Stimmung refers to the tonality of our 
correspondence with a situation, which is at once psychic and physical. Rather than 
acting as a metaphorical designation for a film’s emotional appeal, then, this discourse 
approaches mood as the medium through which the world is encountered. Stimmung is 
considered co-constitutive of perception and understanding in that it shows things – the 
world of things, things in general – to matter (or not), in a significant way. In this sense, 
we might distinguish mood as a structure of experience, a form of perception that does 
not relate directly to any particular object or stimulus, but which determines the tone of 
our encounter with such objects in toto.  
This lack of intentional consciousness constitutes a significant part of the 
conceptual appeal of Stimmung to Walter Benjamin, in that it unseats the conventional 
division of subject from object, consciousness from materiality. This is an approach taken 
by Martin Heidegger also, for whom the integral concept of “being-in-the-world” is 
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necessarily structured by mood or Stimmung, an “attunement” to the “there” which is 
the subject’s access to the world. To Heidegger our attunement is an atmosphere or 
milieu, a “medium for acting and thinking”53 – a designation which, when emphasis is 
placed upon the latter category as a means toward the former, might usefully describe 
one potential of cinematic mood; that is, a medium through which the imminent pathos 
of an emotional tonality can become totalised into an immersive engagement with ethos, 
in the sense of a “dwelling” within the material texture and temporality of a mode of 
being. My contention is that such a cinematic experience can condition a mode of 
thinking, if not an attunement to the world, through the way of seeing it presents. A 
film’s way of disposing us toward a world is in this sense discursive, enabling reflection 
upon the condition of being-in-the-world and, more than this, of being-with (others). This 
is of particular importance in looking at Tarr, in that the poetics of this cinema aim to 
position viewers “inside and outside at the same time,” exploring the vital 
correspondence between an environment and its inhabitants. The camera circulates 
within this milieu, mediating between a human “story” and those “metacommunications” 
that are evinced in an encounter with the intensive qualities of time, atmosphere and 
material presence. It is a milieu that, I will argue, is conditioned in the first place by a 
Stimmung of boredom, a mood that is significant to each of Heidegger and Benjamin in 
their respective critiques of experience in modernity. Boredom in German is Langeweile, 
which translates directly as “long-while,” and which usefully describes the treatment of 
                                                          
53 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William 
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 68. [FCM]. 
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temporality in Tarr’s cinema. But more than “long,” boredom is a relation to time and 
possibility that colours a certain experience of the world, at a socio-historical as much as 
a personal level.  Encountering this mood, “awakening” it, can open new regions of time 
to experience; an experience, moreover, which gestures toward the contemporary 
historical condition that devalues communal and habitual experience (Erfahrung) in the 
proliferation of subjective sensation (Erlebnis). Elsaesser situates post-classical cinema as 
a response to the “failure of experience” in modernity, a normalised medium of shock-
Erlebnis that represents trauma as the pathos of techno-mediated modernity. Against 
this, Tarr’s attunement of melancholic boredom offers an encounter with the time and 
atmosphere of an uncanny world, a significant ethos that seeks to explore and restore a 
more holistic texture of experience. 
 
Stimmung, or Attunement 
Analysing what he refers to as “Slow Cinema,” Jonathan Romney identifies “an increasing 
demand among cinephiles for films that are slow, poetic, contemplative – cinema that 
downplays event in favour of mood, evocativeness and an intensified sense of 
temporality.”54 In such films, emphasis is placed on phenomenal perception rather than 
narrative information, and weighted upon experiential rather than expositive meaning 
structures. Accordingly, such phenomena displace conventional techniques of narrative 
                                                          
54 Jonathon Romney, “Cinema of the 21st Century: In search of lost time” in Sight and Sound 20, no.10 
(2010), p.43. 
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economy in classical storytelling, while more reactively resisting the intensified 
fragmentation of much contemporary continuity editing. Narrative action is reduced and 
withdrawn into rhythms of everydayness, repetition and endurance. Plotlines are de-
centred and diffused instead within a renewed emphasis on holistic phenomenological 
capture, in which atmosphere, mood, and the poetic quality of images become primary 
expressive modes. The sonic component to these images, afforded a corresponding time 
and space, is often likewise emphasised or accentuated for phenomenal affect. In 
speaking of slow cinema’s minimal encounters, Rick Warner identifies their specific force 
as one of “perceptual attunement,” a highly sensitised engagement which can, in his 
suggested cases, “rivet and retrain our perception by drawing us into a particular 
intensity of looking and listening.”55 Such attunement expressively foregrounds an 
awareness of perception, presenting a medium for encountering sensate presence, which 
implies a “certain manner of seeing the world.”56 Suggestively, “attunement” also refers 
to one regular rendition of the German word for mood, Stimmung, a term with a 
semantic richness and corresponding theoretical discourse which is lacking of its English 
equivalent. Stimmung refers to mood not only in the conventional sense of an emotional 
underscore or aesthetic atmosphere – it involves these still – but also as a more distinctly 
vibrational quality, the sense of which inheres in the name itself: its root, Stimm-, also 
forms “voice” (Stimme) and “to tune” ([zu] Stimmen); hence, attunement as a 
transcription of the underlying idea. In highlighting the lack of direct equivalents among 
                                                          
55 Rick Warner, “Filming a Miracle: Ordet, Silent Light, and the Spirit of Contemplative Cinema” in Critical 
Quarterly 57, no.2 (2015), p.67. 
56 Ibid. p.50. 
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the major European languages that can “express the unity of feelings experienced by man 
face to face with his environment (a landscape, Nature, one’s fellow man),” the 
philologist Leo Spitzer explains Stimmung as a condition that can,  
…comprehend and weld together the objective (factual) and the subjective (psychological) into 
one harmonious unity… Stimmung is fused with the landscape, which in turn is animated by the 
feeling of man – it is an indissoluble unit into which man and nature are integrated.57  
Significantly, this “indissoluble unit” is conceived as a pervasive, immersive atmosphere, 
an almost climactic materialisation of affects which is frequently associated with weather 
in addition to musical tone.58 In this way, Stimmung upholds a special relationship with 
environment. Indeed, Spitzer further reflects upon the specifically enveloping character 
of this experiential sensibility by identifying it as a parallel to Milieu; he finds the 
etymological equivalent of “milieu” to be “environment” in English as well as in the 
German “Umwelt” (which translates directly as “around-” or “surrounding-world”).59 
Regarded in this way, Stimmung is an affective tonality that structures our engagement 
with the world, conditioning the sense of its presence by enveloping situation within a 
certain form of perception. That Spitzer takes this term to be “untranslatable”60 does not, 
however, preclude our mobilising the significant ways of thinking about affectivity that 
resonate within the idea of Stimmung, or by its rendition as “attunement.” Critically, 
                                                          
57 Leo Spitzer, “Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the 
Word “Stimmung”: Part I” in Traditio 2 (1944), p.411. 
58 Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism (Cambridge & London; 
Harvard University Press, 2008), p.22.   
59 Leo Spitzer, “Milieu and Ambiance: An Essay in Historical Semantics” in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 3, no.1 (September, 1942), p.2. 
60 Spitzer, “Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony,” p.411. 
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Stimmung connotes a unity of “factuality” and “psychology” that unseats the divide 
between “subject” and “object,” mediating between them, if not bringing their apparent 
disunion into question. Its “tuning” connotes heterogeneous elements brought into 
correspondence, and so - in terms of mood - the tempering of an interior experience and 
its external conditioning, of subjective and objective “realities,” of physical space and 
psyche. In this regard, temper/ament is the concept in our own language that most 
closely parallels this broader equivalence between a state of being and musical harmony 
(but without the same experiential connotations, or contemporary currency).  
The connection between the German language’s conception of mood-as-
attunement – as a concert of human and environment, “subjective” and “objective” 
spheres – and a cinema involved in the evocation of mood and atmosphere becomes, in 
these terms, a substantial matter. It is also in regards to this conception that we can 
engage the prominent position of Stimmung within the thinking of both Martin Heidegger 
and Walter Benjamin. As Illit Ferber demonstrates, and despite a mutual antipathy 
towards the work of one other, these thinkers occupy common ground in attempts to 
account for a structure of experience, contra Kant, which might overcome the subject-
object divide of empirical epistemology.61 In this, each sought to de-privilege those forms 
of knowledge prescribed by the traditional authority of subjectivity over a world of 
objects, as exemplified by intentional consciousness and empirical-scientific method. To 
Heidegger, a formulation of the inter-determinacy of “subject” and “object,” human and 
                                                          
61 Illit Ferber, “Stimmung: Heidegger and Benjamin” in Sparks Will Fly: Benjamin and Heidegger, eds. 
Andrew Benjamin & Dimitri Vardoulakis (Albany: SUNY, 2015), pp.68-70. 
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world, is famously figured in his concept of their enmeshment in “being-in-the-world.”62 
Neither polarity is given primacy, so much as they are rendered as a holistic relational 
totality. In this, the subject is not independent from a world of objects, but is instead 
always-already outside itself, involved in the world and an interpretation of it. Da-sein 
(being-there) is the name Heidegger gives to individual existence, in order to denote the 
subject’s essential situatedness in a human context.63 In this, Dasein can be said to exist 
only insofar as it stands out (ek-sists) into the world, the “there” that is Dasein’s 
involvement in the structure of meaning and possibilities that articulate human 
existence. In this view, the world does not stand over and against the subject as a source 
of objects for knowledge, but is instead the presuppositional context of understanding 
that enables knowledge in the first place. “World” is the matrix of meaningful 
understanding into which we are disposed as historical subjects, and by which things take 
on their purposeful significance to Dasein.64 Significantly, Heidegger takes Stimmung, 
mood-as-attunement, to condition the nature of Dasein’s experience of being-in-the-
world, determining the manner in which things are encountered and so the way they 
become intelligible. Prior to experience and the condition of its possibility, Stimmungen 
reveal one’s Befindlichkeit, which translates directly as “how-one-finds-oneself-ness,” but 
more usefully as “situatedness” or “disposition.”65 It is in this way that moods are 
disclosive. Attunement is the tenor of our exposure to being-in-the-world, the way that 
                                                          
62 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1985), pp.78-79. [BT] 
63 Ibid. pp.26-28. 
64 Ibid. p.33. 
65 For a discussion of this translation, see Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1995), p.168. 
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we correspond with this situation – the way that it “speaks” to us, and so the way that we 
comport ourselves to it in return. To Heidegger, Stimmungen are neither internal nor 
external, residing neither within a psyche nor in the world itself, but instead as the 
threshold between being and world.66 Heidegger says, “A mood assails us. It comes 
neither from ‘outside’ nor ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such 
Being.”67 In regards to this statement, Stephen Mulhall posits that Heidegger is not only 
suggesting the not wholly subjective nature of Stimmung, but that, “it also, and more 
fundamentally, implies that moods put the very distinction between inside and outside, 
subjectivity and objectivity, in question.”68 Attunement allows things to show themselves 
as meaningful, or not, in a specific way – in this, we might view it as a medium of 
experience, as the milieu in which the world is present, and through which we comport 
ourselves to the possibilities that structure our interpretation of it. 
Both Benjamin and Heidegger seek to challenge the authority of the dominant 
model of subjectivity, which is placed over and against a world of objects rather than with 
regard to the experience of meaningful commerce we have with them.69 But Benjamin’s 
interest in Stimmung is both more diffuse within the context of his work and turns in a 
direction separate to that of Heidegger. Less systematic in approach than Heidegger’s 
ontological critique, Benjamin’s engagement is with mood as an optic through which to 
                                                          
66 Ferber goes so far as to suggest that we conceive of Stimmung as the hyphens structuring the formation 
“being-in-the-world.” See Ferber, “Stimmung: Heidegger and Benjamin,” p.76. 
67 Heidegger, BT, p.176. 
68 Stephen Mulhall, “Can There be an Epistemology of Moods?” in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 
41 (September, 1996), p.199. 
69 The oppositional structuring of this model is given clearer expression in German, where the English term 
“object” is denoted by Gegenstand - that which “stands against.” 
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think about historical structures of knowledge and experience (in their relation to 
“Truth”). In “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” Benjamin challenges the formal 
structures of Kant’s epistemological account of experience, seeking to collapse the 
empirical viewpoint of a subjective consciousness.70 Benjamin seeks to think affect and 
experience from a position exterior to Kant’s a priori structure of the spatio-temporal 
intuition of objects of knowledge, and, so, without limiting experience to a framework of 
means-ends intentionality.71 Indeed, Benjamin’s early “Program” thus pre-empts his 
longstanding engagement with the relations between means and ends, and their 
disentanglement into a “pure means” which is emancipated from teleological ends (and, 
so, their pre-determination).72 Against the empirical structure of subjective 
consciousness, Benjamin posits an alternative that would begin from the separation of 
knowledge and experience, so that the latter may not be constrained by the judgements 
of the former. This is an idea explicated by Giorgio Agamben, who shows that, in the 
model of empirical consciousness, knowledge and experience become conflated, where 
in earlier conceptions they had been separate inspirations; experience a matter of (a) 
common sense, knowledge of the active intellect.73 Agamben calls this “the expropriation 
of experience,” the displacement of its embodied authority on to technical means of 
                                                          
70 Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” trans. Mark Ritter in Selected Writings 
Vol.1: 1913-1926, eds. Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1996), pp.100-110.  
71 Implicit in this, Ferber points out, is a rebuff to the split between subject and object preserved in the 
intentional structure of Husserl’s phenomenological method – another foot on common ground with 
Heidegger. See Ferber, “Stimmung: Heidegger and Benjamin,” p.71. 
72 Given expression in Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 
pp.277-300. 
73 Giorgio Agamben, “Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience” in Infancy and 
History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 2007), p.20. 
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verification, transforming the burden of experience from a matter of existence to one of 
scientific method.74 Shifting toward his later writings on melancholy in the Baroque 
Trauerspiel, Benjamin posits that, “the object of knowledge,”  
…determined as it is by the intention inherent in the concept, is not the truth. Truth is an 
intentionless state of being, made up of ideas. The proper approach to it is therefore not one of 
intention and knowledge, but rather a total immersion and absorption in it. Truth is the death of 
intention.75   
It is this imminent absorption in a “state of being,” which is without an object and cannot 
be possessed by knowledge, that marks out a vital connection in Benjamin between 
Stimmung and Truth. He saw the Kantian model of the subjective conditions of 
knowledge as furnishing a notion of experience that, in its restriction to the empirical 
consciousness of a realm of present objects, is emptied of meaning and significance.76 It 
is in this direction that Benjamin looks to tie in this notion of Stimmung to a historical 
materialism, in order to critique a perceived poverty of experience in the modern age –
it’s “atrophy”77 – and the ways in which empirical consciousness limits the range of 
legitimate experience within it. He thus comes to think of Stimmungen in their relation to 
a situation and its historical consciousness, most significantly in his analysis of the 
structure of Baroque melancholy in The Origin of German Tragic Drama; but also in 
thinking of experience and boredom in the context of modernity. Benjamin enlists 
                                                          
74 Ibid. p.22. 
75 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 2009), p.36. 
76 Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” pp.100-101. 
77 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn 
(London: Collins/Fontana, 1973), p.161. 
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notions of Stimmung, and particularly the attunements of boredom and melancholy, to 
conceptualise the way that moods are historically embedded models that structure 
experience (as much as they are an affective response to it). In so doing, Benjamin 
presents capitalist modernity as the site of an increasingly profound rift, to be addressed 
below, between the distinct modes of “experience” found in German, Erfahrung and 
Erlebnis. Erfahrung refers to experience as a continuous and totalising process of 
understanding integrated over time and history, as in life experience or that of a 
community, while Erlebnis implies a succession of transitory lived events, such as in 
experiences of novelty or sensation. To Benjamin, the collective, connective texture of 
experience has become devalued, “atrophied,” in an age of subjectivised shock, 
sensation, and the disconnection it effects.78 In terms specific to the subject of mood that 
I will return to at the end of this chapter, Erlebnis and Erfahrung can be read in alignment 
with the distinction between pathos and ethos in their original denotation.79 By this I 
refer to the distinction between a singularly affective passion, in contrast to the forms of 
understanding that mark the borders of a common-place, or world.   
The most significant aspect of Stimmung to each of Heidegger and Benjamin is its 
mediating presence, issuing neither from a subjective centre of intention nor from a 
discrete world of external objects, but instead comprising and conditioning the context of 
their more fluid phenomenal encounter. To each of these theorists, thinking through 
                                                          
78 Idem. 
79 Robert Beekes, Etymological Dictionary of Greek (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010). The definition of pathos 
(p.1142) is related to “incident, experience…;emotion, passion…,” while ethos (p.511) relates to “custom, 
usage…accustomed place.” It is in this sense that I will follow a common interpretation of ethos as 
“dwelling,” and pathos as “passion.” 
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Stimmung promises to account for the ways in which perception and judgement could be 
said to be affected by the ways in which we relate to our situation, our being-situated in a 
historical “there.” To Heidegger our attunement is a “medium for acting and thinking”80 – 
a designation which, when emphasis is placed upon the category of thinking as a 
foundation for action, might usefully describe the ethical potential of a cinema that takes 
mood to be a primary condition of experience of the world; it is for this reason, perhaps, 
that Contemplative Cinema has been offered as an alternative to the potentially 
pejorative Slow Cinema. Furthermore, this is a cinema in which the pathos of an 
emotional tonality is transfigured into an encounter with ethos, a (mode of) “dwelling.”81 
It is an immersion within a totalised milieu – an engagement with the temporality of a 
situation and an environment, which attunes us to a certain mode (if not quality) of 
being. This is not to say that we might stake our consideration of melancholic boredom in 
Tarr wholly upon Heidegger’s schema of attunement, so much as to suggest that those 
notions underpinning a philosophical discourse on Stimmung are conceptually rich in 
their application to a certain kind of cinematic experience. Thinking in terms of one’s 
becoming immersed in an atmosphere and a situation, to which one becomes attuned, 
and through which a certain way of thinking about (or relating to) the world becomes 
disclosed – these notions might usefully describe, or at least be generatively deployed in 
relation to, mood in the cinema of Tarr. It is in this sense that we might encounter Tarr’s 
cinema through Heidegger’s key descriptions of Stimmung, and particularly where he 
                                                          
80 Heidegger, FCM, p.68. 
81 The origin of ethos with “dwelling” (as in, a home or “accustomed place”) is recognised not only by 
Heidegger, but is “dwelled” upon by him more than others.  
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associates mood with a kind of atmospheric force that conditions our encounter with the 
world. For instance, in a rich formulation of the idea that also manages to evoke the 
social and ethical dimensionality of attunement, Heidegger states,  
Attunements are not side-effects, but are something which in advance determine our being with 
one another. It seems as though an attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, like an 
atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through 
and through.82  
Not only does this accord with the significant role given to climactic atmosphere within 
Tarr but it also reflects the way in which a sense of mood might be said to appear therein. 
It is worthwhile to note, in this context, that “attunement” as it is ordinarily conceived in 
English is near-synonymous with “acclimatisation” – both of them speaking to a 
sensitivity toward environment. In Tarr’s cinema, sound and images of climate are 
constant and palpably affective means of representing and conditioning the atmospheric 
tonality to which we are exposed. The sound design is deliberately disquieting, often 
evidently artificial and repetitive, with some form of aural underscore only rarely abating 
entirely – whether as the ambient humming of a synthesised drone, in Mihály Víg’s often 
dirgelike musical scores, or in the expressive foregrounding of otherwise ostensibly 
naturalistic, diegetic sound. In each case, sound imbues the image with a texture of 
rhythmic constancy or a cyclical patterning of aural pressure. This is most often produced 
by the prominent resonances of natural processes: the unending rain and wind that form 
the climactic atmosphere of these films’ worlds are combined into an audio-visual 
                                                          
82 Heidegger, FCM, p.67. 
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consistency, which conditions our experience of this environment. These invoke a 
potentially penetrating synaesthetic envelopment, shared with the characters, which 
aligns with an essential feature and appeal of the category of Stimmung: that it belongs 
neither solely to objective facticity or internal psychology, but refers instead to the 
affective tonality with or within which the world is encountered. In this, Stimmung is a 
totalising structure of experience which one inhabits and mediates. It discloses the world 
as a whole in a particular way, to which one responds or corresponds; to respond in a 
musical analogy, this might be soft or loud, consonant or dissonant, in a major or minor 
key.  
Mood in Tarr is not simply a matter of an interior psychology, of causal 
motivations or their objective attachments. We find here instead something of an 
existential situation or state of being, one that is shared among those collected in its 
milieu (even where delimited by proximity to a central protagonist-figure). Moods, as 
“already there,” act as a frame of access to the world, one that is not preconditioned in 
terms of a subjective consciousness, but which is instead that medial atmosphere 
through which a particular perspective of the world is given. As addition to this allusion, 
we might note the extensive linkage made by Benjamin of certain atmospherics (rain, fog, 
dust) to that Stimmung of boredom which will become our primary focus in the 
subsequent discussion.83 Not only do these forces present an atmosphere as the medium 
or milieu by which each of us, character and spectator, are situated, immersed and 
                                                          
83 See Walter Benjamin “Convolute D [Boredom, Eternal Return]” in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard 
Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2002), p.101.  
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attuned; they are conceived by Tarr himself to be co-constitutive of his films’ dramaturgy. 
The director states in a number of interviews that not only people serve as characters 
within his films, but that the weather, landscape and time also play major or even equal 
roles.84 Before moving on to identifying this notion particularly within Tarr’s image, we 
might last of all pay heed to the idea of immersion as it is first alluded to in the above 
quote, “an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then 
attunes us through and through.” More than simply atmospheric, this notion of 
immersion is also and perhaps more profoundly figured in Benjamin, as foreshadowed 
above in connection to Truth. Benjamin posits Truth as having a particular ideational 
character, which cannot be subsumed within the judgements of knowledge, but which 
presents itself instead through an immersion within the arrangement (disposition) of 
meanings and attachments by which things become articulated for experience. As 
Benjamin states in the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to Trauerspiel, “truth-content is only 
to be grasped through immersion in the most minute details of subject-matter.”85 Where 
he is speaking in this context of mosaic, whose fragmentation we could take to find 
equivalence in a montage cinema, this does not preclude the resonance of this 
immersion in the minutiae of subject-matter with a cinema whose central subject matter 
is an environed experience of attunement. Tarr’s cinema is consciously immersive, “close 
to you,” emphasising atmosphere, texture, and materiality within what Kovács calls a 
“radical continuity”86 of time and space. It enacts a deliberated encounter with/in the 
                                                          
84 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
85 Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, p.29. 
86 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.114. 
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presence of an estranged world, an attunement to its existential texture. To literary 
theorist Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, and resonating with Warner’s formulation, reading 
Stimmung is to, “encounter otherness in intense and intimate ways.”87 Gumbrecht points 
out in this connection, that each of sound and climate are dimensions of our physical 
reality: forms of pressure that both constantly “surround,” but also “happen” upon, our 
corporeal being, making their presence felt.88 It is in this way that Stimmung at once 
encompasses and penetrates lived bodies as an affective milieu, but it is also why an 
aesthetics of Stimmung functions as a specific medium of embodied cinematic affect. In 
this direction, Robert Sinnerbrink has posed Stimmung as an alternative to established 
and largely cognitivist positions on cinematic mood. Broadly, these theories tend to see 
moods as diffuse affective states which work to induce audience responses of emotion or 
cognition, guiding viewers toward an understanding of narrative content or character 
actions.89 Sinnerbrink highlights the historical importance of Stimmung as an aesthetic 
principle for early film theorists such as Béla Balazs and Lotte Eisner, and seeks to 
reinscribe it as a contemporary figure of thought able to frame a phenomenological 
perspective on cinematic mood.90 Sinnerbrink’s own formulation has an instructively 
Heideggerian turn of phrase, in which moods in cinema, and particularly those that 
“ground” our viewing position, can serve a “disclosive” function: revealing and expressing 
                                                          
87 Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, Atmosphere, Mood, Stimmung: On a Hidden Potential of Literature, trans. H. Erik 
Butler (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p.13. 
88 Ibid. p.4. 
89 Robert Sinnerbrink, “Stimmung: exploring the aesthetics of mood” in Screen 2, no.53 (Summer 2012), 
p.151. 
90 Ibid. pp.149-150. 
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the character of a cinematic world.91 These, he says, have the ability to pervade a film as 
a whole, positioning the viewer within a relationship of shared affective attunement.92 
Stimmung seen in this way is not simply an underscore or backgrounded frame of 
representation, but a constitutive aesthetic environment into which one enters into 
affective dialogue.  
 
Framing Disposition 
To speak, then, of this manner of deliberation within the world(s) of Béla Tarr is to speak 
of an immersion in a state of being that is represented as a situation and a situatedness, 
an atmosphere and a temporality. The particular tonality of this concord can be regarded 
as a grounding topos, a milieu which structures and mediates our encounter with the 
disclosure of “world.” Viewed in terms that reflect the situatedness of mood, this 
paranarrative topos grounds a fundamental form of disposition, in which we are entered 
and to which we are attuned. It is in this direction that I turn to a focus on landscape as a 
fruitful example of a broader cinematic poetics that seeks to decentre the narrative 
emphasis on causal agency and subjectivised psychology in favour of a more immersive 
encounter within a milieu. Landscape is given specific form by the establishing shot of 
Damnation, which forms the entrance to the second period Tarr. This shot serves not 
only as a primary example of the figural use of landscape as a constitutive force within 
                                                          
91 Ibid. 156. 
92 Ibid. 158. 
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the evocation of a disposition – one that reverberates between the film’s world and the 
viewer’s experience of or attunement to it – but also of the figuration of the gaze of 
melancholic boredom that becomes a defining feature in Tarr’s cinema. To begin, a long 
take in black-and-white shows an industrial cable-car system stretching off into the 
distance above a barren vista. The points of reference for this vast apparatus, its origins 
and ends, are withheld by the expanse of its dimension, but its continuous motions imply 
a mechanically assured cycle. Partially obscured by distance, a rain-laden atmosphere, 
and a grayscale tending toward indistinction at its limits, our eye is nevertheless drawn 
into the depths of this degraded landscape and toward the point where this coursing of 
steel and wires descends beneath the horizon, splitting the dimension between earth and 
sky as it does. To its right lies a flat, unbroken horizontal expanse; to the left, a rising 
prominence, perhaps formed of the accumulating materials carted in its direction, and 
behind which the human edifice disappears. As we watch, the camera draws back 
gradually - almost imperceptibly at first - and, over the course of three-and-a-half 
minutes, slowly opens the frame to reveal our looking onto this scene through a window. 
The camera continues to recede slowly, so that the window’s frame is fully realised and 
then, behind it, an unlit room is shown to be our apparent setting. We rotate slightly in 
coming to rest behind the darkened head of a seated figure, staring out, it would seem, 
into this distance. The procession of cable-cars hum, groan and churn continuously, while 
the man takes a long draw on his cigarette. Silhouetted against this view, motionless, 
watching the cycle of departure and its inevitable return, we are first presented with our 
as-yet faceless protagonist, Karrer, by being interpolated into his own passive position, 
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his world and this watching of it. In this way his visage becomes something like the dark 
imprint of a reversed Rückenfigur,93 affixed to a landscape whose inspiration is decidedly 
mundane, in the sense of being both monotonous and earthbound. Unlike that 
fundament of Romantic landscape painting, however, here we begin with the landscape 
and work back toward a given viewing position; but, as with the Rückenfigur - which 
serves to furnish a point of entry into a landscape through a human subject’s position, 
but not an identification with them as an individual subject - our own entrance is Karrer’s 
entrancement, this captivation by the horizon and a fusion with it of our own. For in 
viewing such a film as intends to make a claim on us as participants, we are ourselves 
disposed to the disclosure of a world, displaced within it, in order to mediate its relation 
to our own. As such, we become situated at the outset within the atmosphere and 
temporality which are the medium of experience within this environment. 
 
 
                                                          
93 The Rückenfigur is a device most commonly associated with Caspar David Friedrich and German 
Romantic landscape painting. Conventionally, the Rückenfigur is a person placed in the foreground of a 
landscape painting, seen from behind, in whose position the viewer is intended to interpolate. 
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To think here of our becoming “disposed” to this environment is to make implicit 
reference to “disposition,” which is more explicitly related to notions of mood. In either 
form, there is a tangible connection to be drawn from their shared etymology in English – 
from Latin and through French, and denoting a putting or placing apart, a way of being 
positioned or oriented.94 Where the noun “disposition” itself appears first of all in 
reference to an order or arrangement, commensurate with the Latin stem disponere (to 
put in order, to arrange), its extension into the sense of psychical-emotional inclination 
would appear to stem from an early deployment of the word in reference to the 
determining effect of the (ordering of the) planets in astrology.95 Without staking its use 
on a faithfulness to astrology itself, it is significant that from this idea of planetary 
influence derives a resonant lineage in our language, of the saturnine, jovial, martial, 
venereal and mercurial as bearing this historical link between conceptions of the cosmos 
and the moods or temperaments of earthly beings. The implicit sense of this notion of 
cosmic influence, however, is not entirely to be dismissed, where it bears a metaphorical 
link to one’s having an inclination toward, or being under the influence of, a sovereign 
body (whether literal or figurative). This notion is recognised by Agamben in his account 
of the Foucauldian dispositif, or “apparatus.”96 For Foucault, dispositifs are structures of 
                                                          
94 “disposition, n.,” OED Online, January 2018 (Oxford University Press), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/55123?redirectedFrom=disposition ; via link to “dispone, v.” (Accessed 
January 27, 2008). 
95 Idem. 
96 Agamben presents the idea in two slightly different forms. It is the title essay in: Giorgio Agamben, What 
is an Apparatus?, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2009), pp.1-24. An earlier version of the same text was presented as a lecture at the European Graduate 
School: Giorgio Agamben “What is a Dispositive? 2005,” 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ua7ElsQFZPo&list=PLD799D53E8DE691A6. (Accessed January 29, 2018).  
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knowledge or strategic networks of mechanisms through which relations of “power” are 
inscribed, exercised and maintained.97 Agamben attempts an expansion of dispositif via a 
retranslation according to the English “dispositor”:  “the law of the astrological sign 
[which] embodies all of the forces and influences that the planets exerts on individuals, 
inclining them, binding and restraining them in all possible ways.”98  Where Foucault 
takes institutions such as schools, prisons and madhouses as examples of dispositifs, 
Agamben expands this scope toward, “literally anything that has in some way the 
capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviours, opinions or discourses of living beings.”99 An apparatus viewed in these 
terms is any non-living device (whether physically constituted or not) which mediates or 
conditions the life of living beings100 – up to and including the transmissions of language, 
human being-in-language101 (an idea that will be returned to in the final chapter). It is in 
this sense that the idea of disposition can be mobilised as a productive terminology in 
reference to the way in which a state of mind or mood might be said to “assail us” - to 
always-already affect our constitution, to posit an orientation toward a situation through 
                                                          
An accurate transcription of this video can be found at: 
https://eclass.upatras.gr/modules/document/file.php/ARCH213/Agamben%20Dispositor.pdf. (Accessed 
January 29, 2018). 
97 Foucault gives his clearest expression of the idea in: Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh” in 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin 
Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp.194-195.  
98 Agamben, “What is a Dispositive?” (2005). 
99 Idem. 
100 It is significant, in this sense, that Agamben compares “apparatus” etymologically and conceptually with 
Heidegger’s Gestell, “enframing,” the latter of which denotes the way in which the modern worldview 
relates to (or “reveals”) the world of things in a technological or scientific mode of knowledge, 
consummate with empirical consciousness. For Heidegger’s discussion of the concept, see “The Question 
Concerning Technology” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, 
(New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1977), pp.3-35.  
101 Agamben, “What is a Dispositive?” (2005). 
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the way in which it appears to us. As Agamben notes,102 and as Heidegger infers at one 
point,103 mood can be conceived as a displacement in that it reveals our being 
fundamentally “not at home” in the world, disclosing our being “thrown” into a historical 
context that is not of our making. In that we are always exposed to an attunement, a 
certain mediating presence through which the world is opened, Stimmungen show that 
Dasein is never at one with Being or with world. As such, Agamben points out that the 
consonance and harmony of dispositive Stimmung is at the same time a dissonance and a 
scission.104 Indeed, this might be extended to think of experience in this cinema as one in 
which our participation as viewers is an inhabiting of a perception and an intentionality 
that is not entirely our own. One is positioned or situated as a participant in this cinema, 
displaced within a milieu and a way of seeing as means of contemplating a certain quality 
of experience. In speaking here of disposition, then, I think both of a displacement within 
a filmic world and the orientation positing the mode through which we correspond with 
it. 
In relation to this immersion in disposition, physical environments take on a 
primary function. In Tarr’s cinema, setting and, especially, the landscape is said to appear 
as a character in his films.105 This is a concept the director has expressed repeatedly in 
interviews, where he stresses that the face of a landscape has the same importance to 
                                                          
102 Giorgio Agamben, “Vocation and Voice”, trans. Jeff Fort in Qui Parle 10, no.2 (Spring/Summer 1997), 
p.93. 
103 Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,” trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz & Andre Schuwer (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp.139-140. 
104 Agamben, “Vocation and Voice,” p.95. 
105 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
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him as the face of an actor.106 And while Tarr repeats as often a denial of there being two 
separate periods in his oeuvre, in speaking of Damnation with Emile Breton, in an 
interview itself cited by Kovács and worth quoting at length here, the director states: 
This was when I wanted to have a different approach to cinema. To me this is a landscape film. … 
Fundamentally, the question is how you can bring life into the picture independently of narration. 
It is due to this film that I came to realise that the narrative has no importance whatsoever…What 
interested me in a scene was the falling rain, the awaiting for the most banal event to happen. I 
think the story in the film could be told in twenty minutes. For me, the important things are the 
time, the sky, the cranes, the machines in a factory, the gaze.107 
In this, we find a number of points of contact with mood and environment. The first is the 
admission that Damnation represents a different approach to cinema than in his earlier 
films, and, more than this, that this is an approach conceived of by the director as 
nominally concerning environment, a “landscape film.” The incorporation of the 
landscape into Tarr’s cinema, in its concurrence with the incorporation of László 
Krasznahorkai into the director’s company, will be explicated further in the next chapter; 
it is expressly for this reason that the current argument responds to Tarr’s second period, 
beginning with this film. The second point of contact, already alluded to, is a disavowal of 
narrative density (“story”) and the conventions of its representation, the fragmenting of 
time and space into slices of “information” (a classical continuity). In its place, a holistic 
                                                          
106 Béla Tarr, “Turin Horse,” interview by Sean Welsh, June 23, 2011, 
https://edinburghfestival.list.co.uk/article/35180-turin-horse-bela-tarr-interview/ (Accessed January 29, 
2018). 
107 Emile Breton, ‘’Quelques jalons dans une oeuvre vouee au noir’’ in Vertigo 41 (2001), p.100. Cited in 
Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, n.1, p.71. 
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phenomenological continuity seeks to bring life – sky, rain, waiting, watching – “into the 
picture.” Where this is by no means a definitive or entirely unproblematic 
characterisation of the director’s work, and will become clearer later in connection with 
Benjamin’s “The Storyteller,” it nevertheless serves as a tangible indication of the poetic 
emphasis that structures the experience of environment in Tarr. Rather than relating to a 
schema of causally motivated actions, the milieu presents a medium of disposition in an 
encounter with those presences – material, temporal, atmospheric - that co-constitute 
the “life” of an environment. Both aligned in each case with a central protagonist and yet 
undertaking autonomous, “anthropomorphic”108 movement in the service of 
investigating the milieu to which that protagonist is disposed, the camera mediates 
between these centres of intentionality and renders them neutral. Speaking of The Man 
from London, but with regard to a central disposition that is effected throughout his 
cinema, Tarr stresses that, “the camera is inside and outside at the same time.”109 Kovács 
echoes this sentiment in his reading of Damnation, and takes this position to reflect the 
status of Tarr’s characters – all of them “outsiders,” all of them inextricably linked to an 
(uncanny) environment with which they share a “textural similarity”;110 where, “the 
bodies and faces of the characters” are “part of the material environment.”111 This is one 
way of viewing the specific mechanics of Tarr’s long-take. The camera perambulates as if 
embodied of its own consciousness, an omniscient observer that surveys the scene and 
                                                          
108 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.50. 
109 Tarr, “Temptation Harbour,”p.55. 
110 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.60. 
111 Ibid. p.63. 
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positions us within it in a particular way, among its minutiae and material textures. It is, 
at the same time, decidedly engaged in the disclosure of a subject’s relation to their 
physical environment, a form of paranarrative narration that represents their inextricable 
enmeshment within it. 
 
  
Figure 2 
 
Jacques Rancière suggests in relation to Damnation’s opening sequence that Tarr 
“films the manner in which things cling to the individual…that surround, penetrate, or 
reject them.”112 The gravity of the camera is drawn less toward the presentation of causal 
activity in either of speech or physical interaction, so much as to an immersion within the 
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locus through which these take place: the ground of possibility in which they emerge. But 
this is not a matter of setting a scene, or a plot, in that, as Rancière asserts, “action is 
ultimately only the effect of what they see and feel.”113  In a palpable sense, the camera 
seeks to present the ways in which characters are actively imposed upon by the bearing 
of their physical environment, that which embodies the existential situation in which they 
are situated, and in which they find themselves. As both Daniel Frampton and Kovács 
identify, there is a tendency from Damnation on for shots in which no human subject is 
initially present, but which reveal them either through the camera’s movement or by 
intersection with theirs.114 The camera seeks not to frame a direct access to action or 
agent so much as to locate them within the “pure relationship”115 of their environment. 
The above is a first example of this tendency (at a critical juncture in the development of 
Tarr’s work). The opening sequence of The Man from London similarly interpolates us 
into a position of observation, slowly ascending from the waterline, scaling the prow of a 
ship before rising through the floor as we join our protagonist Maloin in his watchtower; 
the camera’s alignment with his point of view is, however, made ambiguous – at one turn 
scanning across the window, then returning in a close frame that reveals (and tracks 
with) Maloin’s profile, before re-entering and re-surveying the harbour as an observer of 
a scene unfolding in the surrounds. Where this is the most conventional establishment of 
causality in Tarr’s later oeuvre, it critically disposes us into the particular time, 
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atmosphere and texture of Maloin’s daily existence, while positioning us “inside and 
outside at the same time.” But as well as these shots where a subject enters an “empty” 
frame, Tarr frequently displays the inverse tendency also, sustaining an image of 
departure for long enough that its subjects have receded into blurs on the horizon of the 
landscape. This is a notable feature of Satantango, by some way the longest of these 
films, in which “dead time” accumulates through extended sequences of walking (and not 
only them). Where these at points track closely behind (as with our initial introduction to 
Irimias and Petrina) or in front (as in Estike’s “death march”), there are a number of 
instances where the camera remains fixed while a human figure is swallowed up at the 
limits of a landscape, or tracks away in order to effect the same withdrawal. In The Turin 
Horse, too – a film in which we enter a “dwelling” and remain there throughout - we 
watch as our protagonists depart over the hill that is their horizon (followed shortly after, 
in the same shot, by their return). In each case, and whether in a mobile sequence (of 
movement) or with a fixed frame, an equivalence is drawn between an environment and 
those that exist there, between a milieu and the disposition it effects.  
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Figure 3.7 
 
Figure 3.8 
More than merely a backdrop, then, the physical environment and its constitutive 
milieu come to embody something of a state of mind, an affective plane that addresses 
us as viewers, by which we are situated and toward which we are comported. As a 
concept (or even as metaphor), the formulation of this idea has a strong precedence with 
Tarr’s compatriot and early film theorist, Béla Balazs, who states, “Landscape is a 
physiognomy, a face that all at once, at a particular spot, gazes out at us. A face that 
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seems to have a deep emotional relationship to human beings.”116 Balazs directly 
addresses the inter-related phenomena of landscape and mood in cinema:   
Since films sets out to depict human destinies rather than to assist the teaching of geography, 
‘nature’ cannot appear as a neutral reality. It is always a setting, a background for a scene, and its 
task is to convey, underscore and accompany its mood…just as painting is an art because it 
provides more than just a photographically accurate copy of nature, so film too has the 
paradoxical task of using the camera to paint images of mood…For what matters in the work of art 
is that the entire picture should be the product of a single conception and that nature, the setting, 
should have the same atmosphere as the story that is being told…nature in film is an organic 
component of the story…In general, film has up to now made far too little use of the poetic 
possibilities of having the landscape join in the drama as a living soul, an active participant, so to 
speak…117  
Some minor points of context are worth noting here in expanding on the phenomenon of 
attunement in Tarr. Balazs, though Hungarian by birth, was of German descent, writing in 
German, and speaking of “mood” in terms of Stimmung.118 That he is speaking expressly 
of silent film, and in service of the critical movement advocating for its recognition as an 
artform, is also significant given that Tarr has been associated with a silent era 
aesthetic.119 Without going further into that too-simple comparison, we might still 
recognise an illustrative commonality of certain features that would allow for that 
evaluation in a broad sense, and so enable this association with Balazs’ discourse on 
                                                          
116 Béla Balazs, Early Film Theory: Visible Man and The Spirit of Film, trans. Rodney Livingstone (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2010), p.53. 
117 Ibid. p.52-53. 
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silent cinema. Most obvious is a shared use of monochrome, but, more than this, a lack 
of spoken dialogue - as totality for the silent cinema, and in a heavily reduced fashion 
with Tarr. That this disables the communication of auditory information necessitates an 
emphasis on graphic, gestural, and tactile imaging, toward which Tarr has stated (and 
practiced) preference. “Metacommunication”, the director says,”…is more important 
than verbal communication.”120 But where the silent cinema (an unwieldy concept, given 
its sheer bulk of individual instances) can be said to have developed visual strategies for 
the elaboration of story in lieu of audible information, Tarr’s rarefied aesthetic and 
reticence toward directive dialogue seeks to disavow story in favour of a steadied focus 
upon the material world. Cinema, says Tarr, is a “concrete” medium, a “primitive” 
language.121 Phenomenal reality becomes in this way a source of concrete visual 
narration that expands beyond a framework of directed action, where “the story is 
always part of the image…The question lies in where you put the emphasis on what’s 
most important.”122 What concerns us most, in the allusions drawn by Balazs, are the 
formulation of film’s “task of using the camera to paint images of mood,” and also the 
equivalence he draws in so doing between setting, atmosphere and narrative – to which 
we might add those inhabiting it – as a “single conception.”  
 
                                                          
120 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
121 Idem. 
122 Béla Tarr, interview with Steve Erickson, http://home.earthlink.net/~steevee/bela.html (Accessed 
January 29, 2018). 
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The Long Now 
In Damnation, a relentless deluge is one apparent cause of the manifest decay that 
pervades an Eastern European any-town and the being of its downcast inhabitants. It is 
also one ostensible root of a degeneration which is reflected, as if in the pools formed by 
its steady accretion, throughout the film’s bleak monochrome world. Balazs’ ideal of a 
unified conception of atmosphere, setting and narrative takes on a special gravity in this 
setting, which is emblematic of the second period Tarr. Across all facets of the mise-en-
scène and through the fatalistically engineered debasement of our protagonist, Karrer, 
there transpires a vital correspondence between this degraded environment, its peculiar 
atmosphere, and the grave sense of ennui through which this world is disclosed. It is this 
disposition toward the world screened that is introduced in the film’s opening scene, 
where, insofar as landscape can be said to be something of a state of mind, this 
particularly flat, grey and sodden expanse might represent the uniformity that conditions 
a certain Stimmung of boredom. As Carlo Salzani points out, “boredom is not precisely 
and clinically defined by Benjamin, but rather identified descriptively through 
images…boredom is associated to images of dreary sky, fog and rain.”123 This association 
is made on account of the monotone that they effect, their muting of light and occlusion 
of clear delineation. It is worth noting, then, that Heidegger too mobilises a comparable 
imagery in suggesting, “Profound boredom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our 
existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and men and oneself along with it into a 
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remarkable indifference.”124 This is echoed by the coat-check lady from Damnation’s 
Titanik Bar, a figure of apocalyptic vision who at one point warns our protagonist to 
button up his coat, lest he fall prey to a fog which, “gets into the corners, into the lungs. It 
settles in your soul.” But, more than relating symbolically with the dull uniformity of grey 
weather (a powerful and invariable presence, it must be said, within Tarr), the Stimmung 
of boredom has as its more significant issue that of time. Unlike Benjamin, Heidegger’s 
boredom is rather exhaustively defined, and motions decidedly in this direction. Where 
Heidegger’s most noted analytic of a Stimmung is that of Angst/anxiety, by far his most 
extensive lies in the consideration of a phenomenology of boredom.125 He posits 
boredom as the “fundamental attunement of our contemporary Dasein,”126 that which 
holds us in thrall and yet leaves us disinterested - empty. In boredom, we find ourselves 
seeking to pass a time that oppresses us (being-bored-by), or to stand it aside in order for 
its casual use (being-bored-with). We are captivated by an indifference toward things as a 
whole, which are no longer revealed to us as meaningful or useful – we are “delivered 
over to beings’ telling refusal of themselves as a whole.”127 But, Heidegger stresses, this 
refusal is telling in that it is a “calling”; it points toward possibilities lying meanwhile 
inactive, held in suspense, while gesturing toward what makes that potentiality 
possible.128 By his reading, this is time itself, that temporality that we ourselves are. 
Boredom broadens perception of this time. It entrances us by its withdrawal into a 
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125 Heidegger, FCM, pp.74-172. 
126 Ibid. p.160. 
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lengthening “now” that eclipses future possibilities as well as their possibilisation by the 
past. Boredom’s intensification into its “fundamental” or “essential form,” into tiefe 
Langeweile (“Profound Boredom”), impels the possibility of a self-disclosing “moment of 
vision” (Augenblick), rupturing this captivation and revealing the pure time and 
potentiality - the freedom - of Dasein.129 In short, there is a degree of being-bored that 
can, in the suspension of potentiality, illuminate our existentiality. It reveals our ownmost 
time and possibilities: our finitude, and “being-towards-death.”130 In these terms, we 
might read boredom as it applies to Tarr in two interrelated ways: as a mode of making 
material and legible the density of the present as presence, as a “long now,” and, in so 
doing, to allow for a certain attunement to the situation to which this temporality 
belongs, as well as an “awakening” within it.  It will be interesting to note, in this respect, 
the connection by which profound boredom, as a way of showing up the mattering of 
possibilities, is related conceptually through boredom to acedia, which means 
etymologically “without care”;131 and so is anathema to Heidegger’s existential ontology, 
in which Sorge, “care,” takes on a fundamentally central position.132 This is a tension in 
each of the conceptual realms of melancholy and of boredom (which are themselves 
related conceptually through the area of acedia - between one’s distance from the world 
and one’s deeper involvement in it - which exists at a fundamental level in Tarr’s cinema, 
too.  
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Where boredom has as its nature a particular experience of temporality in 
Heidegger, it might be said of Benjamin that his boredom pertains to notions of not only 
the temporality of experience but also its historical structure. That is, his writings on 
boredom tend to concern the historical condition of modernity, and become as such 
stratified into thinking of this Stimmung in its connection to each of modern and pre-
modern social forms, and through the implications these have in material and 
experiential terms. Like Heidegger, he is concerned to show the contemporaneity of a 
disposition of boredom, its colouring a modern way of relating to the world. Modern 
boredom is, to Benjamin, characterised by distraction, by disconnection and shock in an 
eternal repetition of the new (such that it becomes the same, and, so, only a semblance 
of the new); hence the title of Convolute “D” of his Arcades Project, “Boredom, Eternal 
Return.”133 But, as Salzani notes, Benjamin’s construal of boredom depends on the 
orientation by which he comes to think of this Stimmung and on which account of 
experience he wishes to expound;134 he is, in such a way, split between critiquing 
boredom as the sign of distraction in modernity and mobilising its potential to act as “the 
threshold to great deeds,”135 a force of “awakening,”136 with this latter broadly 
comparable to that Augenblick posited by Heidegger. In this Benjamin follows the 
bifurcated conceptual history of the idea of boredom, demonstrated by Babara Dalle 
Pezze and Salzani. In this, the English term “boredom” is considered either as an 
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evolution of historical discourses on acedia and melancholy, on the one hand, or as a 
newly emergent concept of the 18th century responding to new forms of experience, 
buffeted by a concurrent coinage of “interest” as an antinomy.137 Against the poverty of 
modern experience, its tending toward overstimulation and distraction, Benjamin 
considers a constructive boredom that is a heightened state of mental relaxation, and 
which is a product of the habitual rhythms of traditional life.138 It is in a slackening of 
active intellect that he recognises the original situation of storytelling, arising from the 
more relaxed repetition through time of those menial tasks and natural routines that 
constitute the locus for a translation of individual lived-experience into a common sense. 
As Agamben notes in this connection,  
…the everyday – not the unusual – made up the raw material of experience which each generation 
transmitted to the next. Hence the unreliability of travellers’ tales and medieval bestiaries; in no 
sense ‘fantastical’, they merely demonstrated that the unusual could not in any way be translated 
into experience.139  
Storytelling is in this way a matter of practical use, of maintaining a fabric of 
understanding – we might call it, in Heideggerian terms that will become clearer in turn, 
“world-forming.” To this, Benjamin posits that, “people that are not bored cannot tell 
stories. But there is no longer any place for boredom in our lives.”140 This is in itself 
interesting to consider in relation to Tarr, in that, arguably, his cinema seeks to open an 
                                                          
137 Dalle Pezze & Salzani, “The Delicate Monster,” p.8. 
138 Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” p.91. 
139 Agamben, “Infancy and History,” p.16. 
140 Walter Benjamin, “The Handkerchief,” in Selected Writings Vol. 2: 1927-1934, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
et al., eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2001), p.658. 
62 
 
anachronistic place for the experience of a (hopefully) constructive boredom; and with 
this, the concomitant orientation of his filmmaking away from conventional narrative 
representation and toward material description. As Benjamin argues in “The Storyteller,” 
the conditions under which a constructive boredom might be experienced are becoming 
rare, as our experience of the world becomes characterised by Erlebnis rather than 
Erfahrung, which has “fallen in value.”141 As regards storytelling itself, as a connective link 
to the memory and community implied by the “red thread” of Erfahrung,142 “the gift for 
listening is lost and the community of listeners disappears”;143 instead of the practical 
“wisdom” communicated through storytelling, we now have the transmission of 
“information.” We might put this otherwise, in calling this practical wisdom a structure of 
understanding contiguous with a human situation, against which information is an 
instance sectioned off from it.  Against the custom of story we have the interest of the 
news item, the fragment of information against the medium of received understanding. 
Here again, we find a comparable scission to that we identified between the object of 
knowledge and the constellation of Truth, possession and immersion.  
In this formulation, and taking particularly the figures of the listener (or 
community of listeners) and of “information” as our particular points of entry, Benjamin’s 
position resonates within Tarr’s own discourse on cinematic narrative. Tarr takes his own 
filmmaking to be informed by a particular attentiveness to the world which he relates as 
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“always listening to life,” to “real people,” as a means to be “thinking about what is 
happening around us.”144 This is an intriguing sentiment given the major transition in this 
oeuvre, which the director regards as a progressive development from a social to an 
ontological to a cosmic perspective; “the shit,” he says, “is much bigger than I believed 
when I was 22.”145 The director’s formative concern with representing the “dignity” of 
the poor and outcast, “the beauty of the destitute,”146 remains central despite this 
widening scope. It is in this sense, most of all, that the director rejects the separation of 
his work into periods, where the entirety of his oeuvre shares in this ethic. Over its 
course, documentary realism tends toward an emphasis on phenomenality and 
metacommunication. As Kovács shows, dialogue drops by 50% between Almanac of Fall 
and Damnation,147 and is given an uncanny poetic quality that is unbefitting of the socio-
economic scenario where it does appear.148 The “poetic quality” of speech that emerges 
with Damnation attests to the hand of the writer, Krasznahorkai, at a point where an 
earlier tendency toward improvisation diminishes along with lengthy dialogue. The 
impulse to listen is thus not connected to verbal expression per se - the issue of language, 
which will be the focus of following chapters, is bound up for Tarr with “story,” power 
and manipulation. Instead, “listening” is the crucible of a sensitive receptivity to the 
significance of life and a quality of experience, to the material density of everydayness. 
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This is part of what turns a social ethic into an ethos, a mode of dwelling and an 
environmental texture to which we are “attuned.” Tarr speaks of filmmaking as a 
“call.”149 In this, he channels Heidegger, who speaks of a “call” emanating from Being, the 
responding to which is to be the task of his fundamental ontology; we might recall here 
that the telling refusal of meaning in the attunement of boredom was described by him 
as a “calling,” to take notice of and agency over one’s time. Tarr’s listening, too, would 
seem to have an implicitly temporal dimension, a stepping out of the time of active 
intention and becoming instead the passive medium of, not “information,” but “life” - the 
experience of “real people,” the material stuff of story. In extending this to the 
opposition “wisdom” and “information,” it is interesting to note that not only Tarr, but 
his student, significant collaborator and fellow filmmaker Fred Kelemen also, cast 
“information” as the negative side of a cinematic communication of something more 
significant. Tarr says that, in watching a mainstream film,  
…what I see is a really simple thing. They are following the story line – 
information/cut/information/cut/information/cut, or action/cut/action/cut/action/cut. But what 
do we call information? What do we call action? Maybe dying is also information. Maybe a piece 
of wall, or when you are just watching the landscape and it’s raining outside, is also a part of time 
– and also part of our lives and you cannot separate that. And when we only give information, 
which just connects human action, we are in the wrong…150   
                                                          
149 Tarr, interview by Levine and Meckler (2012). 
150 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
65 
 
And, perhaps more fittingly in this context and given his greater proficiency in English, we 
have the cinematographer for Tarr’s final two films, Kelemen:  
I think film, cinema, is not this kind of image factory with just information. I think a film artist has 
to give something else. When I let him walk, you experience it. That’s the difference between 
experience and information. We are flooded with information today, but we don’t know so much 
because knowledge and information are something different. Knowledge comes from experience, 
and I think if I go with someone in a film for some minutes, I know what it means to walk, and I 
know from myself that when I walk a long time, it has to do with time, it is quite meditative.151  
In these terms, we might characterise the poetics of Tarr’s filmmaking, as well as that of 
his followers, as one in which a density of narrative information is decentred in favour of 
the affect of quotidian movement, gesture and temporality, as the material expression of 
intensive qualities, as metacommunications.  
More than this, Tarr’s cinema contrasts the adherence to the logic of a storyline - 
as an organising principle which passes over or “kills” time as a means towards an end-
goal - with an alternative structure in which spaces have a logic and time is its own 
locale,152 the medium or milieu through which situations are realised and transposed into 
a continuum of experience; and, more than this, that these aspects of a phenomenal 
reality are inseparable from one another. Further, as Kovács establishes and which will be 
discussed in turn, the narrative “line” in Tarr is in fact a circle153 (or, we might say, a 
                                                          
151 Fred Kelemen, “Seeing in the Dark: Interview with Fred Kelemen,” interview by Robert Chilcott & Gareth 
Evans, Vertigo 3, no.3 (Autumn 2006), p.11. 
152 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
153 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.118. 
66 
 
spiral, which returns to its point of origin but not on the same plane). For where the 
filmmaker says repeatedly that he does not care about story, that all stories are the same 
(or, to Karrer, “stories of disintegration”), we can take this in two ways. The first is to 
mean that conventional cinematic narrative systems, insofar as their causally motivated 
story line is conventionally represented as a multiplying of human actions/“information” 
toward a determinate telos, are divorced from the fabric of lived experience, the flow of 
duration and of everyday being-in-the-world; in this, we might posit it as the sign of 
Erlebnis, whose characteristic forms are those of shock and transience, examples of 
which we might take to be the frenetic pacing and shot-reverse-shot structure of the 
mainstream montage of which he appears to be speaking. The second gloss on Tarr’s 
attitude is evinced further in his claiming that all stories are the same since the time of 
the Old Testament, that “you cannot create new stories. It is not our job to create new 
stories. Our job is very simple, just to try to understand how we are doing the same old 
story.”154 This, too, might be read as an appeal to a traditional logic of storytelling as a 
medium of Erfahrung, as the transmission of a certain way of understanding, the material 
of which is, to Benjamin, human life (or everydayness, by Agamben’s astute extension). 
What Tarr seems to be saying is that the story is the same because a certain human 
nature not only remains but in fact inheres in the narratives by which we represent 
ourselves, as “information connecting human actions.” This might otherwise be located 
in a majoritarian conception of history and a strictly chronological view of time, that 
which conveys the myth of human progress and its unceasing higher development, a 
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means-ends rationality under the guise of which our species’ worst atrocities have 
occurred; (“everything is in there,” Tarr goes on to say, “how it started, Cain kills Abel, 
and then someone fucks their mother, and then there’s the holocaust and the mass 
murders, everything is in there”).155 We might extend this idea toward thinking of the 
storytelling/mythmaking traditions of human cultures as being structured around certain 
narrative topoi, the idea of which retains an etymological connection between place and 
a common knowledge contained therein. As a link to this, we might add the “common 
sense” of the experience that takes as its form this continuity of understanding,156 and 
ethos as a “habitual” or “accustomed place.” What interests Tarr more than a 
progression of actions is an immersion in the affective tonality of the physical space and 
the existential situation from which they are borne, being drawn into a “circular dance” 
within the material stuff of “life.” 
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Figure 4 
 
Continuing to channel Benjamin as we return to Heidegger, and taking the 
observation that the material of the storyteller is human life or the everyday, we might 
recognise the latter thinker’s consideration of the temporal character of existence. It is 
significant, in this respect, that Langeweile – boredom – translates directly as “long 
while.” It thus gestures toward the fundamental temporal aspect of this attunement, and 
so the grounds for why it can be read as a condition of Tarr’s work. Heidegger writes, 
“What is at issue in boredom [Langeweile] is a while [Weile], tarrying a while [Verweilen], 
a peculiar remaining, enduring. And thus time, after all.”157 Tarr’s films are, notoriously, 
characterised by this unswerving dedication to the experience of lived time, 
uninterrupted temporality within meticulously constructed mobile sequence shots, by 
which durations extend into cinematic endurance. The nature of his engagement with 
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time is not, however, a strictly formalist practice, but the means of invoking a certain 
quality of experience, “the quality of life.” Story, he says, is secondary to a human 
situation, to a way of showing something about the way that humans exist, about the 
while they live.158 The nature of this life (its time, as well as its dissolution), might just as 
well be described by Heidegger’s “peculiar remaining, enduring.” For this is a basic 
archetype of Tarr’s films, and particularly from Damnation on. Rancière states a simple 
formulation that is significant in this respect, that, “Realism opposes situations that 
endure to stories that link together and pass to the next.”159 Putting aside the directors 
own reservations over notions of realism,160 to be addressed further below, it is the 
enduring of an enduring condition that is significant here. For it is in such a situation that 
inhabitants of Tarr’s marginal universe go about their minor customs in an attempt to 
escape them. They bear their time in rundown public bars while proclaiming the sickness 
of the world, at length, in a poetic, melancholic speech. To pass time, they drink 
incessantly, and dance in circles, or spirals, which unfurl the essential stasis their lives 
represent. Tarr is concerned to show the quiet dignity of resistance in absurd situations 
of material and existential deprivation, where possibility appears to be hemmed in by a 
web of conspiracy and corruption that is cosmic in dimension. The destitute remain, 
bound to the last vestiges of faith in a progress that recedes slowly into the grayscale of 
the image, in situations played out to ends that appear no further advanced than their 
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beginnings, the limits of which invariably run up against the illusion of a coming 
redemption. This is not only a situation of peculiar enduring but, by implication of its 
repetition across various sites and times, an enduring situation also. 
  
Figure 5 
 
Dwelling on Time 
In this situation and its enduring, we find two notions central to Benjamin’s consideration 
of a constructive boredom, these being repetition and the state of waiting. As Salzani 
demonstrates, repetition is another expression in Benjamin that is coloured by the 
context of its figuration.161 The eternal recurrence of disconnected shocks that condition 
modernity’s experience-as-Erlebnis evinces repetition in a sense connected to the 
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replication of mechanical process – machine time – and so with the destruction of the 
relaxed rhythms of pre-modern life, of habit. “Habits,” says Benjamin, “are the armature 
of [Erfahrung], whereas they are decomposed by [Erlebnisse].”162 This is an armature 
that, as Salzani suggests, “creates a web of connections,” by which one relates, “to their 
environment and history.”163  But habit, too, is recurrent, formed of a cyclical constancy 
that is a necessary condition for storytelling as this transmission of environment and 
history, of experience-as-Erfahrung. As such, the habitual dwelling that is grounded in 
quotidian recurrence forms the inverse image from which Benjaminian modernity is 
articulated as a site of discontinuity and distraction. Seen in this way, the operative 
difference between these forms of repetition, and the modes of experience pertaining to 
them, is a matter of pace, and, so, of temporality. In another sense, we can view it as a 
matter of the form of time that is impressed through repetition – whether organic, 
material or mechanic; this is an idea that will return in the final chapter on rhythm. 
Repetition is for this reason a central principle of Tarr’s treatment of time and narration. 
This is especially true of Damnation and The Turin Horse, chronologically the first and last 
of Tarr’s films under specific consideration here, each representing the rhythm, the 
temporality, of a droll daily life displayed in all of its particularity. This is a rhythm first 
represented through the slow tracking of cable-cars in Damnation’s opening shot, 
described above, and which is maintained throughout that film. It is a view and a 
viewpoint that is repeated in the film’s course, where Karrer takes up his entrancement 
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by this landscape twice more. The same visage is also the initial image from which a slow 
pan across reveals to us Karrer’s ultimate “conquest” (in one of the most inert, joyless 
lovemaking scenes in film history). More than this, and as is often the case throughout 
Tarr’s oeuvre, the predilection for situation over action, mood over plot, manifests in a 
limited variety of spaces and, so, their studied repetition. In this, slightly shifting 
descriptions of the same or similar milieu allow not only for a more intimate familiarity 
with the essentially circumscribed spatial dimensions of this filmic environment, an 
immersion within it, but in such a way for it to become a complexly rendered con-texture 
through which to survey the in/action of its inhabitants. Repetition is most forcefully 
figured in The Turin Horse, in which it structures an “anti-creation”164 narrative that fulfils 
the director’s final dissolution of “story.” “The daily repetition of the same routine,” says 
Tarr, “makes it possible to show that something is wrong with their world.”165 Each day 
we follow this same routine, but in each instance with the force of an occlusion to the 
structure of an environment, until that environment can no longer be said to exist, not 
only in terms of the film’s internal logic, but likewise in the continuity of those 
environments of which Tarr’s filmic universe consists. The “lines connecting human 
actions” can no longer structure narrative, where the ground of action’s possibility is 
removed – in this, it is a culmination of a discourse, running throughout the director’s 
oeuvre, on dignity in the face of exposure to corruption, powerlessness and destitution. 
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Where further analysis of this film will become central in later chapters, what is 
important to note at this point is that this film both takes repetition to a new limit and 
then ceases this repetition as a final gesture, as the endpoint of Tarr’s cinema. Through 
repetition as recurrence (rather than replication), the director is concerned to show the 
way in which even the most colourless processes of life are made up of incremental 
difference through the multiplicity and vicissitudes of time. We might connect this back 
to Tarr’s notion of repeating the same old story, his rejoinder to which is instructive: 
“…but of course everybody is different and everybody has some power to influence their 
own lives…the differences are always interesting…every day there is always some 
difference.”166 Hence, repetition is here a principle means through which to grasp time as 
an intensive quality, which is not passed over, but instead lived in and through. Boredom 
as a captivation by the present moment, which is most of all an attunement to time, itself 
becomes the structure of our experience of temporality.   
It is in this sense that, with each of these films, repetition can be viewed as the 
condition of waiting, for the end of an old order, and – if it indeed follows – the start of 
some new way of being. Whether represented in an explicit figure or as a condition of the 
time they inhabit, waiting is an emblematic state of being in Tarr. This is part of the 
essential indeterminacy that underscores Tarr’s films, which reel at the edge of crisis, 
apocalypse or nothingness. Frampton suggests a kind of tension in Damnation, by which 
the mobile camera that images inactive human subjects “thinks” through “ideas” of 
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movement (or growth) and stasis.167 We might recognise here as well that the figure in 
which movement and stasis find synthesis, the circle, is one that has recognised 
structural force in Tarr. The state of waiting thus becomes consistent with the suspension 
that Kovács suggests is characteristic of Tarr’s narrative circle, with the spectator 
implicated in the ruse of expecting a qualitative change. We become ourselves 
suspended in this milieu, in the time (as well as the vicarious act) of watching and of 
waiting. In his clearest definition of boredom, Benjamin similarly relates the state of 
boredom to waiting,  
We are bored when we don’t know what we are waiting for. That we do know, or think we know, 
is nearly always the expression of our superficiality or inattention. Boredom is the threshold of 
great deeds. Now it would be important to know: What is the dialectical antithesis to boredom?168  
To Andrew Benjamin, the power of this final question resides, “in part in the answer not 
being found in any attempt to identify the content of ‘what we are waiting for’.”169 Its 
answer, Salzani seeks to demonstrate, is “awakening…into a stage of historical 
wakefulness.”170 Terminologically, this “awakening” is strikingly similar to Heidegger’s 
task in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, to “awaken” profound boredom as a 
fundamental attunement, as a structure of experience and as a way toward thinking 
Being authentically. He posits the method of “ascertaining” (which we might align with 
acquiring, possessing, knowing) against the “awakening” that “means making something 
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wakeful, letting whatever is sleeping become wakeful”;171 further, and aligned with the 
sense by which we read Benjamin’s rebuff to intentional consciousness, “all ascertaining 
means bringing to consciousness. With respect to attunement, all making conscious 
means destroying, altering in each case, whereas in awakening an attunement we are 
concerned to let this attunement be as it is.”172 In a similar vein, Salzani points out that to 
Benjamin, “Boredom is thus a waiting without an object.”173 We might recall here that 
emotion and mood are distinguished by intentionality: the objectlessness of mood 
contrasts against the direction of emotion towards specific objects (of affection). 
Boredom’s waiting is, to Salzani “a transformation – a threshold – of the experience of 
time”;174 such that time can appear, we might say, in Truth: not as a succession of 
moments but as the quality of a pure potentiality. It is as this threshold – taken as a 
liminal zone that is at the same time a passage – that Benjamin finds the constructive, 
indeed revolutionary potential of the attunement of boredom. Andrew Benjamin writes, 
“what matters is the structure of an awaiting rather than filling in that structure with 
specific images of the future.”175 Thus, boredom as a liminal zone or transitional state of 
being is a “locus of ambivalence,” whose crossing Andrew Benjamin takes to necessitate 
thinking “beyond a conception of the future that is already pictured.”176 A future already 
pictured is a projection of the present as succession, a conflation of futurity with our 
given image of it; but to await in ambivalence is to remain suspended within a state of 
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indeterminacy, which allows for the condition of its interruption, an “awakening.” This 
indeterminacy might be viewed in the broader context of Benjamin’s notions of 
“dialectics at a standstill” and of “pure means,” precluding as they do the imperative to 
form an image of succession or narrative of historical progression. “If images are 
forbidden,” says Andrew Benjamin, “the imaging of the future involves the continual 
encounter in the present – an encounter that works equally to construct the present – 
with what is there”;177 in this sense it is aligned with Heidegger’s, “letting whatever is 
sleeping become wakeful.” What is there, “sleeping” or obscured by the restless 
production of the modern, the “new,” is a historical consciousness and the relation it 
forms with primordial time. Waiting transforms our relation to time; allows time to be 
dwelled within rather than used up or passed over toward an intended image of futurity, 
and so experienced as a quality of pure potentiality. In this sense, time is experienced as 
a quality of pure potentiality. The present becomes a site of possibility extending beyond 
the succession of already-actual structures. It thus presents the opportunity for a more 
radical encounter with the possibilities inhering within the “now,” gesturing toward new 
interpretations of an existing situation, or situatedness.  
Waiting and watching orient the disposition of Tarr’s second period cinema, from 
the establishing shot of Damnation to the last light of The Turin Horse. Through them, the 
present moment is distended, made present, along with – and as constitutive of - the 
material environment that situates it. This “long now” becomes the site for an 
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attunement to, or a dwelling within, the time and existential contexture of a state of 
being. With the notion of a “dwelling” within time, I refer both to the immersion in 
everyday temporality that characterises experience in Tarr, as well as the way in which 
this might be said to portend the ethical engagement that this cinema seeks to present 
(as presence). This implies the orientation toward the common or habitual through which 
a connection between ethos and Stimmung, ethics and attunement, can be realised. As 
has already been suggested, ethos originally refers to an idea underscored by notions of 
the habitual, an “accustomed place” or a “dwelling” (and hence with an implication of 
temporality, of historicity and habit). The extension into ethics, then, would seem to be 
undergirded by a similar logic to that contained in the etymological origins of topos, 
denoting as it does a “common-place,” and so a figurative marker around which historical 
structures of understanding become organised and conveyed (as story). This, too, can be 
considered the origin for ethics, which become an armature of the individual, but which 
are by nature intersubjective, concerning as they do not the one but as much and more 
so the “other,” being with others. Ethics can be viewed as a matrix of attitudes and ideals, 
which coalesce as the site of a social formation while at the same time structuring its 
limits. As such, ethical thinking arises from the historical continuity of being-in-the-world 
(which is, Heidegger stresses, always a “being-among-others”).178 In reference to its 
etymology, then, ethos regards a habituation to and inhabitation of a structure of 
understanding, in the sense of which we might relate it to Erfahrung. In its later (though 
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still classical), rhetorical denotation, ethos refers to appeals made by a speaker to the 
beliefs of their audience, posited against the appeals to the emotions expressed by 
pathos, which means, etymologically speaking, “what befalls one.” The clear inference 
here, their distinction, is between ethos as fundamentally situated, being spatial, 
temporal, and historical, where pathos refers to the singularly affective, the suffering, 
passion or emotion that occasions the individual (in the moment/instant). Stimmung, in 
the terms here discussed, lies somewhere in between – or indeed connecting – these two 
poles, of situation and subjectification. Stimmung, taken to be the ontic manifestation of 
a way of being historically/ontologically situated, is something like the pathos of ethos – 
the passion that befalls one‘s dwelling, or which arises as the affect of one’s situated ek-
sistence. It is significant to note, then, that the distinction between pathos and ethos is 
one that is taken up by Elsaesser in discussing the vital difference between Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung in the cinema, where he states,  
…’pathos’ rather than ‘ethos’ defines the affective regime of modernity, if we consider Benjamin’s 
Erfahrung to be retrospectively constructed and integrated, while Erlebnis is self-presence without 
self-possession, and ‘pathos’ the affect appropriate to Erlebnis: singular, intermittent, 
discontinuous, transitory.179  
But where Elsaesser takes Benjamin at (a particular implication of) his word in suggesting 
that Erfahrung is no longer a possibility under conditions of modernity, he nevertheless 
takes the classical model of continuity and closure to best exemplify a structure of 
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Erfahrung as it pertains to cinematic narrative.180 This he clarifies in recognising that in 
the classical cinema, “the function of narrative is to facilitate this process of turning 
discontinuous Erlebnis into transmissible Erfahrung; hence Benjamin emphasises 
montage as cinema’s specific contribution to modernity.”181 The classical cinema of 
Erfahrung is, as such, “an ideological construct, a nostalgic or reactionary shoring up of 
the fractured nature of modern experience.”182  It is, Elsaesser suggests, a form of 
catharsis through a narration of progress, from ignorance to recognition, an integration 
and development that he equates with experience-as-Erfahrung. 
In this view, post-classical cinema responds to the status of experience in 
modernity. Elsaesser regards this cinema to be a normalised medium of excess, of shock-
Erlebnis (without re-semblance into Erfahrung), which represents an “exposure to limits 
and the recovery from extremes” (of experience).183 These limits structure cogent 
modalities of narration, perception and affect. Elsaesser identifies the pathoi of various 
generic modes (e.g. neo-noir, action, body horror), as an indication of those limits of 
body (“and embodiment”), agency (“and helplessness”) and time (“and its apparent 
irreversibility”) that characterise the experiences of post-classical cinema.184 In so doing, 
Elsaesser draws parallels between the cinematic event and the experience of trauma he 
finds to be its contemporary emblem, both of them conditioned by a “failure of 
experience,” by its breakdown and reconstitution from fragments. Trauma constitutes 
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what Elsaesser calls “a new ‘economy of experience’,” whose, “shortcuts, blackouts and 
gaps are what saves the self from a ruinous psychic investment in the multitude of events 
observed.”185 In this, the post-classical cinema’s structure of breaks and elisions – its 
“disarticulation of body, sense, memory and speech” - form a kind of coping mechanism 
against the excess of shock that same form presents.186 In the terms of the current 
argument, we can thus recognise this trauma as a “structure of experience,” in a similar 
form to that of Stimmung. But even where making reference to “minimalist states” that 
are “experiences at the edge of everyday perception,” Elsaesser’s scope is firmly affixed 
to trends in the Hollywood cinema to which Tarr is strictly counterpoised; and, even 
where directly referring to many of its more independent or experimental exemplars, he 
does not touch upon an art-cinema such as that which forms our focus here – where a 
“failure of experience” structures a totalised milieu, rather than a narrative device. Nor 
does Elsaesser engage the perspective from which to characterise cinematic experiences 
that are not in some way generically coded, or otherwise predominated by a narrative 
typology. Where Tarr does consciously tap into generic conventions in certain instances - 
notably the formal nexus of Expressionism-Film Noir, by way of French “poetic realism,” 
in Damnation and The Man from London – it is significant that the director acknowledges 
he does so only in terms of his memory of their “mood.”187 This impression is 
strengthened where The Man from London - the only film among our selection not 
originally written by (or with) Krasznahorkai - is based on a story by Georges Simenon; an 
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unconventional crime fiction writer, more concerned with descriptions of atmosphere, 
morality and psychology than with police procedure. It is a story that becomes a vehicle 
for this “mood,” and Tarr’s exploration through it of “the totality of man and nature.”188 
Indeed, Tarr likes to speak of his cinema in terms of such a totality, which his treatment 
of time, environment and its metacommunication seeks to represent. Where Elsaesser 
views cinema to attempt a cathartic amelioration of the shocks of modernity (in the 
classical mode) or to reflexively channel them in recognition of their conditioning the 
medium itself (in the post-classical), we can view Tarr’s ethos in quite another sense. If it 
seeks to transmute subjective Erlebnis into Erfahrung, it does so not by way of narrative 
completion (as in the Classical mode), but with regards to a perceptual attunement to a 
fabric of experience. It invokes an attunement to atmosphere and materiality, an 
immersion in a disposition and an environment, which is effected through studied 
observation of a continuity in time, space and movement. In this, it is poised conceptually 
(if not ethically) against the fragmenting of time and space in the montage-based 
narration characteristic of mainstream cinema, whose operating principle has in recent 
times become more and more the appeal to somatic sensation. Erika Balsom, who 
likewise finds that Tarr “restores something of the quality of long experience or 
Erfahrung,” posits in a similar context,  
While for critical theorists such as Benjamin and Kracauer, the cinema constituted the modern 
form of distraction par excellence, now the darkened theatre can become a privileged site of 
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contemplation, in which the spectator is forced to give him or herself over to the time of the 
film…experiencing the heavy weight of time’s passing.189   
In a cinema whose primary formal principle consists in mobile editing, and whose 
continuity thus refers to phenomenal space, time and atmosphere, the conventional 
predominance of sensation over sensibility, of pathos over ethos (or of a pathos 
disconnected from ethos), is emphatically reversed. We enter a time and an 
environment, toward which we are disposed and attuned, and through which is revealed 
an experience of (a mode of) dwelling, of ethos. 
An attunement allows things to show up as meaningful, or not, in specific ways, 
and so mediates our relation to the world. It is a “medium for thinking and acting” and, 
more than this, a disposition into meaningful perspective. When recognised accordingly, 
our mode of being, or dwelling, can be seen with new regard. It is significant, in this 
sense, that the concept of emotion and, more properly, mood, in the elicitation of ethical 
experience is gaining currency in Film Studies. The cognitive film theorist Carl Plantinga 
says, for instance, 
Moods are gestalts that combine ways of feeling with ways of thinking and perceiving. As such, 
both art moods and their associated human moods have marked implications for the ethical and 
ideological import of narrative films.190 
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Leaving aside the distinction (or interaction) between “art moods” and human moods - 
which Plantinga posits as the “conscious experience” of a film’s “affective character or 
tone”191 - we find here the particular impulse which underscores the situated attunement 
of Tarr’s cinema. Where Plantinga posits mood as “clearly central to understanding,” he 
accords with many of those principles we have been working under to this point, even 
though he does so in reference to the cognitivist psychology of aesthetic affect. His 
interest is in distinguishing and then denying the equivalence of “art” and “human” 
moods in order to theorise their affective interaction, a notion of mood as a primer to 
emotional or somatic body responses192 and central to the phenomenological experience 
of narrative.193 But, like Elsaesser, Plantinga’s is a generalised view on narrative film, and 
as such can only contend so far with the specialised poetics of Tarr’s cinema. Even so, in 
seeking to show the way in which moods, in film as otherwise, “constitute ways of 
perceiving and thinking of the world,” he nevertheless comes close to the major concepts 
underpinning my position. As Plantinga relates through Hwanhee Lee’s Heideggerian 
reading of mood in Terrence Malick, certain films “express but do not explain the 
character’s moods, or more broadly, their mode of being.”194 This he takes to be a matter 
of sensibility in advance of psychology, foregrounding mood in relation to plot, by which 
“poetic scenes…serve less to drive the plot forward than to lyrically illustrate the mindset 
                                                          
191 Ibid. p.461 & p.469. (My emphasis). 
192 More explicit in Greg Smith’s “mood cue” theory, but, as John Rhym points out in a similar context, 
Plantinga works with Smith and likewise, “assumes that viewer interest…is a given and overlooks the 
emotional disengagement central to the watching of a film that generates boredom.” See John Rhym, 
“Towards a Phenomenology of Cinematic Mood: Boredom and the Affect of Time in Antonioni’s L’eclisse” in 
New Literary History 42, no.3 (Summer 2012), p.481. 
193 Plantinga, “Art Moods and Human Moods in Narrative Cinema,” p.473. 
194 Ibid., p.471 
84 
 
of his characters.”195 Certainly, the de-privileging of “story” or plot – by which is implied a 
plotting of action – in favour of a lyrical illustration or description of a mode of being is 
central to the cinematic ethos of Tarr. But where Malick creates such a “fabric of 
experience” primarily through an aggregation of significant paranarrative moments, 
through montage – more directly invoking the mosaic or constellation described by 
Benjamin – our encounter with the poetic in Tarr is part of the dynamics of the sequence 
shot. “The story is part of the image,” the director suggests in relation to the continuity of 
the sequence shot, which reveals the integral duration and metacommunication that 
conditions the experience of a milieu. As it pertains to Tarr, then, the environment might 
be seen to be the phenomenal realisation of a state of boredom, making material the 
temporality of waiting as a particular milieu or medium of experience. Rather than the 
image of a continuity constructed of fragments, we find instead a total spatio-temporal 
structure – a singular conception within a circular limit, in effect – which becomes a site 
of survey. Where the human agent becomes de-centred, environed, the affective tonality 
through which the situation is disclosed becomes a point of access with an equal force to 
any direct mode of identification through narration. As an immersion in an environment 
and a duration, in repetition and through waiting, the innate sensibility structuring this 
world becomes an experience of time that opens beyond the frame of the image or of 
“story.”  
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This chapter has looked to explicate the philosophical concept of Stimmung, as a 
framework through which to consider the mode of experience that emerges in the 
encounter with the weighty time and affective atmosphere of Béla Tarr’s second period 
films. In this milieu, the function of Stimmung – taken as a concert of environment, 
atmosphere and temporality – is an entrance (or threshold) into a disposition of 
meditative contemplation in relation to the presentation of a situation onscreen. It is a 
medium of experience and a perceptual attunement. We can think of Stimmung as the 
pathos of ethos, the sensation arising from our dwelling in the world, in order to 
recognise the temporal extension through which attunement to a situation might 
transmute emotional orientation into an “awakening” of ethical thinking and the 
implication of Erfahrung. Rather than acting as a potential elicitor of affect intending 
toward the evocation of mood, an engagement with mood as Stimmung - as attunement 
to ethos and atmosphere - allows for an inner consideration of the conditions of that 
modality of mood, a situatedness within it. The condition of boredom that structures the 
temporality of this situation will be drawn, in the next chapter, toward the notion of a 
melancholic, “cosmic” perspective that emerges through Tarr’s departure from “story” 
and toward metacommunication. This is a matter concerning the “primitive language” of 
cinema in distinction from language more broadly, and yet the natural-historical 
cosmology that it implies seems to be profoundly influenced by Krasznahorkai’s prose 
writing. I will argue that the transposition from prose to image displays a poetic 
character, a resistance to conceptual understanding, which can be framed in terms of the 
notions of a free indirect discourse and the mode of “being-with” that is effected by it. 
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2. A Cosmic Poiesis: Natural-History, Melancholy and The Language of Reality 
 
László Krasznahorkai is critical to the development of the poetics of Béla Tarr’s second 
period films. The writer enters into collaboration with Tarr for Damnation, and is the last 
of those members to join Tarr’s collective of contributors and then remain involved 
through to Turin Horse (the others being editor/co-director Ágnes Hranitzky and 
composer Mihály Víg, both of whom predate Krasznahorkai).196 Of the films produced in 
this period, Satantango and Werckmeister Harmonies are based upon novels written by 
Krasznahorkai, and The Turin Horse is developed from his short essay, “At Latest in 
Turin.”197 The writer had a strong hand in two other Tarr films, adapting George 
Simenon’s The Man from London and forming the scenario and screenplay for 
Damnation. Further, Krasznahorkai’s role in developing the script is also evident to those 
that have encountered his prose. The pessimistic monologues that dot Tarr’s cinematic 
landscape - and which, in the context of these films’ often reductive use of dialogue, take 
on a special gravitas – are inimitably Krasznahorkian, and echo those core ideations from 
the writer’s own conceptual cosmos which come to reverberate throughout the Tarr 
universe. And while the director’s approach to his auteur status is exemplarily 
democratic, elevating and crediting his contributors to a commendable degree, the exact 
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nature of Krasznahorkai’s influence - in both its thematic and formal aspect - remains a 
point of contention that does not extend to either Hranitzky or Víg. Over the next two 
chapters, the crucial continuities and marks of distinction between Krasznahorkai’s prose 
writing and Tarr’s filmic realisation of it will frame my examination of the director’s 
representation of temporality and paranarrative environmental tonality. The basic 
premise of this discussion begins with Tarr’s insistent view on cinema in 
(contra)distinction from the written word – framed in terms specific to the relationship 
between writer and director, film and novel, and marking their distinction by virtue of the 
different “languages” through which they communicate. Of cinematic language, the 
director offers that, “Film as a genre is always something definite, because that piece of 
instrument which we call the lens can only record real things, which are there.”198 With 
reference to this perspective, Tarr maintains a rhetorical border between parallel texts 
that is at once instructive and restrictive, and, what’s more, instructive in its terms of 
restriction. This is especially the case when considering the director’s prickly anti-
theoretical bent against the writer’s claim of offering “philosophical background” as well 
as “background atmosphere” to Tarr’s films, claims that respond directly to the current 
argument’s assertions regarding the affective atmospherics of these films’ worlds.199 Tarr 
enlists two operative terms which I take to be key descriptors of his own distinctly 
cinematic language: “concrete,” in respect of his medium-essentialist perspective 
regarding the “objective” materiality of film images, as in the above quote; and 
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“primitive,” to denote an apparently innate, pre-grammatical understanding of the 
“visual” that inheres in our experience of phenomenal reality. Taken together, the 
primitive and the concrete refer to a core initiative of Tarr’s discourse on his work. The 
director orients interlocutors away from overly conceptual or symbolic interpretation, 
and instead toward the experience of materiality, temporality, and atmosphere which 
are, he strongly suggests, meaningful in and of themselves. “Don’t think about it too 
much,” Tarr says, “…it’s a very primitive language.”200 Taken separately, however, the 
primitive aspect of visual literacy and the affective presence of a concrete materiality to 
which it responds give rise to distinct sets of implications, which do not so much 
undermine Tarr’s self-conception as shade in some of that background to which 
Krasznahorkai refers. Indeed, Tarr’s anti-conceptualism appears in itself rhetorical, where 
it takes on the aspect of a formal-theoretical principle concerning cinematic expression 
and experience, and especially when considering the dynamics whereby the director’s 
rejection of “story” and its apparent connection to a “cosmic” perspective echo concepts 
evinced through Krasznahorkai’s work. In this direction, the notions of “primitive” 
imagination and “concrete” realisation will form the core issues around which the 
following two chapters will be structured - the first establishing an outline of Tarr’s 
special association with Krasznahorkai’s world picture, the second delineating the 
specifically cinematic character of the director’s approach to representing it. With the 
notion of cinema’s “primitive language” as a platform, this chapter will explore the 
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transposition from prose to image - from one language to another - of the uncanny 
cosmos delimited in Krasznahorkai’s rich and densely weighted prose.  
This transition is, I will argue, poetic – not in the sense that poetry implies 
“thinking in images,” but instead an ontogenetic category of language. In its original 
Greek, poiesis denotes a “production into presence,” the act of “bringing into being (out 
of nothing),” and implies a primary articulation (an origination) of the experience of truth 
or meaningfulness.201 In this view, prosaic language is a socio-historical abstraction of the 
original creative activity through which things are first articulated within the sphere of 
human understanding, of meaning and discourse. This notion of primacy will become 
increasingly significant as it comes to the discussion of “concrete” presence in the next 
chapter. As it comes to Tarr’s discourse on a cine-linguistic primitivism, the idea of a “fall” 
- from poetic truth, into the fragmented codifications of propositional language – 
resonates strikingly with the director’s disdain for “story” and “information.” Tarr’s 
intensive formalism can be regarded in this way. Just as significantly, this trajectory (of 
downfall) mirrors other, related themes in Krasznahorkai and Tarr: time, history, nature, 
and ideas concerning the way in which language formalises our conception of existential 
phenomena and, in turn, our experience of the world. We find a precursor to a number 
of these considerations in an unlikely source: Pier-Paolo Pasolini’s essay on the “Cinema 
of Poetry,”202 and its figuration of film history as a fall from poetic expression into prosaic 
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narrative convention. The “pre-grammatical” “language of reality,”203 which Pasolini 
takes to be the mythic arche of cinematic imagination, is an avenue which opens Tarr’s 
anti-theoretical perspective on film language toward a wider frame of reference. The 
expressive formalism advocated in Pasolini’s essay is recognisable in Tarr, as is the socio-
historical consciousness which Pasolini found crucially lacking among his contemporaries. 
That this consciousness emerges through films which intend no allegorical meaning and 
which are dissociated from real-world specificity can be viewed partly in terms of a 
further point of contact with Pasolini, and in a way that re-implicates Krasznahorkai on 
both formal and thematic levels.  
As a model for “The Cinema of Poetry,” Pasolini enlists the literary mode of “free 
indirect discourse,” a device which Krasznahorkai frequently employs, and through which 
many of the most conceptually resonant images in his novels are articulated. Free 
indirect discourse is a perspective which dwells within the space between first and third 
person, mediating between the personal experience of a represented subject and an 
outlook exterior to them, where “subjective” and “objective” points of view inflect one 
upon the other. As it comes to film, Pasolini suggests that “free indirect subjectivity” 
describes the way in which a director’s consciousness can become reflected in the 
experiential world of their film’s protagonist, the latter forming the pretext for a 
paranarrative exploration of aestheticism and affect. Deleuze later extends this concept 
in a way that resonates with the previous chapter, regarding the structure of Stimmung 
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91 
 
and disposition. Deleuze associates Pasolini’s “free indirect subjectivity” with a 
“generalised semi-subjective image,” and draws it toward the notion of a 
“cinematographic being-with.”204 The latter refers at once to a Heideggerian social-
ethical imperative and to a way of being positioned in the cinema. This notion of “being-
with” speaks to the poetics of Tarr’s long-takes, and not only in the concrete terms of 
their frequent gravitation toward, or around, human figures. These shots display a 
tendency to mediate between psyche and environment by way of intensive excursions 
through time, traversing the space between “human” and “world” and, in so doing, 
transgressing the borders between “subjective” and “objective” points of view. More 
than this, or as its result, it is by relation to the being-with implied in such movement that 
we come to dwell within the state of being that the director offers in resistance to the 
schematic causality of conventional narrative representation. The viewer is implicated in 
an expectation of qualitative progress in narrative or its resolution, the suspension (and 
eventual failure) of which becomes figured as a “circular dance,” or an “eternal return.” 
The course of this back and forth dance traces the outline of the image of the world, or 
cosmic perspective, which is shared between writer and director across their respective 
media, and which reflects an ethico-political consciousness concerning the experience of 
time, nature and history.   
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A Cinema of Poetry 
Tarr’s ostensibly medium-essentialist view of the cinema responds to the notional ability 
of the art to record and transmit the brute, affective presence of the material world. The 
director turns to the films themselves to implore, “Please, trust your eyes: everything is 
very clear and very simple. Watch. That’s important. Don’t think about it too much. 
Everyone can understand it if they don’t complicate it…It’s a very primitive language.”205 
In speaking of film-as-language, this “primitive language” that is distinct from the 
descriptive or propositional forms of prose and philosophy, Tarr seeks to approximate 
what Pier-Paolo Pasolini calls the “pre-grammatical” dimension of our phenomenal 
experience of the world.206 Indeed, there are a surprising number of points of contact, 
conceptually and terminologically, between Pasolini’s film theory and Tarr’s discourse on 
cinematic language. Each director is concerned with the “primitive” essence of the 
medium, even where tending in different directions in the final analysis: Pasolini’s 
theories are “semiotic,” critically-engaged, facing outward toward the world of art 
cinema in its reflection of contemporary society, while Tarr’s ideas are resolutely anti-
theoretical and incline toward his apparently singular point-of-view (even where speaking 
of the medium in general). Pasolini practices a peculiar form of semiotic film theory, 
addressing the cinema as a poetic medium that can transcribe and realise meaningful 
aspects of phenomenal reality. For Pasolini, there is a pre-cultural (or –historical) 
“language of reality,” of which the cinema provides a unique means for inscription. That 
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is, in this view, “reality” relates to the cinema as oral language does to its written form.207 
To Pasolini, action (or, perhaps, being) – which he equates in its “simplest terms” with 
reality - precedes the verbal codes that would represent and transmit it as sign, concept, 
or knowledge.208 Cinematic images are taken from the natural “chaos” of inter-action 
with the world rather than from the socio-historical codification of the language that is 
found in dictionaries; they access the “natural” perception through which humans 
mediate their relation to the presence of (the) world.209 For Pasolini, this is our specific 
attunement to phenomenal reality. Pasolini finds cinematic expression to correspond 
essentially to this “reading” of the phenomenal, which is pre-verbal, imagistic and 
irrational (without human measure or logic, logos), and thus marks a refusal to be drawn 
into the antinomy between culture and nature which structures semiotic (and, in a wider 
sense, metaphysical) discourse.210 It is by virtue of this “irrationality” - or semantic 
multiplicity - as a correlative to the material resistance of poetic disclosure, that Pasolini 
identifies a “language of poetry” as mythic arche of the cinema.211 He views the art of 
cinema as having been subjected to a “fall” from an essentially poetic nature, which, in 
this case, takes place through the predominance of the “language of prose narrative” 
over the more fundamental and expressive “language of poetry.”212   
                                                          
207 We might note here the resonances with the concepts of listening and storytelling that formed part of 
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Pasolini finds the pre-textual archetypes for cinema’s fundamental “im-signs” 
(image-signs) to be the inherently non-logical languages of gesture, environment, 
memory and dreams, which are, he says, “pre-human events, or on the border of what is 
human.”213 Implicated in this view is not only a notion of dialogic contact with 
environment – with what Tarr calls its “metacommunications” – but, in extension, the 
way that the affect of this correspondence with presence (whether physically constituted 
or not) operates at the register of poetic experience (in its distinction from prosaic 
knowledge), as per concepts in the previous chapter. Elsewhere, in apparent recognition 
of the intermedial non-exclusivity of their qualities, Pasolini qualifies the cinematic 
language of poetry as a hybrid form, of “narrative poetry.”214 Pasolini explains in an 
interview with Oswald Stack that this cinematic language of poetry operates on two 
levels, apparently inseparable. The first of these inheres in cinematic imaging per se: any 
film text, he says, can be observed poetically on some level given its relation to the “mute 
chaos” of the world of objects. Pasolini speaks of the “pre-historic, almost pre-
cinematographic” aspect, where “physicity is poetic in itself, because it is an apparition . . 
. full of mystery . . . ambiguity . . . polyvalent meaning” and thus that “the cinema by 
directly reproducing objects physically, etc. etc. is substantially poetic.”215 What is 
“substantially poetic” in physical reality is that it always exceeds the possessions of our 
knowledge, and occurs in phenomenal experience with an enigmatic contingency, or 
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gratuity216 - the reproduction of “reality” is doubly so for being appropriated by the 
filmmaker as the realisation of these qualities. It is in this direction that the second aspect 
- always in reference to the first – denotes the way in which this “language of reality” 
becomes inscribed as a matter of form, through the adoption of certain techniques. It is 
in this way that a filmmaker inscribes their personal meter and syntax of expression upon 
this encounter with the “real” - their handwriting, so to speak.217 Viewed as such, the 
innately poetic potentiality of phenomenal reality is, as it comes to film, only part of what 
constitutes a “cinema of poetry”; it must also be realised through a formal perspective or 
disposition. In this sense, the tendency toward the poetic appears uniquely responsive to 
the notion of Stimmung current in our last chapter. Robert Sinnerbrink, in particular, 
views mood-as-Stimmung as the “’paranarrative’ or expressive dimension of cinematic 
aesthetics” (and refers to Béla Tarr explicitly in this connection).218 The poetic is this 
personally expressive element of a film style, which escapes the determinism of narrative 
convention in the direction of a filmmaker’s image of the world. 
No sooner does Pasolini describe the poetic substratum of “reality” underlying 
cinematic expression than he embarks upon identifying the particular mode that 
formalises his “language of poetry.” He takes its model, counterintuitively, from prose - 
“free indirect discourse.” This is an unusual form of third-person narration which refers 
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to a first person perspective, wherein the thought or speech of a character is conveyed 
not directly (through marked quotation) or indirectly (without direct quotation, as 
interior monologue for instance), but instead merged with that of the author: first person 
experience is fused with a third person omnipotence, in a way that conflates (and, so, 
undermines the valency of) “subjective” and “objective” points of view. Pasolini says it 
“serves to speak indirectly...in the first person…”219 In German, this mode is referred to as 
erlebte Rede, or “experienced speech/discourse,” and is associated particularly with 
Krasznahorkai’s greatest influence, Franz Kafka.220 That Krasznahorkai writes frequently in 
a free indirect manner is a mark of this influence, which extends to Tarr.221 This mode of 
discourse appears as a link toward delineating the director’s own poetics of Stimmung, 
his approach to cinematic form through a rejection of “story.” The allusion in erlebte 
Rede to erlebnis, experience in its self-referential dimension, is to a form of discourse that 
refers to the foundation of its expression, in a consciousness of lived-experience; or a 
“subjectivity” that is objectively constituted, and which thus resists direct identification or 
empathy. As it comes to cinema, Pasolini finds that free indirect discourse becomes a 
“free indirect subjectivity” which is displayed in the director’s way of representing and 
reflecting on the experience of an-other within the form of their own aesthetic vision. 
This perspective is ciphered through, and formed around, the narrative figure of a 
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protagonist – an “immersion of the filmmaker in the mind of his character.”222  It is in this 
sense that Pasolini speaks of two films (or film languages) produced, but co-responding 
to one another, in the cinema of poetry: the one a prosaic structure of narrative 
causality, the other formal, poetic, and expressive of the director’s aesthetic sensibility.223 
Pasolini discusses the “language of poetry” in films directed by Antonioni, Bertolucci, and 
Godard, as indicative of a “technical/stylistic tradition…taking form.”224 In other words, 
the cinema of poetry thus pertains to an ideal of Art Cinema, in a way that implicitly 
evinces the genetic connection between art and poiesis.225 And yet, for all that Pasolini 
appears to be encouraged by these developments - the emergence of a self-reflexively 
formal aestheticism that departs from classical narrative logic – his essay also criticises 
the lack of socio-historical consciousness in these films. Implicit in Pasolini’s essay is a 
justification of his own aesthetic mores and political ideology, against which he finds his 
contemporaries to be ideologically constrained, or reactionary.226 The poet’s class 
consciousness and admiration for spoken (i.e. non-codified) dialect influenced his 
poetically inflected representation of a minoritorian (and semi-mythic) “sub-proletariat,” 
in literature as well as cinema. In this we find another point of contact with Tarr and 
Krasznahorkai (both of whom draw on comparable sociological inspirations) as well as a 
path toward delineating the role of the free indirect in the collaboration between writer 
and director. As with Pasolini, but with a less “delirious” sense of aestheticism, Tarr’s own 
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“obsessive” vision and style is prominently foregrounded. His cinematic universe is 
invested with an expressive disposition toward the material world. This is realised as an 
affective environmental atmosphere that is rendered in stark monochrome and within 
the extended durations of mobile sequence shots. In these films - and taking on the 
appearance of a cinematic dispositif - the camera is “felt” in its autonomous 
deliberations, and made a subject and participant in the poetic disclosure of a situation. 
This is the exploration of what the director calls “a tension between the human being and 
the world,”227 a Stimmung which conditions the director’s style and the form of vision to 
which the viewer is disposed. 
Beyond a shared sensibility toward cinematic expression, and in addition to the 
role of free indirect discourse in the Tarr-Krasznahorkai collaboration, further meaningful 
areas of proximity emerge in the comparison between Pasolini and Tarr. Specifically, with 
each of these directors, the shift toward a poetic free indirect style can be viewed in 
terms of a transition from a broadly realist aesthetic toward a more personal stylistic 
register. Indeed, in both instances, and partially affirming the problematic socio-political 
contentions concluding Pasolini’s essay, we see a movement from stylistic aberration 
within pre-existing (and nominally “realist”) national-cinematic models toward a novel, 
expressive transgression of realist conventions. Pasolini’s essay is now widely seen to 
develop from, and respond to, the film he had made immediately prior to presenting it228 
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– Il Vangelo Matteo – an account of the life of Christ mediated by the vision of a “non-
believer” (albeit, one with a lively religious consciousness). Prior to this, however, the first 
two films that Pasolini had made – Accatone and Mama Roma – were recognisable 
descendants of Italian Neorealism (a neo-Neorealism). The milieu of the Roman 
“borgate” in these films, and its association with the binds of poverty and social injustice 
that tie people to slums, crime and corruption, has a decidedly Neorealist quality; this is a 
cinematic tradition with which Tarr, too, has been associated.229 Against earlier 
Neorealist preoccupations with the naturalistic rendering of a “transparent” social reality, 
however, Pasolini’s cinema employed expressive stylistic registers that respond to the 
director’s sensibility for the religious, the mythic, and the “primitive.” The director’s 
approach to neorealist scenarios was tempered by his contradictory impulses toward 
transcendence and fatalism, the sacred and profane, brute reality and its poetic 
realisation, in a way that undermined ostensible “objectivity” and gestured beyond the 
contemporary “real.” In a similar fashion (but in a different socio-historical context), 
Tarr’s early films appear broadly within the guise of social-documentary realism,230 albeit 
with the characteristic critical fatalism that underscores the entire continuity of his 
corpus (the logic of circularity,231 or of no-exit situations).232 This is the first phase in the 
development of Tarr’s cinema, in its development from a “social” to an “ontological” to a 
“cosmic” perspective. For both Tarr and Pasolini, a departure from representing 
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contemporary social justice issues invokes an ethico-political consciousness that is 
constituted expressionistically, through aesthetic style and treatment of subject-matter. 
In each case, the realist context is re-figured, if not de-realised.233 Regarding Pasolini’s 
“Neorealist” use of (non-professional, “sub-proletariat”) actors and on-location shooting 
(albeit in Southern Italy, rather than Palestine), Greene observes, “…the play of 
oppositions characterising Pasolini’s early films is…reversed in Il Vangelo, where the 
subject is mythic and epic; the style realistic.”234 The adoring devotion which casts the 
epic misfortunes and degraded physical milieu of pimps and prostitutes in an almost 
saintly aspect - what the director calls “reverential style,” his desire to “reconsecrate 
things” – was “gilding the lily,” in the case of an already sacralised figure.235 In Il Vangelo 
Matteo, the gospel of Saint Matthew provides the pre-text – literally, the script - for a re-
interpretation of the historical figure of Jesus Christ through the eyes of a gay, Marxist 
poet. As with his earlier films, a liberal use of pieces from the Christian musical canon - 
and J.S. Bach in particular – refers to a sacred tradition. In Accatone, this presents a 
disjunct between holy music and a forsaken milieu; in Il Vangelo, the musical 
counterpoint extends to a more connective (rather than ostensibly contradictory) role, 
where not only Bach but also (Christianised) African chorals236 and African-American 
blues/spirituals invoke both a transhistorical and a global element to Pasolini’s Biblical 
exegesis. The director experiments with modernist techniques to realise, 
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expressionistically, a figure of Christ that is at once scriptural and modern – emphasising 
the element of social consciousness in the word of the gospel. Jesus takes on the 
appearance of a revolutionary upstart, if not a Socialist, brimming with rage at a corrupt 
religious order established in the name of his Father. Following the life of Christ as a 
movement - both a literal procession and politico-religious campaign - the camera is 
“felt,” as a presence and a participant. That is, expressive techniques are foregrounded, 
as representation, rather than disappearing into the flow of images, of narrative 
(information). Pasolini experiments with cinema-verite-like documentary realism (the use 
of shaky, handheld cameras as an embodied POV), while also deploying telephoto zooms, 
and the abrupt cutting techniques of a modernist/new wave editing, to effect a striking 
impression of Christ’s historical appeal. In so doing, the director produces the double 
aesthetic register, and tension between style and theme, that John Orr reads as implicit 
in Cinema di Poesia237 – a dialogic encounter which produces an expressive resonance 
between “form” and its “content.” 
 
Pseudo-realism and Poiesis 
In contrast to the expressive intertextuality of Pasolini’s Il Vangelo, the minimal style of 
Tarr’s films is more hermetically conceived and constituted within a singular vision. The 
notion of a free indirect subjectivity – in which an aesthetic perspective is formalised 
around the pretext of a protagonist-figure – is one which the director seems, indirectly, 
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to affirm. The disassociation of Tarr’s “image of the world” from the conventions of 
“story” develops into a formal-structural engagement with the affect of lived-time and -
space, duration and environment, a singular aesthetic practice formed around the lived-
experience of subjects and counterpoised against narrative “information.” Evoking a 
similar trajectory to that taken by Pasolini toward his “Cinema di Poesia,” Kovács 
describes the transition from the “first-” to the “second-period” of Tarr’s films as a 
negotiation between verisimilar filmic “realism” and a creatively generative artifice that 
he classes as “poetic/lyrical.”238 Kovács further suggests that this transition represents an 
aesthetic shift from an “objective” description of real social conditions to a more 
authorial expression of a point of view representing the “true” reality of a human nature 
that undergirds those conditions.239 Essentially, says Kovács, there occurs here a conflict 
not so much between realism and artifice, but between “a personal and an impersonal 
representation of reality.”240 He takes this conflict to effect the development of (the) two 
fundamental figures in Tarr’s film-worlds: the environment (setting, spatial orientation, 
landscape) and the characters (primarily in terms of their dialogue and disposition).241   
Charting the structural shift in Tarr through this period, Kovács identifies the 
“first” period as “realist” in both its environment and characterisation, and the 
somewhat-anomalous Almanac of Fall as representing realist characters in a 
“poetic/lyrical” environment. It is by reversal of the latter, from Damnation onwards, that 
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the basic structural logic of the mature Tarr style is inaugurated; Kovács dubs this 
schema, placing “poetic” characters in “realist environments, “the pseudo form of the 
real.”242 Kovács finds that the introduction as set-designer (and actor) of Gyula Pauer – an 
esteemed artist of the Hungarian avant-garde, who had in the 1970s initiated a 
movement of so-called “PSEUDO art”243 – had greatly influenced Tarr’s filmmaking 
practice. This partnership inspired the emergence of an apparently postmodern self-
reflexivity, in which a conscious intermingling of “realism” and “artifice” created, as 
Kovács puts it, “the feeling of reality in an artificially created pseudo-world.”244 In so 
doing, however, Kovács considerably downplays the role of Krasznahorkai – to whom he 
ascribes the (admittedly significant) innovation of a circular narrative form, and a poetic 
diction through which to formulate an uncanny disjuncture between characters and their 
social milieu.245 For Kovács, the idea of circular time that Tarr reads from Krasznahorkai 
inspires the elevation of a pre-existing theme – entrapment – to the level of narrative 
structure. With Damnation, Kovács suggests, “the illusion that there is hope for a big 
change” renders a formerly static circle - a proscribed limit to “progress” - as a more 
dynamic, temporalised cycle (of return).246 But thinking through the transition between a 
literary free indirect discourse and its cinematic equivalent presents a suggestive line of 
comparison between Tarr and Krasznahorkai that goes far beyond poetic verbalisation 
and cyclical narrative form. As previously stated, Krasznahorkai writes frequently in a free 
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indirect discourse, or, more properly to his inspirations, erlebte Rede. The stability of 
subjective perception is often undermined through the writer’s representation of 
aberrant environments (degraded, animated) and the psyches (angst-ridden, 
melancholic, manic) that respond to them; these appear, as in Tarr’s cinematic 
Stimmung, to be mutually and indivisibly constituted. Krasznahorkai oscillates between 
intimacy and detachment, interior process and peripheral phenomena, in reflection of a 
wider tendency to form “systems” that link the universal with the particular, the abstract 
with the concrete, the sublime with the mundane – representing their mutual reflection 
in one other. A polyphony of voices and perspectives are shown to interact within this 
layering of discourses, where, in the coursing of Krasznahorkai’s impressive prose style, 
we encounter free-floating citations of thought and language, figures of speech strewn 
amongst the “lava flow”247 of verbiage. Direct quotation is often parenthetical, 
unattributed, or signals an internal thought-process or association that is not distinctly 
voiced as emanating from a delimited consciousness; “monological”, official and 
intellectual lines of thought overlap with discourses of a more social or personal nature, 
those of hearsay and memory. Time and space become malleable, or indefinite, where 
the borders between states of being and consciousness are repeatedly transgressed in 
the course of the writer’s wending sentences. At the same time, and for all of this agility, 
Krasznahorkai’s prose takes on a particularly labyrinthine quality, characterised by manic 
digression, extenuation and correction – circumlocution, even - in the free indirect 
description of its subjects’ psycho-physical experience; the manic quality of 
                                                          
247 George Szirtes, “Foreign Laughter : Foreign Music” in Music and Literature 2 (Spring 2013), p.97. 
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Krasznahorkai’s prose also displays the significant influence of the Austrian writer Thomas 
Bernhard, to whom, as Zsuzsa Selyem suggests, he pays tribute in the “screenplay” for 
The Turin Horse.248 This circumlocutory tendency retards the progressive plotting of 
narrative and extends instead toward a reflexive awareness of erlebnis, the happening of 
lived-experience in the “real-time” of its perception, which accords with (or inspires) the 
obsessive observation of Tarr. In this sense, it is not only the total form of these 
narratives, but their affective tone and estranging method of description that is 
transposed to film – even before considering the thematic content of Krasznahorkai’s 
novels.  
Much has been made elsewhere of the comparable stylistic tendencies that can 
be found in the novels of Krasznahorkai and in Tarr’s films.249 Most often, these 
evaluations will recognise that the long and rambling sentences of Krasznahorkai’s prose 
find their correlative (or adaptation) in the Slow Cinema, long-take aesthetic of Tarr’s 
films. Where this is certainly a meaningful comparison, it does not go fully to the heart of 
the translation of literary concept into environment as it occurs in the audio-visual 
composition of Tarr’s films. The comparative length of their “utterances” does little to 
ascribe the particular nature of their conceptual correspondence; Tarr’s aesthetic-poetic 
vision and forming of a disposition are undoubtedly inspired in the first place by the 
                                                          
248 The Nietzschean neighbour is named as Bernhard, while the father is Ohlsdorfer – after Ohlsdorf, where 
Bernhard lived for many years, and where his memorial museum currently stands. Szusza Selyem, “How 
Long and When: Open Time Interval and Dignified Living Creatures in The Turin Horse” in Acta Universitatis 
Sapientiae, Film and Media Studies 10 (2015), p.110. 
249 Jonathon Romney, “End of the Road” in Film Comment 37, no.5 (September/October, 2001) pp.61-62; 
James Wood, “Madness and Civilisation: The very strange fictions of László Krasnzahorkai” in New Yorker 
(July 4, 2011 Issue): www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/07/04/madness-and-civilisation 
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scenes, situations and figures of Krasznahorkai’s novels. To give an impression of the free 
indirect discourse in Krasznahorkai’s prose, its uncanny affective atmosphere as well as 
the melancholic, apocalyptic character of the creaturely cosmology it seeks to convey, 
the following - a single sentence250 from Satantango - is worth quoting in full: 
His imagination was bewitched almost to the point of paralysis by the notion that this estate with 
its rich, generous soil was, only a few million years ago, covered by the sea…that it had alternated 
between sea and dry land, and suddenly – even as he conscientiously noted down the stocky, 
swaying figure of Schmidt in his soggy quilted jacket and boots heavy with mud appearing on the 
path from Szikes, hurrying as if he feared being spotted, sliding in through the back door of his 
house – he was lost in successive waves of time, coolly aware of the minimal speck of his own 
being, seeing himself as the defenceless, helpless victim of the earth’s crust, the brittle arc of his 
life between birth and death caught up in the dumb struggle between surging seas and rising hills, 
and it was as if he could already feel the gentle tremor beneath the chair supporting his bloated 
body, a tremor that might be the harbinger of seas about to break in on him, a pointless warning 
to flee before its all-encompassing power made escape impossible, and he could see himself 
running, part of a desperate, terrified stampede, comprising stags, bears, rabbits, deer, rats, 
insects and reptiles, dogs and men, just so many futile, meaningless lives in the common, 
incomprehensible devastation, while above them flapped clouds of birds, dropping in exhaustion, 
offering the only possible hope.251 
Here, within the one movement, we enter the imagination of “the Doctor,” digress from 
it to relate his notations on occurrences happening simultaneously outside, while 
transitioning from internal experience (“he was lost in successive waves of time”) to a 
                                                          
250 The ellipsis in line 2 is in the original. 
251 László Krasznahorkai, Satantango, trans. George Szirtes (London: Tuskar Rock Press, 2012), pp.58-59  
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metaphorical register that is as if anterior to it (“it was as if he could already feel the 
gentle tremor beneath his bloated body”). It is worth recalling here that Tarr read this 
novel, and expressed interest in adapting it to film, in 1985252 – after Almanac of Fall, but 
prior to Damnation; in the same year, he first heard Krasznahorkai read the short piece 
“At Latest in Turin,” which formed the inspiration of the director’s final film, The Turin 
Horse (and remained a figure of thought for him in the 26 intervening years).253 To be 
clear, to reference this neat confluence - the outline of Tarr’s “second period” - is not to 
discredit the originality of the director’s work, nor the authenticity of his comment upon 
it. The Krasznahorkai connection is by no means unrecognised; and, in any case, Tarr 
regularly acknowledges his close collaborators, recognising their share of responsibility, 
in interview (for which he tends to act as spokesperson for these films) as much as in the 
film credits themselves (where the names of core contributors are presented together, 
with Tarr). But what becomes evident in reading the above text is that it in fact shows, as 
both writer and director are keen to point out in their own ways, the absolute difference 
between film and literature – and how this difference becomes a chasm when speaking 
of the use of a free indirect discourse/subjectivity, representing spatio-temporal fluidity 
and perspectival flux. Suffice to say that Tarr, with his affinity for the concrete presence 
of phenomenal objects and rejection of special effects, does not seek to represent this 
scene as it is conveyed in words – and yet he is, as he says, interested in “psychological 
                                                          
252 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
253 Tarr, interview by Petkovic (2011). More than this, the quote that prefaces the novel, from Kafka, speaks 
to a central thematic in Tarr-Krasznahorkai: “In that case, I’ll miss the thing by waiting for it. –FK” 
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processes”254 as they emerge from these situations from Krasznahorkai. Against the anti-
theoretical stance of Tarr, Krasznahorkai claims that the director used him “as a 
philosopher…I told him always something about the philosophical background, or 
questions, not exactly about the scene.”255 Perhaps tellingly - though not referring to 
Krasznahorkai – the director admits that, starting specifically with Damnation, “I’ve 
always thought about the questions: what is the power of humanity, what is the power of 
nature, and where we are, because we are a part of nature.”256 As much as it is the case 
that Tarr’s entire oeuvre displays a continual development of formal elements and critical 
spirit, it is with regard to these concerns that Tarr’s pessimistic humanism takes on its 
properly cosmic dimensions. Indeed, the vision of an increasingly “cosmic” disorder 
underpinning the development of Tarr’s perspective can be found equally, and first of all, 
in Krasznahorkai’s novels. It is surely no coincidence that this inclination in Tarr becomes 
apparent from Damnation on, the beginning of their working relationship.  
In that first collaboration between Tarr and Krasznahorkai, the urban environment 
and landscape become a plastic material, fashioned in such a way as to achieve a 
particular affective atmosphere and mode of experience. This was a tendency that had 
ostensibly begun with Pauer’s “PSEUDO art” stylistics in the chamber melodrama of 
Almanac of Fall, but which takes a distinct new form with the writer’s arrival, through 
which the natural world enters at the same time as it becomes de-naturalised in stark 
                                                          
254 Tarr, interview by Ballard (2004). 
255 László Krasznahorkai, “Conversations with László Krasznahorkai,” interview by Mauro Javier Cardenas, 
December 12, 2013, www.musicandliterature.org/features/2013/12/11/a-conversation-with-lszl-
krasznahorkai (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
256 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
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monochrome. Krasznahorkai speaks explicitly of lending “background, atmosphere to 
these movies by Béla Tarr”257 – a view which, again, supports my reading of the 
environmental atmospherics of mood. The writer’s influence thus extends beyond the 
terms of narrative and its structure, and toward the (trans)posing of certain questions, if 
not the particular quality of Stimmung or articulation of disposition by which these 
questions become formed as a discursive image of the world. This image bears the 
reflection of Krasznahorkai’s self-professed melancholy – a relation to (and perception of) 
the world, things, and time that has forever been associated with strange and uncommon 
insight – a negative imprint of the quotidian world, of time and history.258 Satantango is, 
the author says, “really about the world at a deeper level,” than contemporary concerns 
of a social, national or political nature.259 It presents a universal image that is cosmic, if 
not mythic, in quality. Indeed, Rancière suggests that we can “more simply” refer to the 
“cosmological” dimension of Tarr’s cinema – that which develops through contact with 
Krasznahorkai - as the “mythological.”260 Elsewhere, and perhaps more keenly, Rancière 
reads the landscape and milieu of Damnation as mythological and the historical at once: 
a town abandoned by the Soviet project in which hordes of dogs roam, where the 
“wrecks of the socialist voyage into the future” and the “threat of animality…merge into 
the same element, the rain.”261 Further, Rancière suggests that this deluge, likewise, is, 
                                                          
257 Krasznahorkai, interview by Cardenas (2013).  
258 László Földényi, Melancholy, trans. Tim Wilkinson (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016), 
pp. 191-192. 
259 László Krasznahorkai, “This society is the result of 10,000 years?” interviewed by Richard Lea, August 24, 
2012, www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/24/laszlo-krasznahorkai-interview (Accessed January 30, 
2018). 
260 Rancière, The Time After, p.54. 
261 Rancière, “Béla Tarr: The Poetics and Politics of Fiction,” pp.246-248. 
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“at the same time, an entirely material element and the condensation of a whole 
situation.”262 This elemental convergence of the material and existential speaks directly 
to the idea of Stimmung, and Rancière recognises its construction as one in which 
sensible moments become condensed into a “global affect”263 – a term which resonates 
with the concept of (totality in regards to) mood-as-attunement discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
But this milieu that mediates between the temporal (historical) and atemporal 
(mythological), this disposition by which the character of a situation is made present 
through climate and environmental texture, is, again, recognisable in Krasznahorkai’s 
Satantango. Its milieu is broadly but recognisably similar to that of Damnation, taking 
place in an unnamed Soviet collective that exists under a condition of social collapse at 
one and the same time as it is beset by deluge. More than this, it is a setting within which 
the materiality of environment is vitalised, animated, in accordance with these dynamics 
– where the natural and the historical become entangled, coalesced, within 
Krasznahorkai’s free indirect consciousness. Directly following the above passage from 
Satantango, the same figure – “the Doctor”– experiences a disquieting realisation, 
sensing the spectre of a (pre-)historical suffering that is invested, and ingrained, in the 
object-world surrounding him (“somehow preserved in time”).264 It is as if the revelation 
of a natural-historical creaturely cosmology (and one, moreover, that appears in the 
throes of its devastation) has attuned the Doctor to the spectral life of his milieu. “The 
                                                          
262 Ibid. p.247. 
263 Rancière, The Time After p.34; “Béla Tarr: The Poetics and Politics of Fiction,” p.249. 
264 Krasznahorkai, Satantango, p.59. 
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evidence of suffering does not disappear without a trace,” he remarks to himself, a 
thought extended in the same sentence to suggest that these “prehistoric screams” are 
“raised by the rain, like dust.”265 The animation of environment that Tarr’s long-take 
produces, and the perception of meaningful materiality to which it responds, run in 
parallel to such scenes in Krasznahorkai – which tend to inhabit the free indirect field of 
indetermination between the experience of subjects and the phenomenal reality which 
conditions it. But where Krasznahorkai can imaginatively conceptualise and describe 
processes that evade empirical perception, which can mediate between a variety of 
temporal and perspectival planes, Tarr remains wedded to the concrete materiality of 
situations – a constraint that takes on central value in the filmmaker’s work. This means 
that his focus is intrinsically linked to substantial presence and, more than this, to the 
present – to a weighty presence of time. Where this marks a major point of difference 
between Tarr and Krasznahorkai, it is one that takes place with regard to medium, rather 
than worldview. Tarr’s engagement with time is one that seeks to reveal the “face” of a 
landscape or location, to attune his viewers to the address of environment, to that 
metacommunication of material presence evinced by an immersion in the minutiae of a 
milieu. In other words, it seeks to see things from that melancholic, cosmic perspective 
that is shared between writer and director: one that seeks to frame a perception that is 
at once exterior to the human world while gesturing toward a deeper involvement with 
it. 
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Melancholy Economy 
What is presented through Tarr-Krasznahorkai is not a statement but, rather, a 
perspective, a way of perceiving, and conceiving of, the world and reality. Where 
Krasznahorkai earlier in Satantango describes the “nervous conversation” between 
household objects (“that had so far been merely listening”),266 there is an intimation of 
the metacommunications of beer glasses, of decaying walls, and of what goes on 
“beneath the table” that become so significant in Tarr. In response to the above 
recognition of animate nature (if not the supernatural), the Doctor notes down the 
cryptic words “cosmic wirtschaft” (before reconsidering, and questioning his hearing).267 
There is no further explication of the phrase, but it presents an intriguing idea within the 
broader context of that “cosmic perspective” developing in Tarr – and particularly given 
that it is taken up in, but relocated to a crucial point near to the end of, the film 
(remaining unexplained there, also). Wirtschaft is the German word for “economy,”268 
but which, in current usage, can additionally refer to the sense of (literally, domestic) 
management or arrangement that is implied by the original Greek concept, oikonomia.269 
This is a sense largely lost in connection with the more etymologically proximate English 
term, but which broadens the semantic scope of the German to refer also to households, 
                                                          
266 And repeats it at end, in the concluding lines of the repeated narrative. Satantango, pp. 5 & 274. 
267 Krasznahorkai, Satantango, p.60. 
268 There is a more etymologically equivalent word, oekonomie, but which tends to refer to economy more 
at the theoretical level, i.e. as an academic discipline, the equivalent to the English “economics”. 
269 Robert Beekes, Etymological Dictionary of Greek (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), p.1055. 
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businesses, bars and inns.270 By this implication, wirtschaft denotes a system for 
regulating human affairs. Kosmos itself also refers originally to a system of order or 
arrangement, which only later – and, significantly in the world of Tarr-Krasznahorkai, by 
way of Pythagoras – comes to refer to the physical universe; we have already noted the 
notion of disposition as a mode of organization under external influence to which cosmic 
connotations have historically accrued. The etymological resonances between 
disposition, oikonomia and kosmos (as concentrically related system-conceptions) are not 
accidental in this sense, but part of the dialogic process of linguistics – or, from another 
perspective, the fall from poetic “truth” - in which inflection serves to splinter concepts, 
which then harden into common definitions.271 Given this ostensive “doubling” of words 
that connote a form of systematic relationality, and in correlative sets that trace widening 
arcs of influence, what, if anything, might the idea of cosmic economy seek to articulate?  
There is some precedent for the term in the work of the esoteric Russian 
“Cosmist” Nikolai Fedorov, concerning the notion of a human domination over the 
natural universe – over death itself - which poses our ultimate vocation as a drive to 
“defeat its destructive forces”;272 this way of thinking is, however, anathematic to Tarr-
                                                          
270 These are commonplace settings for Tarr-Krasznahorkai, such that “cosmic wirtschaft” could in itself 
describe their aesthetic environment – the opening sequence from Werckmeister Harmonies, in particular, 
stages the movement of the universe with drunks in a bar. 
271 Significantly, Agamben suggests that it is as an appropriation - by the Latin church - of oikonomia as 
dispositio that we originally derive the concept of disposition, as well as its reference to a state – as in an 
order, or administration. For Agamben, this reflects on the constitution of the nation-state, and the 
dispositif for its management; in the current argument, we may refer this concept to the situatedness of 
mood, and the psychic displacement effected in the existential-environmental dialogism of a Stimmung. 
See Agamben, “What is an Apparatus?,” in What is an Apparatus?, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp.11-12. 
272 The only reference I can find is a secondary usage, a commentary on a commentary, found in: Dmitry 
Shlapentokh, “Life/Death – Cosmos/Eschatology: Nikolai Berdiaev and the Influence of the Fedorovian 
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Krasznahorkai, and the Soviet cosmology pertaining to it is explicitly disavowed by the 
director in strong terms.273 A response more fitting with the conceptual orientation of 
Tarr-Krasznahorkai, whose perspective appears to gesture in the very opposite (but no 
less “cosmic”) direction, can be made with reference to the English language translator of 
Satantango (and The Melancholy of Resistance), the poet George Szirtes. Szirtes finds 
that - as with Tarr - in Krasznahorkai “nothing…is about plot,” but what the translator 
instead calls “system.”274 “Story” in Krasznahorkai, Szirtes suggests, is formed in the 
movement between (or circulation within) “complementary patterns.”275 Among those 
he identifies, an oscillation between “microcosm” and “macrocosm” is at this point 
especially significant. Their common root, -cosm, is itself a derivation of kosmos. 
Considered in this way, the sense of intersecting and mutually reflective “worlds” - 
universal and particular, cosmic and domestic– appears a strong implication of the 
Doctor’s enigmatic phrase. Just as important, in this sense, is the implication of a 
complementarity which connects and characterises these “patterns,” of which the image 
of “cosmic wirtschaft” would be emblematic. Szirtes is perceptive, in this sense, in not 
conceiving of these complementary patterns in view of their apparently antinomic terms, 
lest they then become read as a formal dialectic – which would portend progressive 
development toward a teleological ideal, a synthesis, rather than a more qualitative 
encountering of paradox.  
                                                          
Vision” in Life: Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of Philosophy, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p.308. 
273 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
274 Szirtes, “Foreign Laughter : Foreign Music,” p.106. 
275 Idem. 
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While not a work that is directly associated with Tarr, Krasznahorkai’s Destruction 
and Sorrow Beneath the Heavens – written in the period between Werckmeister 
Harmonies and The Man from London, and first published in 2004 – gestures specifically 
in this direction at one point. Significantly, it is a novel in which an analogue of 
Krasznahorkai (named László Stein) travels through China in an attempt to establish how - 
and, more to the point, if – the country’s Classical culture (of art and philosophy, in 
particular) survives within its late rush toward a globalised modernity. László Stein, 
responding to an interlocutor who fears the “horrific speed” of progress and a 
“terrifying” ubiquity of “knowledge,” suggests (through his translator) that, 
Only a new metaphysics can be of help. But such a metaphysics cannot be built on any kind of 
dichotomy, it cannot be built on contradictions, on duality, on some new kind of enigmatic 
designation, it cannot be built on expression with its redemptive strength. He does not 
believe…that words can have any role in it. Nor, he believes, can concepts.276  
It is intriguing, in this sense, to find that Krasznahorkai – in a way befitting Tarr’s own 
discourse – evinces a mistrust of words and concepts. At the climax of Stein’s discoveries, 
however, in a chapter titled “The Spirit of China,” he admits that he could never exist 
without words.277 He does so in a surprising encounter with a sagacious interlocutor, Wu, 
who invokes - by way of abstract poetic compositions that refer directly to the 
philosopher - a Heideggerian ethos of poetic truth, aletheia; a concept of the ontogenetic 
                                                          
276 László Krasznahorkai, Destruction and Sorrow Beneath the Heavens, trans. Ottilie Mulzet (London; New 
York; Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2016), pp.214-215. 
277 Ibid. 257. 
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truth of poetry, poiesis, which we will return to in the next chapter. Wu continues in his 
next composition to propose,  
Things next to one other  unspeakable   density278   
The phrase “cosmic wirtschaft” may be taken as a poetic image of such “unspeakable 
density” – that is, of a concept that evades definite conception. It effects an intersection 
of the two orders of being that Tarr references above: “the power of humanity…the 
power of nature,” as micro- and macro-cosm; or a recognition of an infinite regress in 
articulating one without reference to the other (“…because we are part of nature”). In 
signalling this uncanny proximity between the cosmic and the mundane, such as we find 
repeatedly in Tarr, the figure of a “cosmic wirtschaft” also meaningfully implicates a set 
of related patterns in Krasznahorkai’s work. Within this conceptual constellation, the 
oscillation between chaos (tending toward disintegration, destruction) and order (as a 
socio-historical category, the sign of human culture) is also recognised by Szirtes, and 
becomes legible in Tarr.279 This constellation in itself invokes the dynamics of system, the 
articulation of pattern upon either of disorder or, more properly, nothingness – the 
Greek khaos means “void” or “abyss,” and named a primordial god out of whose 
atmosphere emerged a “heaven,” Earth and Eros.280 Khaos and kosmos thus lie along a 
continuum. Most explicitly in Werckmeister Harmonies, but implicit throughout his 
oeuvre, Tarr’s films demonstrate a reciprocal relationship between the violence (physical 
                                                          
278 Ibid. 264. 
279 George Szirtes, “Things Fall Apart” in Fireflies 2 (May 2015), pp.28-31. 
280 H.J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Mythology (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p.14. 
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or otherwise) that establishes and maintains order,281 and its reflection of an equally 
consistent universal order - that of entropy, the agent of transience and irreversible 
decay. In the source text, The Melancholy of Resistance, Krasznahorkai makes the 
connection to entropy explicit, in a description of biological decay which mirrors that of 
geological forces in Satantango.282 Toward the end of a detailed account of the chemical 
process of putrefaction - in which is revealed the truth that, “from the moment of birth 
every living organism carries within it the seed of its own destruction”283 – Krasznahorkai 
describes of the elements of the human body how, 
…a superior organism welcomed them, dividing them neatly between organic and inorganic forms 
of being, and when, after a long and stiff resistance, the remaining tissue, cartilage and finally the 
bone gave up the hopeless struggle, nothing remained and yet not one atom had been lost. 
Everything was there, it is simply that there was no clerk capable of making an inventory of all the 
constituents; but the realm that existed once – once and once only – had disappeared for ever, 
ground into infinitesimal pieces by the endless momentum of chaos within which crystals of order 
survived, the chaos that consisted of an indifferent and unstoppable traffic between things.284 
It is in regards to this cycle between order and chaos that Kovács most perceptively 
writes about Krasznahorkai’s role in these films – and convincingly implicates the process 
whereby, “the forces of order appear as the forces of nature,” as part of the “circular 
logic” for which he argues more pressingly.285 Kovács links this logic to the Nietzschean 
                                                          
281 It is this cycle to which Benjamin refers when formulating the idea of “pure means” in “Critique of 
Violence.” 
282 Krasznahorkai, Satantango, pp.55-58. Laszlo Krasznahorkai, The Melancholy of Resistance, trans. George 
Szirtes (New York: New Directions, 1998), pp.310-314. 
283 Krasznahorkai, The Melancholy of Resistance, p.313. 
284 Ibid. p.314. 
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idea of circular time, or eternal return, which he elsewhere argues as the basic 
connection between Tarr and Krasznahorkai. But for Kraszahorkai, at least, it would 
appear that it is “once and only once” that a human life (as “realm,” or microcosm) ek-
sists (that is, “stands out”) in(to) this “unstoppable traffic between things”: a cosmic 
economy.  
Furthermore, and whether intentionally or not, the circle of eternal recurrence as 
here described by Kovács (in its conceptual, rather than temporal dimension) invokes the 
idea of “second nature” as it appears in Georg Lukács.286 This is not the “second nature” 
that commonly refers to habit, or at least not in the sense by which we have used habit 
to this point. Lukács’ “second nature” is “the nature of man-made structures,”287 the 
reified “world of convention” which modern human (more particularly, the Western 
bourgeoisie) inhabits. Lukács suggests that, “…despite its regularity, it is a world that does 
not offer itself either as meaning…or as a matter, in sensuous immediacy.”288 To Lukács, 
“first nature” (or just nature) is immediate and potentially meaningful: “mute, corporeal 
and foreign to the senses.” What he calls “second nature” is, by contrast, a historically 
produced matrix of conventions that have become alienated from the meaningful 
conditions of their production. It thus speaks to a “fall” from a “meaningful” to a 
“meaningless” world.289 Second nature has lost its vital grounding in a fabric of 
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Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 1971), pp.62-65.  
287 Ibid. 63. 
288 Ibid. 62. 
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experience, but also, by the same turn, the recognisable quality of human artifice, in that 
its products take on the appearance and status of permanence. The ostensive durability 
and otherness of the world of convention becomes experienced with the mythic, 
manifest a-historicity of natural phenomena. But where Lukács seeks a redress to the 
spectre of second nature in a “metaphysical act of reawakening,”290 it is with Theodor 
Adorno and his reading of Benjamin that this concept finds new life. Second nature is 
taken up by Adorno in his important early essay on, “The Idea of Natural-History,” an idea 
that he reads with particular reference to Benjamin (in relation to Lukács and Heidegger). 
With it, Adorno seeks to formulate a critical imperative that might, “dialectically 
overcome the usual antithesis of nature and history,” without, however, collapsing them 
as categories.291 As Adorno relates, “Natural history is not a synthesis of natural and 
historical methods, but a change of perspective.”292 History (as process, progressive 
change) would be regarded as a natural condition (that is, mirroring nature rather than 
“overcoming” it), at the same time as nature (as ahistorical background) could be 
interpreted as a historical category (that is, as meaningful process). More important for 
the current argument than the method of this dialectic, however, is its intended affect: 
the “change of perspective,” which Adorno relates to an experience of thaumazein.293 
This Ancient Greek word is translated here as “shock,” but is more often accorded the 
status of “awe” or “wonder” – and is, famously, the Stimmung which is said to found 
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philosophical insight.294 Indeed, Max Pensky takes the idea of natural history in this sense 
to be an (uneasy) analogue to the notion of world-disclosure in Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology,295 which is – as discussed in our first chapter – bound to the concept of 
Stimmung therein. To reiterate: Stimmungen serve a disclosive function, revealing the 
relation between Dasein and world in the form of environmental tonalities. But if “natural 
history” can effect a change of perspective, a shock of insight, this disclosure is not, or 
not only, to be characterised in terms of wonder. Indeed, as with the thematic of 
profound boredom, this “shock” might be viewed broadly in the terms of Heidegger’s 
Augenblick and Benjamin’s “awakening.”  
More specifically, the idea of natural-history can in this sense be regarded as the 
awakening of an attunement, of melancholy – for it is by relation to Benjamin’s discourse 
on allegory and melancholy in Baroque aesthetics that Adorno situates this dialectical 
image (a “dialectics-at-a-standstill”) of “natural history.” What this means in effect is 
given a neat summary in Eric Santner’s suggestion that,  
For Benjamin, natural history ultimately names the ceaseless repetition of…cycles of emergence 
and decay of human orders of meaning, cycles that are for him…always connected to violence.296 
It is in this direction that Adorno, referring to the “other side of the phenomenon” of 
“second nature,” enlists Benjamin to assert that, “The deepest point where history and 
                                                          
294 ““Wonder is the only beginning of philosophy,” Plato has Socrates say.” See John Llewelyn, “On the 
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nature converge lies precisely in this element of transience…nature itself is seen as 
transitory nature, as history.”297 As Tom Whyman indicates, the concept of transience is 
later amended within the Adornian schema, to be replaced by that of “decay.”298 This 
shift in terminology resonates with a return to Kovács, where he goes on to write of 
Krasznahorkai-Tarr that: 
Artificial and social orders are unnatural and oppressive; natural order, on the other hand, is 
impersonal and destructive…social order is a conspiracy…the only goal of which is to maintain the 
existing oppressive hierarchy. The only power that is greater than this is the unstoppable natural 
process of disintegration, the result of which is decay as well, and thus the circle closes.299 
As aforementioned – and with reference here to the final chapter of Krasznahorkai’s 
Satantango, “The Circle Closes” – Kovács identifies the structural sign for these works to 
be the figure of a circle, in an eternal return of the same (situation). This follows 
particularly from a postmodern (or, perhaps, pre-historical) turn in its narration, where 
the Doctor becomes author, or demiurge, writing the world of the novel into existence; 
both book and film conclude with a re-description of the opening scene, implying that the 
narrative begins again (and again, and so on). More than this, the very image of a Satan’s 
tango is one that connotes return, tracing six forward steps before retracing them 
backward. But while this figural circularity is certainly legible and significant, it takes on 
another form with regards to the effect of decay, and in regards to the perspective of 
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eternal transience - the shock-optic of natural history serves to shatter the illusion of 
permanence, of any totality of meaning, such as the metaphysics of eternal return would 
effect. In other words - viewed from a certain angle we may see a circle, but at the local 
level its ends do not appear to meet. By virtue of tone and thematic, and the non-
metaphysical, anti-transcendental existentiality implied by them, the orientation of this 
figure becomes clear. Descending – however imperceptibly slowly – ever downwards, this 
spiral thus traces the outline of the melancholic imagination toward an endpoint in 
apocalypse, khaos. But khaos is that abyss from which physis, concrete physical nature, 
rises up; and apocalypse does not denote a final devastation, but only “an imminent end 
of the present world” - and, more than this, by the terms of its etymology, a form of 
revelation or disclosure.300  
 
Figure 6.1 
 
                                                          
300 “apocalypse, n.,” OED Online, January 2018 (Oxford University Press), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9229?redirectedFrom=apocalypse (Accessed January 27, 2018). 
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Eternal Transience 
From this perspective of natural history, the (re)deployment of the key phrase, “cosmic 
wirtschaft,” in the film of Satantango becomes significant. Where in Krasznahorkai’s 
prose passage, “cosmic wirtschaft” is a concept occurring to the doctor ostensibly in 
relation to an awakening of (trans)historical consciousness, a spectral animation of 
creaturely suffering such as underlays the concept of natural history in Benjamin and 
Adorno, it occurs within the film’s concluding sequence as an even more ambiguous 
proclamation. The Doctor is recording observations in a ledger, unaware that the estate 
has been abandoned – it is at this point in the novel that he first conceives of a demiurgic 
power, a realisation that is, in the film, a final and non-self-conscious revelation. 
Reflecting on the character of the collective, the doctor notes down that, “their dull 
inertia leaves them at the mercy of what they fear most.” After a pause, we hear a slow 
ringing in the distance; the Doctor considers this occurrence for a time, takes a drag of 
his cigarette, before noting down the words, “cosmic wirtschaft” (taking a moment 
further before noting, “my hearing is getting worse” – as with the novel). The sound that 
we (both) hear, or variations of it,301 has arisen several times throughout the film. It is 
ostensibly the sound of church bells, but formed of the layering of at least three “tracks” 
that ebb and flow discretely. The first we hear is the least diegetically discernible, a 
dissociating tape or synthesiser loop that evokes an eerie and disquieting harmony of the 
spheres – its droning waveforms oscillating in rounds. On another track, echoing the first, 
                                                          
301 There is a similar sound that occurs in relation to Irimias, but I have not included it as sufficiently “bell”-
like enough to warrant direct comparison. 
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we hear the slowly resonating ring of a large, church-style bell (or gong). Last is another 
field-recording of bells, which are smaller, less resonant, and more repetitively struck. 
The description of these bells in the first (and last) pages of the novel, as “ringing-
booming” and “ghostly,”302 closely befits these tones as they occur in the film: the ringing 
of small bells, the booming of large ones, and a ghostly harmonics (from which they 
emerge, in which they converge, but which maintains a distinct presence). The ghostly 
tone arises, almost imperceptibly at first, within the whistle of wind that is the constant 
background to the film’s infamous opening scene, of which there is no direct equivalent 
in the novel. It shows – as is revealed in hindsight – the collective’s cattle, whose sale is 
the initial pretext for each version of Satantango. Starting with a fixed long shot, we 
observe this herd enter and fill an empty, mud-sodden town-square, then track their 
course on a parallel path through the deserted hamlet, before finally halting again to see 
them exit at its far edge – at which point the tubular hum fades out. This shot lasts for 
close to eight minutes. The whistle of wind continues as the screen fades to black, itself 
waning as a voiced-narration begins – reciting the opening sentences of the novel.303 
These speak of the town’s seasonally inflicted physical isolation, the sound of bells which 
one of its inhabitants, Futaki, has woken to hear, and how its source sounds close by, 
despite any possible location for it being impossibly distant and, so, mysterious. The first 
                                                          
302 Krasznahorkai, Satantango, pp.3 & 5; repeated on pp. 272 & 274.  
303 I am of the belief that the translation of sub/intertitles has caused some discrepancy between texts, but 
that, if there are differences between them, they appear insubstantial, and will have been overseen by 
Krasznahorkai in his role as screenwriter. Kovács, a native Hungarian-speaker, refers to chapter titles in the 
film which are identical to the Szirtes translation of the novel, but which, in the English subtitles on the 
Artificial Eye DVD, are shown to have been alternate translations. With close inspection of text and –titles, I 
gather that any differences are in vocabulary rather than underlying idea or structure – to the extent that I 
believe them to differ only in translation. 
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chapter (“The News Is They Are Coming”) is then announced through intertitle, before we 
are introduced to a dark space, at the other side of which daylight is rapidly gaining 
through a window frame’s silhouette. The sound of what are now more distinctly bells 
begins. Futaki approaches the window, looks out, before returning toward the camera as 
the sound stops – at which point it resumes, he stops, and returns to the window. The 
bells fade into the droning hum of electrical appliances and disappear as Futaki returns to 
bed and bedfellow, dismissing his observations to her as “nothing.” Two chapters later, 
we view this same scene from opposite - a binocular-effect framing the direct point of 
view of the Doctor, inspecting Futaki peering out the window while he sits at his own. 
Throughout, but for a more extended duration than in the earlier instance, the same 
sound of the bells can be heard while the Doctor scans across to observe the town’s 
decaying facades, stray animals and running taps, fading out more suddenly as we cut to 
view him in a close profile. He does not, at this time, appear to notice the sound, or at 
least notice it as remarkable.  
 
Figure 6.2 
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At this point in the novel, and in the same section of the film I’ve just described, 
the Doctor frames his obsessive observation as itself a “system.”304 It is his own form of 
resistance against “the decay that consumed everything around him…the triumphal 
progress of the wrecking process…the power that ruined houses, walls, trees and 
fields”;305 he feels he must note down even “the apparently insignificant” to its smallest 
detail, lest he “fall a silent captive to the infernal arrangement whereby the world 
decomposes but is at the same time constantly in the process of self-construction.”306 In 
other words, the doctor stages the resistance of word and memory - of history as eye-
witness - against the cycle of endless decay and renewal that characterises natural being. 
At the end of Satantango, however, the Doctor’s observation – or his observance of 
order – becomes either (historical) recollection or (divine, demiurgic) creation. In either 
case, the nominal transience of these concrete events takes on the form of cycle, a 
naturalised permanence - which is to say, an ahistorical temporality, such as is projected 
by mythic (or “primitive”) consciousness. Prior to this return, or recurrence, however, it is 
this sound of bells that the Doctor observes, which seem to signify to him a “cosmic 
wirtschaft,” and which draws him out from his observation post in order to locate their 
source. The camera frames the Doctor approaching from a distance along the length of 
an unsealed road, with the volume of the bells slowly gaining as he slowly nears. The 
camera pans to the right with him as he goes to pass but, as he comes to a stop and 
turns, we cut to an apparent POV that itself pans across an antediluvian landscape for 
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305 Ibid. p.54. 
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close to 180 degrees. The ringing rebounds across this primeval swamp of bare, drowned 
fields as far as the eye can see, as if from all directions – an enveloping and disorienting 
resonance. We cut to see a ruined chapel on a hill, from which the more repetitive, less 
resonant tolling seems to be emanating. The Doctor enters the frame from behind, and 
we begin to closely follow his dark form lumbering toward it. As we get closer, the audio 
dynamic shifts further, so that the deeper reverberations fade out to the lesser tolling; a 
person calling rhythmically along with it becomes audible, shouting repetitively but 
without expression, “The Turks are coming.” This is both emphatically not the sound we 
hear at a distance but, more significantly, not some kind of message from beyond the 
physical realm (as the Doctor himself later says, to himself, “I took a common bell for the 
Great Bells of Heaven…I’m an idiot!”) Entering the ruined building, the Doctor comes 
upon a dishevelled older man striking a metal bar against a rusty iron beam that is 
suspended from the ceiling; departing from the Doctor, the camera closes in on the face 
of this lunatic in close up, staring skyward as he continues to deliver his “warning” while 
acknowledging neither his visitor nor the hand that the Doctor has placed upon his “bell” 
(without, however, affecting its tone). And yet, as we continue to watch the straining 
features of this manic figure in the process of his enigmatic calling, the more global 
harmony of the spheres re-emerges, re-establishing the cosmic cacophony that this 
deflationary discovery has just severed. In the following shot, we track backwards and 
away from the doctor as he walks toward the camera, along the path back home, during 
which time the tolling of the “bell” continues over the ghostly harmony, with the latter 
fading out. Returning home, he begins to board himself into his observation post, into 
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complete darkness, in which he begins to “write” the self-same narration with which the 
film begins – and during which, the ghostly, ringing-boom of the bells begins again. 
Where the narration cuts out for the credits, the tubular drone of bells continues after 
even they are finished. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 
 
Figure 7.2 
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With reference to Satantango’s structure and Tarr’s faithful representation of it, 
Kovács locates Krasznahorkai’s major contribution to the director’s project in this circular 
narrative dynamic, or in its animation of a preceding thematic principle. This follows what 
he calls a “dialectics of hope and hopelessness,”307 which in the earlier films had been 
marked by a cycle of inertia that, after Krasznahorkai, proceeds along an ostensive, if 
deceptive, causal linearity. Where before we rotate on or around a central axis, as if held 
by some magnetic force, with the narrative structures of Krasznahorkai we are loosed to 
advance along an outer edge, but become unaware of the inwardly curving arc of its 
trajectory. This new direction, then, plays out thematically at the level of narrative 
structure – or as a reflection of content by form – in which the earlier “dialectics of hope 
and hopelessness” engender a more extensive discourse on “story.” “In each of these 
films,” the director states, “you can see a combination of faiths, beliefs and interests. But 
each faith is revealed as based on illusion. And then it spreads thin and disappears.”308 
Each narrative cycle belies the self-same lack of qualitative development that figures a 
loss of faith in progress, reflecting an historical consciousness which takes on universal, 
mythic proportions. This is the “post-historical” condition which Rancière posits as a 
central subject of his study, and describes as “the disenchantment regarding the 
capitalist promise following the collapse of the socialist one.”309 It is part of the 
historically conditioned atmosphere with which the films become increasingly infused, an 
affective existential mood that responds to “the morose, uniform time of those who no 
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longer believe in anything.”310 This is the time against which Rancière posits a “time 
after” (time, history, story), which the “radical materialism” of the films present through 
their departure from literature.311 Neither book(s) nor film(s) are “about” the dissolution 
of Communism, nor its previous course, nor that of any historical period in particular; the 
writer says that it is enough to know that they are set in the 20th century. Both of Tarr 
and Krasznahorkai are more directly concerned with material poverty as a cultural 
condition, which the writer calls, “a kind of universal domain of human experience which 
has its own world; destitution, by contrast, only means that instead of having this world, 
you merely exist in the fact that you have no money at all, in a system where others 
do.”312 The loss of this culture of poverty (in globalised capitalism) forms part of the 
background image for both of their work, toward which Rancière too gestures: the loss of 
vocation, of meaning, of experience in its communal dimension. With Satantango, and in 
a way that affirms the structure of experience named by Stimmung, Krasznahorkai was, 
“only concerned to explore why everyone around me seemed as sad as the rain falling on 
Hungary and why I myself was sad, surrounded as I was by such people, in the rain.”313 
While the author is speaking here of a particular, and historically resonant, time and 
place – Hungary during the slow “thaw” of the Soviet period – we must recall that he 
takes this perspective to be “about the world at a deeper level,” or in other words, 
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concerning the phenomenal qualities of time, place, situation and psychology that 
together underlay the totalising, artificially harmonising plot of narrative pattern. The 
dense richness of his prose seeks to describe and analogise the unseen intersection of 
those orders of being within which the “story” of “history” occurs and recurs, winding 
between the universal and its particularities, between abstract forces and their concrete 
manifestations. 
It is in this relation that Kovács has foregrounded the idea of eternal return, 
where, “Circularity for Krasznahorkai, just like for Tarr, does not appear in a static closed 
form, but rather in the eternal return of the same situation, always flashing the possibility 
of a change and always falling back to the same misery.”314 Whether, or to what degree, 
this figure of eternal return is specifically related to the Nietzschean aphorism is a subject 
of contention, as is the extent to which this would be the initiative of either Tarr or 
Krasznahorkai. In an earlier essay, Kovács himself had identified a “closed, circular time-
concept,” which was proof of their mutual inspiration by Nietzsche.315 Rainer J. Hahnshe’s 
essay on Nietzschean thematics in Satantango offers compelling analysis of the 
psychology of freedom and order, and a sharply drawn reading of amor fati in the central 
child suicide.316 But Nietzschean affirmation of the will to power, the object of the 
thought experiment figured by eternal recurrence is severely undercut by Tarr’s final 
cinematic statement, The Turin Horse – inspired in the first place by the great 
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philosopher’s inability to suffer the practical weight of his own theories. Furthermore, it 
should be added that eternal return and cyclical time are not specifically Nietzschean 
innovations, and had roots in both Ancient cosmology and its modern interpretation. 
Rancière calls Krasznahorkai “Schopenhauerian,” with reference to the philosopher who 
most closely prefigures eternal return in Nietzsche, inspiring the latter’s (active) 
affirmation of life as a reaction to the former’s (passive) pessimism.317  At least one 
interviewer has posited to Krasznahorkai that Eliade Mircea’s idea of eternal return in the 
form of myth and ritual, the alternation of sacred and profane time, may also have been 
an inspiration – which the writer, in part, affirms, while expressing his eventual 
disillusionment with Mircea’s thought.318 Reflecting on their work together in the same 
interview, Krasznahorkai proposes a more profane explanation that both mirrors Kovács 
and fruitfully expands the idea of circular of time toward the notion of habit (and away 
from the metaphysics of eternal recurrence). “What Tarr offers,” Krasznahorkai suggests, 
“is a vision of the circularity of time, of the small rituals we perform to protect ourselves, 
as well as a certain luminosity, flashes of light that show us another way.”319 This raises 
the question of what it is that we humans are supposed to be protecting ourselves from – 
“what we fear most”: the cosmic economy of creaturely existence, of biological 
vulnerability, the gratuity of being and its eternal transience, the signs of which are death 
and entropic decay; but, also, viewed from outside the human, regrowth and renewal. 
The “small rituals” through which we contend with this cosmic fate can be viewed in 
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terms of those systems of faith, their narrative patterns and habitual customs, through 
which chaos is made governable, or forgettable - manifestations of the hope that a 
totality of meaning might become revealed in time. Kovács posits in this connection that, 
for Tarr and Krasznahorkai alike, “fate…is the unchanging, the eternal return.”320 We 
might refer to “the unchanging” as ahistorical, or “mythic” – a connection that Adorno 
makes in terms of the atemporality of nature, whether primary or “second.”321 As to the 
“flashes of light,” illuminating “another way”: where Krasznahorkai can describe the 
illumination of, and awakening to, this mode of consciousness – as in the sentence from 
Satantango – Tarr seeks alternative means through which to make this perspective 
concrete, or present.  
 
Mitsein, or Being-with 
As Tarr’s clearest statement on Nietzsche reminds us, the point made clear in the 
anecdote of The Turin Horse is that “we have to understand and get closer to the real 
things”322 - to their “unspeakable density” - rather than to create theories governing or 
anticipating them. This is implicit, too, in Pasolini’s “Cinema di Poesia” – seeking to 
overcome the binds of ideology in the direction of “reality,” in its “pre-grammatical” 
dimension. In this view, words and concepts do disservice to the experience of this reality 
– to the chaos that order seeks to articulate, or make intelligible. This is a distinction Tarr 
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makes, or otherwise implies, repeatedly. His filmmaking rationale is based upon this 
“primitive” nature of cinematic language, which marks the distinction between his own 
work and Krasznahorkai’s – poetry and prose, word and image, theory and praxis. It is 
significant, in this respect, to note Kovács’ observation of an almost 50% decrease in time 
devoted to dialogue between Almanac of Fall and Damnation.323 Being lost for words - 
not only led astray by them, as remains consistently the case - becomes a strongly 
thematic element from the point at which they become most inspired by prose. Like 
Pasolini in his modelling of the cinema of poetry on prose technique, Tarr’s cinema 
becomes more “primitive” and poetic by relation to its literary pretext. Indeed in 
Damnation, “the singer” muses on this subject - “you lose your words,” she croons, in a 
prefiguration of the film’s final scenes; there, our protagonist is left barking at dogs, 
described by Tarr as going, “into nature.”324 Earlier, the same character, Karrer, reflects 
that, “all stories are stories of disintegration” – a view that is held in more or less identical 
terms by the director. This preoccupation is evident in a short piece, “Why I Make Films,” 
which Tarr wrote during preproduction of this film, where he states,  
I despise stories, as they mislead people into believing that something has happened. In fact, 
nothing really happens as we flee from one condition to another. Because today there are only 
states of being – all stories become obsolete and clichéd, and have resolved themselves. All that 
remains is time.325 
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This is an early example of Tarr’s insistent view upon the repetition of “the same old 
story, since the Old Testament,” which is resisted in his cinema through the 
representation of experienced time. In this direction, Agamben posits in an essay on 
“Time and History” that,  
Every conception of history is invariably accompanied by a certain experience of time which is 
implicit in it…Similarly, every culture is first and foremost a particular experience of time, and no 
new culture is possible without an alteration in this experience. The original task of a genuine 
revolution, therefore, is never merely to ‘change the world’, but also – and above all – to ‘change 
time’.326 
Insofar as Tarr is involved with his particular conception of time, the foregrounding of it 
as the medium of experience, life, he is responding to a certain conception of history. To 
this end, Tarr’s repeated reference to the Old Testament - whether wittingly or as a more 
rhetorical figure - locates story within history. That is, linear and, so, properly historicised 
time – a positive progression toward a (messianic, or otherwise utopian) telos - is a 
Judeo-Christian innovation.327 Within the circular concept of time that had predominated 
in the West beforehand there is no experience of historicity as we now conceive it.328 
Perhaps as important, given the tone and trajectory of Tarr’s oeuvre, is that it is also from 
this same point that the idea of an end to time first enters the Western psyche, in the 
Christian eschatology of apocalypse and judgement day. It is in this direction that Kovács’ 
claim of eternal recurrence/narrative circularity might best be re-positioned. As covered 
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in the first chapter, the narrative circle is a means toward implicating the viewer in the 
ruse of expecting a qualitative change in the circumstances of those inhabiting its milieu, 
habituating an awareness of environment and a mode of being-in-the-world in which we 
become mutually suspended by temporal distension. With reference to the above quote 
from Tarr, this mode of implication presents us with the apparition of story while instead 
positioning us within a state of being – its integral dispositif implies a displacement into a 
certain disposition, a disclosure of situatedness that produces an affective psycho-
physical Stimmung. In so doing, the narrative circle in Tarr figures, at its structural level, a 
fatal path – the time in which the human story meets its dissolution beneath a higher 
power, the realisation of time’s destructive force. This appears to be recognised in itself 
by Irimias in Satantango, the chief manipulator whose superior verbal dexterity elevates 
him within this world to the position of (false) messiah. His first expression, in novel and 
film alike, speaks to time and fate: referring to two clocks, neither of which shows the 
“correct” time, he speaks to the one pointing into the future as showing, “not so much 
time as the eternal reality of the exploited, and we are to it as the bough of a tree to the 
rain that falls upon it: in other words we are helpless.”329  
With regard to this dissolution of narrative into fate, and with reference to Szirtes’ 
assertion that Krasznahorkai’s novels are less about plot than “system,” I would like to 
suggest that this disposition can be viewed, with only minor diversion, as an implication 
of free indirect discourse; and, so, the “cinema of poetry.” Specifically, in speaking of 
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Pasolini’s “free indirect subjectivity,” Deleuze refers to Jean Mitry’s notion of a 
“generalised semi-subjective” viewpoint in cinema, which he associates with a mobile 
camera that, “no longer mingles with the character, nor is it outside: it is with him.”330 
With reference to this with-ness, Deleuze expands Mitry’s observation by re-coining this 
perspective as a “truly cinematographic Mitsein.”331 Mitsein translates from German as 
“being-with,” and holds a prominent position within Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world. Indeed, Heidegger suggests that Dasein (“being-there”) and its being-
in-the-world are essentially also Mitsein. Being-with refers to the fundamentally social 
context(ure) of being-in-the-world, the dialogic character of human being, through which 
meaning, or understanding – as discourse (Rede, as in erlebte Rede) - is collectively 
formed, shared and projected.332 Even being alone is a being-with in this sense, given 
that an understanding of solitude can only be formed with reference to the social body 
(from which I exclude myself). Deleuze, however, is less interested in this phenomenon 
from within its socio-ontological aspect than as a formal-technical device which oscillates 
between subjective and objective points of view, or which renders them indiscernible. His 
formulation speaks of free indirect discourse as testament to “a system which is always 
heterogeneous, far from equilibrium,”333 constituting a semi-subjective perspective that, 
“sets itself up as an autonomous vision of the content.”334 It is a special form of 
“perception-image” (or image of perception) that reflects (and is transformed by) a 
                                                          
330 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.74. 
331 Idem. 
332 Heidegger, BT, pp.153-168. 
333 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.75. 
334 Ibid., p.76. 
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“camera self-consciousness” that, “no longer marks an oscillation between two poles, but 
an immobilisation according to a higher aesthetic form.”335 This is a significant point of 
resonance, given the foregrounded status of perceptual experience in Tarr’s cinema: not 
only as attunement, but also in terms of the observer and seer-figures that populate 
these films, and around whom the camera’s autonomous excursions orbit. Our 
acquaintance with the Doctor’s life-consuming duties at his observation post – the filling 
and filing of writing ledgers, in which he records verbal and pictorial notes – is a key 
example here, evincing a veritable “cinematographic being-with.” In a single shot, the 
camera looks directly out a window (at a dog drinking from a puddle), before slowly 
drawing back and scanning down, across a desk and the objects assembled upon it, until 
we have a close-up of a notepad being drawn upon, and which, resting momentarily, we 
come to view from over the Doctor’s shoulder. From this (classical) point of view shot, we 
draw back further, to then watch the doctor from behind, at his window – a recurrent 
image in Tarr, from Damnation through The Turin Horse, to be discussed further in the 
next chapter. The Doctor rises, with difficulty, and the camera rotates to observe him 
cross the room, pick up a few more notebooks and return to his post. Movements then 
proceed in reverse to again watch out the window from beside the Doctor’s perspective 
and again look over his shoulder as he transcribes the events happening outside, before 
again scanning across various items on the desk, and returning to a direct view out of the 
window. It is in the course of moments such as these that the relation of camera-
consciousness to character perspective becomes most “felt,” while least distinctively 
                                                          
335 Ibid. p.78. 
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discernible. Like the Krasznahorkian sentence, in which we pass back and forth between 
frames of perspective, here we are at points interpolated into the doctor’s point of view 
more or less directly, while becoming entirely autonomous at others; such transitions in 
Tarr occur most often within the same movement, a continuum, as is the case here. We 
observe the observer as much as identify with his perspective (while sharing in his 
particularised “vocation” in so doing). In these encounters, the camera traverses the free 
indirect space between centres of perspective, becoming autonomous, embodied, in 
slowly but continuously seeking out an angle on the “action.” Our “being-with” becomes 
as much discursive as it is proximal – the integral purpose or “meaning” of the shot 
becomes the revelation, or de-limitation, of this form of life as an environed being. A 
mobilised and foregrounded perception effects, either sequentially or simultaneously, a 
sense of accompaniment as well as distance; of being-in-a-world while reflecting upon it 
– without, however, referring it toward some higher (symbolic or allegorical) meaning. 
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But there is another way to view the formal heterogeneity of being-with, with 
regards to a particular sense of what “with” itself implies. We see this in the way that 
Thomas Elsaesser invokes Mitsein in reflecting on the politics of representation and 
identity in the “postheroic narratives” of contemporary European cinema.336 This is a 
cinema no longer grounded in “national” or “independent” models, or in identification 
with the kind of “heroic” narrative which would imply a self-other schemata, but which 
would affirm difference and incompatibility as principles of a new form of community 
(that is irreducible to self-identity). It is, as such, positioned within a “new thinking of the 
“we” after the collective and after the subject,”337 and with relation to the context of that 
postmetaphysical thinking which forms the background of the current argument. 
Elsaesser mobilises Jean-Luc Nancy’s critique of Heidegger’s Dasein and his extension of it 
toward thinking a community founded on a “being-with,” in which,   
“With” implies proximity and distance, precisely the distance of the impossibility to come together 
in a common being. That is the core of the question of community; community doesn’t have a 
common being, a common substance, but consists in “being-in-common”. From the starting point 
it’s a sharing, but sharing what? Sharing nothing, sharing the space between.338 
Seen in this way, “with” neither produces difference nor collapses identity, but renders 
them neutralised – “inoperative” – in the impossibility of a common being, of unity as/or 
identity. This is an idea that we will return to, with Agamben, in the final chapter. 
                                                          
336 Thomas Elsaesser, “European Cinema and the Postheroic Narrative: Jean-Luc Nancy, Claire Denis, and 
Beau Travail” in New Literary History 43, no.4 (Autumn, 2012), pp.703-725. 
337 Ibid. p.709. 
338 Ibid. pp.712-713. Elsaesser cites a Round-table discussion held at the European Graduate University in 
2001, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/nancy-roundtable-discussion2001.html  
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Elsaesser builds on Nancy’s designation in order to posit that, in avoiding binary 
opposition and instead “sharing the space between,” 
Mit-sein would thus be a constantly shifting relation of distance and proximity, of contiguity and 
presence, of the field of vision and its effacement or invisibility, of the single point of view and its 
multiple, impossible refractions.339  
As it comes to cinema, it is a model that, he says, would break with “traditional notions of 
identity and difference,” and with the corresponding epistemologies that think the screen 
as mirror (of subjectivity) or window (onto objective realism).340 Tarr’s cinema, and its use 
of a free-indirect image, can be positioned in this “space between,” in this “being-with.” 
Indeed, Elsaesser places Tarr among a group of filmmakers who operate in this 
“postheroic” interstice, who are not “beholden to either a nationalist or an antination 
agenda” and who present,  
a cinema of contemplative purity, of images uncontaminated by narrative, genre, or message, and 
thus of a world washed clean again, reborn as it were, in the spirit of cinematic poetry and 
presence.341  
This is a description that befits the current discourse on Tarr. Indeed, the idea of a world 
“washed clean” of story, ideology and identity could be taken as mode of being that has 
awakened to its “second nature”; one which, (Elsaesser later implies) opens onto “the 
(liberating, renewing) meaninglessness of the world, and our being in it.”342 With Tarr in 
                                                          
339 Ibid. 713. 
340 Ibid. p.711. 
341 Ibid. pp.705-706. 
342 Ibid. p.719. 
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particular, the long-take functions as the special means of invoking this poetry and 
presence. More specifically, Tarr invokes the poetry of presence, such as that which 
inspired Pasolini when he suggested that, “physicity is poetic in itself, because it is an 
apparition…full of mystery…ambiguity…polyvalent mystery”; an “unspeakable density.” 
The literal sense in which we are “with” characters in Tarr extends beyond our witnessing 
their role in a series of actions, and instead toward an experience of the temporality, 
material environment, and affective atmosphere in which they are encountered.  
And yet, insofar as these narratives are structured in the form of a circle, or spiral, 
which implicates the viewer in the illusion of qualitative change to the circumstances 
represented therein, the notion of “being-with” takes on a new, psychological dimension. 
Tarr posits his own suspicion of verbal communication, and practice of seeking 
metacommunications, within the scope of his attention to “internal psychological 
processes” and “the personal being-present of the actors and actresses”;343 “from here,” 
he says, “it’s only a short step to put it into time and space. And that’s it.”344 The passage 
between materiality and psychology that is traced by Stimmung – by way of presence, the 
“concrete” subject of the next chapter - becomes in Tarr a primary initiative. Here we 
find, as well, a final path linking back to Pasolini’s socio-historical consciousness, his 
dialectic of the sacred and profane, and the pre-historic language of images that serves 
to express it. Pasolini states that, “Misery is always – because of its deepest nature – 
epic.”345 His choice of words here is significant, given that it is with reference to the epic 
                                                          
343 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
344 Idem. 
345 Cited in Greene, Pier Paolo Pasolini, p. 43. 
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mode of literature that Lukács first posits his theory of “second nature.” In Lukács’ view, 
the (Homeric) epic corresponds to an age of immanent sense and total meaning, a “first 
nature,” and “gives form to a totality of life that is rounded from within”; the novel, 
which he finds to be its modern equivalent, corresponds to the age of “second nature,” 
and, “seeks, by giving form, to uncover and construct the concealed totality of life.”346 
That Pasolini views the “epic” quality of misery in similar terms, with regards to a primary 
(or primordial) totality of meaning, is established in his subsequent suggestion that, “In a 
certain sense, the elements at work in the psychology of someone who is wretched, 
poor, and sub-proletarian are always pure.”347 We might recall here that Kovács has 
identified circularity in Tarr-Krasznahorkai with “the eternal return of the same 
situation…flashing the possibility of a change and always falling back to the same misery,” 
and that Tarr’s self-description of his development engenders a path toward simplicity 
and purity. Along the same trajectory, the director places a greater emphasis on 
psychological states that are not verbally articulated, but instead realised on formal-
aesthetic registers between speech and thought, as material and tonal qualities that are 
invoked through bodily gesture, atmosphere and environment. A certain mood and/as an 
experience of time inheres in these films’ deferral of narrative development toward an 
exploration of existential condition and situation - a situation in which narrative 
expectations, or hope for deliverance from a cosmically ordained fate, are shown to be 
equally fictive. Narrative is schematised not along a line of causality, of problem and 
                                                          
346 Lukács, Theory of the Novel, p.60. 
347 Cited in Greene, Pier Paolo Pasolini, pp.43-44. 
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resolution, where the corruption implied by it is instead shown to be essentially 
irresolvable. It forms part of a larger continuum, between eternality and transience, 
which projects an epic temporal cycle upon the qualities of its inherent events: an 
ahistorical, cosmic perspective. 
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3. Uncanny Harmonies: Realism, Truth and the Presence of World. 
 
Béla Tarr’s concept of the “primitive” nature of cinematic language forms part of the 
director’s broader rejection of “story,” which, in a seemingly contradictory fashion, 
becomes more pronounced by association with the prose-writing of László Krasznahorkai. 
It is significant in this sense that it is most often in connection with Krasznahorkai’s prose 
that Tarr speaks of cinema’s primitivism, when responding to questions of his 
“translation” of the writer’s work. Where the director bristles at the concept of this 
“translation,” worse in his eyes is that of an “adaptation” from Krasznahorkai of 
ostensibly symbolic or allegorical imagery. It is with reference to this kind of expression 
that Tarr asserts that “such metaphysical things [as symbolism] are far from the genre of 
film.”1 Film – or, at least, his own brand of it - pertains to the physical and the “real,” 
rather than referring to the coded structures of meaning that humans abstract from, and 
project upon, material presence. And yet, in Tarr’s cinema, there is undeniably a 
proliferation of strange phenomena that defy ready explanation, to which a seeking-out 
of a metaphorical understanding would appear only natural. This is the case even before 
considering the vital presence of myriad images (chiefly drawn from Krasznahorkai, who 
also rejects symbolism) that are indeed pregnant with prior association: from the false 
prophet Irimias,2 to a stuffed Leviathan,3 to a pair of “potato eaters” facing earth’s 
                                                          
1 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
2 In Satantango; Irimias is a Hungarian version of the name ‘Jeremiah’. 
3 Werckmeister Harmonies 
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darkest night. 4  As part of the same logic, Tarr claims that, “Film as a genre is always 
something definite, because that piece of instrument which we call the lens can only 
record real things, which are there.”5 Tarr locates this ostensible objectivity of the film 
lens within cinema’s “primitive” language and its intrinsic correspondence to “concrete” 
reality. But even where bracketing this sentiment so that it applies to Tarr’s own cinema 
only, and respecting that it is a rejoinder to the “metaphysical” interpretations attached 
to it, Tarr’s position is problematic when taken purely at face value. Indeed, whether 
intentionally or not, Tarr’s position invokes a medium essentialist “direct realism” such as 
was (in)famously attributed – with a significant degree of misapprehension – to Andre 
Bazin. A formative voice in film theory and criticism, Bazin invoked the photographic 
genesis of the film image as part of a broader discourse concerning the notion of its 
ontological “realism.”6 Famously, the realism that Bazin advocates is closely associated 
with long-takes, sequence-shots and depth-of-focus, as means toward the de-
dramatisation of narrative. These are conventions that gesture toward a preservation of 
the phenomenal continuity and contingency of perceptual experience in the world, in 
advance of an illusionism that would seek to master a total reality. Bazin’s notable 
aversion to dramatic or analytical montage is the emblem of this inclination toward a 
more “transparent” filmic expression, which might reveal a sense of the presence of the 
world of perception (rather than its re-presentation through abstracted fragments). 
                                                          
4 In The Turin Horse. 
5 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
6 Beginning with “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” in Andre Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol. 1, ed. & 
trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley and L.A., Calif.; University of California Press, 1967), p.9. 
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All of those techniques associated with “Bazinian realism” are, of course, staples 
of Tarr’s aesthetic – to a degree not precipitated in Bazin’s own time, but which may 
present an advance along the theorist’s projection of a mythic “total cinema.” And yet, 
for all that the director himself appeals to medium-essentialist filmic “indexicality,” the 
world expressed in his films is far from transparent. Tarr himself says unequivocally that 
he “hates realism,”7 and (more implicitly) filmic “naturalism.” This he posits in terms of 
his affective use of monochrome, where “you see immediately that it is a creation”; in a 
revealing seeming-paradox, he finds that colour is too “naturalistic” and (so) “far from 
you.” This, he says, is “not my style.”8 This style, its mode of producing a sense of 
presence, is, however, the essence of his filmmaking, and in a way that follows from this 
double-movement between a sensible realism and its becoming uncanny, or made-
strange. This movement forms part of a tendency that we have looked into already, in 
terms of the interaction of (dialogic) stylistic registers and their production of a free-
indirect subjectivity - that cinematic being-with through which we enter into, and 
mediate the polarities of, a “state of being.”  
Tarr’s oeuvre is a formal excursion toward the eventual completion of this mode 
of film language, which is, as per the previous chapter, poetic in quality. The notion of 
poetry, poiesis, as this kind of “production of presence,” and its formulation by Martin 
Heidegger as the fundamental structure of artistic truth-making,9 recalls the Bazinian 
                                                          
7 Tarr says: “I prefer things to be dirtier or more elegant than ‘reality’.” Tarr, interview by Andrew (2007), 
p.19. 
8 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
9 In Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York, NY: Harper 
Collins Perennial Classics, 2001), pp.17-86. From this point referred to as “the artwork essay.” 
153 
 
distinction between what he calls “true-“ and “pseudo-realism.”10 With reference to Hans 
Ulrich Gumbrecht’s reading of Heidegger’s artwork essay,11 we can view Bazin’s “true” 
realism within the context of a discourse on the desire for “presence effects” in an age of 
metaphysical interpretation of deeper “meaning.” In this way, the co-constitution of 
presence and meaning in Tarr’s cinema, or of meaning produced by encounter with 
“concrete” presence, takes on the appearance of that “expression of the world both 
concretely and in its essence”12 that Bazin posits as the “true” form of realism. 
Gumbrecht identifies a specific transition in the nature of human (self-)representation 
toward a “meaning culture,” taking place at the end of the Middle Ages. This is a period 
to which Bazin himself refers, and which he admired as an aesthetic model. In a way that 
gestures in this direction, Tarr’s cinema seeks to inhabit and mediate that seemingly 
irremediable fissure between rational mind and material being that is opened up in the 
modern mentality. It is in this same connection that the current chapter will look into the 
quality of melancholy that is formalised in the perceptual regime of modernity. According 
to László Földényi, melancholy is an interpretation of human existence that is formalised 
– or democratised – through (aesthetic) perspectivalism itself, a spatial regime that 
renders an avenue into Cartesian subjectivism.13 Tarr’s “cosmic perspective” is tinged 
with this melancholic character, a reference to the loss of pre-modernity’s dwelling 
within a more “primitive,” cosmological disposition. This disposition is not mere nostalgia, 
                                                          
10 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.12. 
11 Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, The Production of Presence: what meaning cannot convey (Stanford, Calif.; 
Stanford University Press, 2004), pp.72-78. 
12 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.12. 
13 László Földényi, Melancholy, p.125. 
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however, but a discursive model of time and experience. The melancholic disposition is 
implied through the director’s explicit foregrounding of perception and its extension 
through duration, and doubled by virtue of the observers and seers that populate his 
cinema and form its figural pretext. These figures resonate within the conceptual 
constellation of melancholia, which illuminates the instability of historical meaning and 
the transience of worldly phenomena. In viewing a world conditioned by this Stimmung 
of loss and discord, however, new forms of meaning, or states of being, can become 
unconcealed as, and through, poetic experience – what Krasznahorkai calls a “certain 
luminosity.” Indeed, the experience of this uncanny phenomenality speaks to the poetic 
device of ostranenie, “making-strange” or “enstrangement,” which was theorised by the 
Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky.14 As with Heidegger’s discourse on poetic truth, a 
rupture of ordinary perception or common understanding effects a momentary 
illumination of a new way of seeing and, in turn, of being. With reference to the “anti-
anthropocentric” potential of cinematic realism, Tarr’s appeal to a re-vision of Humanist 
perspective can be viewed in this light. Where Renaissance Humanism implies the pre-
eminence of the human over natural being, Tarr explicates the central Humanist concept 
of “dignity” in order to displace the human from the centre of the universe, while re-
situating its essential being within the “concrete” or material presence of the world. 
 
                                                          
14 See Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Device” in ed. & trans. Alexandra Berlina, Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader (New 
York: Bloomsbury academic, 2016), pp.75-96. 
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“True” Realism 
In the “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” Bazin famously references the shared 
word – objectif – that denotes both “lens” and “[the] objective” in French.15 This 
programmatic exposition appears first among the theoretical essays that comprise the 
opening movement of What is Cinema?, and which have been widely read together to 
argue that the cinema, in being essentially a photographic medium, is indexically linked 
to the “objective real” by its optical automatization, which therefore harbours the 
potential for totally transparent representation – if not illumination – of the world. 
Several of these essays appear overtly polemic, railing against formal manipulation - 
especially that of dramatic-analytic editing (Soviet montage) and decorative staging 
(Weimar expressionism). But more than this, they are inflected with a religious 
terminology of faith, belief and revelation that can appear ambiguous. Taken selectively, 
Bazin’s appeals to transparency in these essays can suggest a mythic trajectory toward a 
totally objective representation.16 Read in this vein, it would appear that Bazin seeks to 
outline the process of achieving a true cinematic vocation: to reveal “the real” itself with 
an unprecedented degree of clarity, if not insight – a photographic transfer un-muddied 
by human intervention. Such a revelationist teleology, and its ostensive claim to 
unmediated transparency, was met with resistance upon its introduction to an 
Anglosphere in which cinema studies was held under the dominant influence of a 
                                                          
15 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.13. 
16 Bazin’s reference to a “Myth of Total Cinema” seems, at first blush, to support this idea. What is Cinema? 
Vol.1, p.17. 
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psychosemiotic “Grand Theory.”17 In effect, Bazin’s reputation was tarred by a lasting 
association with an apparently naïve or idealist theorisation of the medium essentialist 
position, and his recognition was for a time maintained largely in contradistinction to 
more rigorously structured theoretical models, or by virtue of his seminal role in film-
theory (and -history). Adrian Martin calls this initial characterisation, or caricaturisation, 
“the pulverisation of Bazin’s multifaceted critical practice into a dogmatic credo or 
prescriptive theory.”18 A more considered inspection of Bazin’s position has since re-
established the broader context and scope of his critical insight, his philosophical 
background, and has drawn attention to the effect of the mistranslation of its concepts. 
As Martin suggests, Bazin, “let films new and old suggest the aesthetic parameters and 
possibilities of the medium of cinema as it unfolded in history.”19 As far as these 
possibilities were concerned, the “realism” that Bazin posits is – by his own admission - 
not a simple or singular notion, never directly defined, and is subject to a series of 
dissections that respond to the question(s) of film style, its inspirations and implications. 
As Dudley Andrew asserts, the closing statement of the “Ontology” essay (that, “On the 
other hand, of course, cinema is also a language”20), “upends the huge claims made for 
raw photography, which may be necessary for cinema, yet is evidently insufficient to 
explain the full phenomenon that Bazin cares about.”21 It is a segue, from this attempt to 
define a cinematic essence by way of photography, to the recognition that cinema is not 
                                                          
17 Thomas Elsaesser, “A Bazinian Half-Century” in Postwar Film Theory and its Afterlife, ed. Dudley Andrew 
& Herve Joubert-Laurencin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.10. 
18 Adrian Martin, Mise en Scene and Film Style, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.67. 
19 Ibid, p.68. 
20 Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.16. 
21 Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is! (Malden, MA.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p.111. 
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simply this photographic ontology, but (as Bazin says elsewhere) “impure,”22 in flux, just 
like the (considerably “impure,” intangible) world from which it is derived. For Bazin, the 
medium enables a mediation between modes of representation familiar to other plastic 
arts, while distinguishing itself - and exceeding them - in so doing.23 As with language – a 
dynamic, historically contingent medium of communication, if not being - the cinema 
evolves through a system of representation that is not immutable or fixed, but which is 
shaped as an impression (or ontological imprint) of the situation to which it responds. As 
Bazin himself made apparent in his own praxis – founding Cahiers du Cinema, and, 
through it, influencing the emergence of the Nouvelle Vague - the language of critical 
discourse can force a change in cinematic language, and vice versa. To this end, the 
“indexicality” of film images that Peter Wollen influentially reads from Bazin, via C.S. 
Pierce, had seen the predominance of a semiotic conception of referentiality as 
characterising his notion of realism (distilling its crux into the relationship between object 
and representation, sign and signified).24  
Against this impression, a renewed push has been made to think Bazin beyond 
the implicitly linguistic notion of “indexicality” – a term he never used, but which has 
become intimately tied to his thinking – in order to think beyond the apparent “truth 
claim”25 of the image (as a correlate to its facticity). This is an observation following Tom 
                                                          
22 I refer here to Bazin’s essay, “In Defense of Mixed Cinema” in What is Cinema? Vol. 1, p.53, which was 
originally titled, “For an Impure Cinema.” 
23 Bazin, “In Defense of Mixed Cinema,” p.53. 
24 Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (London: BFI Publishing, 1998), p.93. 
25 Tom Gunning, “What’s the Point of an Index? Or, Faking Photographs” in Still/Moving: Between Cinema 
and Photography, eds. Karen Beckman and Jean Ma (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), p.24. 
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Gunning, who reads Wollen’s “semiotic gloss” on Bazin as an attempt to rationalise what 
is necessarily abstruse – that, with relation to the still image in the first place, Bazin sees 
the photograph not as a sign of something, but as something that exceeds the facticity of 
representation26. Furthermore, the “ontology of the photographic image” is not the same 
as a cinematic ontology; even less than in still photography, the notion of indexicality – or 
of mimesis, or representational facticity – is not in itself what constitutes cinema, so 
much as it refers to one of its motivations (or attractions) at a psychological level. That 
we believe implicitly in cinematic images should not define our relation to them – that 
they take us in to a complicity of their apparent objectivity should be a start point, and 
not an end, to their claims to resemblance, or to realism. Indeed, and as will become 
clear through the course of the current argument, the “truth” of Bazinian realism is not 
mimetic, but rather phenomenological.  
The non-human fidelity which characterises the medium of photography by virtue 
of its mechanical reproducibility is only part of the claim of cinematic images – one which 
Bazin, in the final analysis, views as a cause for (generative) scepticism.27 Significantly, 
indexicality does not in itself constitute any guarantees to “realism.” As Angela Dalle 
Vacche suggests, the “objectivity” of the objectif is significant for reasons other than this 
fidelity of representation, and more in the direction of its autonomy of perspective – or, 
rather, what she calls the “anti-anthropocentrism” of the medium.28 In particular, and 
                                                          
26 Ibid. p.36. 
27 For more on Bazin as skeptic, see Prakash Younger, “Re-reading Bazin’s Ontological Argument” in 
Offscreen (vol.7 n.1, July 2003), www.offscreen.com/view/bazin2   
28 Angela Dalle Vacche “The Difference of Cinema in the System of the Arts” in Opening Bazin, p.144. 
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drawing on concepts raised in previous chapters, the “indifferent gaze” of the camera has 
an equalising potential, “to displace a human being from the centre and make a person 
appear as an object like any other included in the field of vision.”29 Such displacement is a 
special preserve of the autonomous camera-consciousness which characterises a free 
indirect subjectivity. We can recall here the opening sequence of Damnation and the 
tendency introduced with it, where the human element of a situation is not initially 
present, but revealed through the movement of either the camera, or of a person 
entering the frame. In Tarr, it is rare that a sequence will not encounter a human subject, 
but common for this encounter to be displaced within a more excursive course of 
movement that connects environment and experience. This forms part of a central 
dynamic of Tarr's cinema. A focus on human bodies and faces is at once made central 
(often in a distinct fashion: slowly circling a subject, or closely tracking them), while 
becoming extended toward a figural equivalence between the human and the milieu that 
surrounds and conditions them (a medium of experience). In a similar vein, Dalle Vacche 
suggests that the autonomous camera can “mediate between the human and the 
nonhuman, art and nature.”30 The formal disposition which she describes has particular 
relevance to Tarr’s cosmic vision of a state of being, which moves through the spatial 
proximity between bodies and environments, psyches and milieus, such that they 
become co-constituted as - and in - an integral lived-temporality or duration. In Bazin, the 
anti-anthropocentric potential of film is particularly apparent in his distinction between 
                                                          
29 Ibid, p.150. 
30 Ibid, 148. 
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theatre and cinema, concerning the schism between (human) presence and absence, 
which defines the former and is problematized by the latter.31 The theatre - from text, to 
drama, to architecture - is predicated on the physical presence of a human agent-actor.32 
But in the cinema, “everything takes place as if in the time-space perimeter which is the 
definition of presence,”33 and yet its drama is freed “from all contingencies of time and 
space,”34 or, from presence.  
This ontological push and pull between presence and absence, or of a presence 
that is immaterial but spatio-temporally constituted and physically affective – and which 
thus challenges how we conceive of what is “present” - is among those cinematic 
anomalies that entertained and inspired Bazin’s dialectical thinking. Within the same 
passage of “Theatre and Cinema,” Bazin suggests, “The cinema does something strangely 
paradoxical. It takes a moulding of the object as it exists in time, and furthermore, makes 
an imprint of the duration of the object.”35 Cinema has the capacity to take an impression 
not only of an object at a moment in time, as in photography, but also to re-locate it 
within the opening up, the immanence, of its specific duration – its phenomenal 
existence or being in time. This double mimesis of cinematic temporality is what 
distinguishes it most of all from the other arts: its presence is a presentness of a past (as 
past, present, future, or their combination); it is presence in its happening, unfolding as 
an experience of (structured, or sculpted) time. The cinema not only incarnates, but 
                                                          
31 Bazin, “Theatre and Cinema” parts 1&2 in What is Cinema? Vol.1, pp.76-124 
32 Ibid, p.96. 
33 Ibid, p.98. 
34 Ibid, p.103. 
35 Ibid, p.97. 
161 
 
animates, an impression of worldhood – and this, too, as a matter of time in motion. 
Elsaesser asserts that, “Bazin’s ontology of cinematic realism is above all a theory about 
the inscription and storage of time, rather than what we normally understand by image, 
namely mimesis and representation,” and indexicality.36  To this end, Lee Carruthers 
suggests that the significance of that ambiguity which opens up in cinematic temporality, 
to Bazin, “shows us time, not as something we know in advance, or master 
retrospectively, but as something that is opened up in experience, that solicits our 
receptiveness and continued questioning.”37 In this same vein, Dalle Vacche posits that 
Bazin’s reference to perspective as “the original sin of Western painting”38 is a mark of 
the “illusory sense of mastery over space in depth”39 which it entails. In a similar fashion, 
Bazin judges dramatic montage as an equivalent technique in the representation of a 
spatio-temporal integrity.  
Against Bazin’s reputation as a naïve theorist, he regularly recognised illusion, 
artifice, and montage, as consistent with or conditioning cinematic realism – it is only 
where the impression of a priori mastery of phenomenal reality overtakes that of an 
impression of the happening of lived-experience that the cinema’s realist potential 
becomes disavowed. Carruthers takes ambiguity to be central to Bazinian realism, in a 
way that serves to invoke, “the ambiguity of being – that is, the way it is never fully 
                                                          
36 Thomas Elsaesser, “A Bazinian Half-Century,” p.7. 
37 Lee Carruthers, Doing Time: Temporality, Hermeneutics and Contemporary Cinema (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY 
Press, 2016), p.20. 
38 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.7. 
39 Dalle Vacche, “The Difference of Cinema in the System of the Arts,” p.149. 
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accessible to understanding, yet is always an issue for us.”40 It is in this context, within an 
awareness of understanding and its limitations, projected in terms of artifice and its 
mediation, that we can position Bazin’s suggestion, in the “Ontology” essay, of two 
discrete, but never wholly distanced, versions of “realism.” Here, he delineates between,  
true realism, the need…to give significant expression to the world both concretely and in its 
essence and the pseudorealism of a deception aimed at fooling the eye (or for that matter the 
mind); a pseudorealism content in other words with illusory appearances.41  
“True” realism, then, is something (significantly) more – but not entirely other – than 
imitation.  By way of illustration, Bazin offers that, “medieval art never passed through 
this crisis” because it is “simultaneously vividly realistic and highly spiritual.”42 While 
seemingly abstract as a precursor to cinematic realism, Dalle Vacche points to Bazin’s 
specific admiration for the Romanesque sculptural style as a means to illuminating the 
special relevancy of this perspective. 43 What interests Bazin most, as Dalle Vacche reads 
it, is a “dialectical reconciliation between material form and spiritual content,”44 in which, 
“Medieval art…openly calls attention to the symbiosis of concrete and abstract 
elements.”45 Dalle Vacche quotes Bazin’s essay to illustrate the lines running between 
historically distant realisms (which would balance “spiritual and scientific values”),46 
where he echoes his discourse on neorealism in suggesting that the Romanesque 
                                                          
40 Carruthers, Doing Time, p.24. 
41 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.12. 
42 Idem. 
43 On which he wrote an essay, “Les Eglises romanes de Saintonge,” published posthumously in Cahiers. 
See Dalle Vacche, “The Difference of Cinema in the System of the Arts,” pp.148-149. 
44 Ibid. p.148. 
45 Ibid, p.149. 
46 Ibid, p.148. 
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sculptor, “shies away from major dramatic topics, he is an observer of daily life, 
addressing secular life and sacred themes with the same realism.”47 It is, in this sense, 
where art is able to mediate between abstraction and figuration, the ideational and the 
material, that it can lay claim to a “true” form of realism in the sense of which Bazin 
speaks of it.  
 
The Production of Presence 
To Dalle Vacche, the purpose of Bazin’s true realism was, “not to fabricate a believable 
reality but to disclose the mysteries and epiphanies of lived experience.”48 While this 
again seems to echo the more ephemeral invocations of Bazin’s discourse, with recourse 
to a further examination of the concept of presence, the significance of this idea takes on 
a more concrete appearance. Specifically, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht locates a significant 
transition in how Western culture saw – and, so, represented - the relation between 
humankind and the world, which takes place with the waning of the Middle Ages.49 The 
effect as described by Gumbrecht goes to the heart of Tarr’s disquiet with “story” and 
“metaphysics” - broadly, it is from this point that a conception of existence based on 
metaphysical principles begins its final ascendancy over pre-modern cosmology; a 
                                                          
47 Ibid, p.149. 
48 Ibid, p.148. 
49 Gumbrecht, The Production of Presence, p.24. 
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revolution in, “the concepts of self-description.”50 In this instance, the transformation 
inheres in a, 
…new configuration of self-reference in which men began to see themselves as eccentric to the 
world, and this position was different from the dominant self-reference of the Christian Middles 
Ages, when man understood himself as part of and surrounded by a world that was considered to 
be the result of God’s creation.51  
This new “eccentricity” produced the conception of the human’s being a disimpassioned 
observer of the world, a disembodied mind, privileged in relation to the entities existing 
within it by virtue of its rational agency over them (this, rather than being intrinsically 
enmeshed in a world of Divine Grace).52 The notion of “worldview” could hardly be more 
appropriate than in this instance of its transformation. This ideological shift in Western 
self-conception was at the same time a scission, which saw a splitting of the “spiritual” 
from its “material” (as well as “soul” from “body”). In this way, it reflects a metaphysical 
interpretation of the world, given that metaphysics by its etymology implies this 
distinction of physical reality from immaterial forces “above” it, outside or acting upon it. 
More than this, and dovetailing with the discourse on historical time in the previous 
chapter, this separation further implies that split in temporal projection which opens 
between a plane of corporeal-material transience in its remove from the eternal, 
atemporal realm of spirit or essence; the imperfect real as distinguished from a 
transcendent ideal. Gumbrecht identifies this configuration as, “the origin of an 
                                                          
50 Ibid, p.23 
51 Ibid, p, 24. 
52 Ibid, p.82. 
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epistemological structure on which Western philosophy would from now on rely as the 
“subject/object paradigm.””53 Some implications of this structure have been covered in 
the discussion of the concept of experience in the first chapter, but are worth renewing 
from this angle. The new, empirical worldview privileged the intellectual capacities of 
humankind over its sensory being or creaturely life, reaching a highpoint in the modern 
subject of the Cartesian Cogito. Gumbrecht, with reference to the Aristotelian concept of 
the sign current in the Middle Ages – which coincides a (spatial, material) substance and 
a (perceptual, ideational) form – indicates that there had previously been no such 
distinction between (the concrete) “material signifier” and (the essential) “immaterial 
meaning” in the way that modern, “metaphysical” thought determines.54 It is only from 
this perspective that we transition from ritual, transformation and substantiation – of 
making meaning “present” – to representation, signification, and interpretation. It is 
these latter processes and faculties that enable the separation and, so, extrication of 
meaning from material form, but crucially now in a way through which the material itself 
becomes passed over or consumed in the acquisition of that knowledge.55 As we have 
seen, Benjamin similarly constructs his dialectic between knowledge and truth according 
to the same set of concerns, formulated as it is in terms of the fleeting experience of 
illumination (of truth-constellations) against the categorical possession of conceptual 
knowledge. In each is implied, in other words, that the modern mind has lost touch with 
                                                          
53 Ibid, p.25. 
54 Ibid, p.29. 
55 Ibid, p.26. 
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concrete materiality, or its attunement to presence – to the mute but immanent 
meaningfulness of a “first nature.”  
It is little coincidence, in this sense, that Lukács had located the late-Medieval 
Dante as an intermediary figure between the epic and the novel, and, so, positioned 
between an Ancient and Modern conception of worldhood. As John Freccero suggests, 
“the world of the epic was experienced as homogeneous, a totality of which the hero was 
part, while in the novel, the world was experienced as fragmentary and, with respect to 
subjectivity, radically ‘other.’”56 Lukács finds that, 
In Dante there is still the perfect immanent distanceless and completeness of the true epic, but his 
figures are already individuals, consciously and energetically placing themselves in opposition to a 
reality that is becoming closed to them, individuals who, through this opposition, become real 
personalities…57  
This description chimes with the dynamics of Tarr’s approach to audio-visual 
“storytelling,” which de-centres the agency of subjects within an indifferent creaturely 
cosmology, while at the same time feting the dignity of their resistance and individuality 
of their presence. These personalities are at once shown to be inextricably linked to their 
environment while at the same time existentially estranged from it. They are not-at-
home within world, an estrangement that produces an unheimlichkeit, or uncanniness, 
which conditions the Stimmung of their worlds (as well as our encounter with them). This 
estrangement reflects a corruption in the modern experience of “concrete” material 
                                                          
56 John Freccero, “Dante and the Epic of Transcendence” in The Cambridge Companion to the Epic, ed. 
Catherine Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.76. 
57 Lukács, Theory of the Novel, p.68. 
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reality, which resonates throughout Tarr’s anti-metaphysical cinematic discourse: its 
rejection of “story” and of re-presented ideation. It is also a reference that takes on 
special gravitas by relation to the central Nietzschean-Krasznahorkian monologue in 
Tarr’s final work, The Turin Horse, which describes the apocalyptic “end of the present 
world” in that film as a consequence of cultural mores: “…to touch, debase and thereby 
acquire, or touching, acquiring and thereby debasing. It’s been going on like that for 
centuries, on and on and on.”58 The neighbour (Bernhard), who delivers these words, 
says that this is “a matter of man’s judgement over his own self, which, of course, God 
has a hand in.” This speaks both to the shift in modern human self-conception and its 
origins in that teleology which is set in motion by the eschatological mindset: when 
secularised, it is transfigured into the narrative of historical progress and enlightenment 
rationality, which would “complete” our mastery over nature (which is to say, death). 
With regard to either utopia, it is not the presence of the present world that is the source 
of meaning, but a state of conclusion apparently lying beyond (or above) the here and 
now. To this end, it is significant that Gumbrecht’s discourse centres on the particular 
point in historical time from which “the plastic arts are relieved of their magic role,” as 
Bazin suggests,59 and which coincides with the birth of a modern historicity itself. Both 
Gumbrecht and Bazin thus gesture toward the period in which the temporal divide 
between events and their re-presentation, rather than their “being-present” or 
                                                          
58 Written by Krasznahorkai. This monologue is delivered by a neighbour from ‘over the hill’, who comes to 
borrow some Palinka (fruit-brandy), and launches upon a lengthy spiel about the condition of their world 
and the presence of its impending extinction. 
59 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.10. 
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“presentification” (“making-present”), became recognised and disseminated.60 This is, as 
such, the transition from a spiritual-cosmological to a scientific-historical frame of self-
reference and world-appropriation. In the scientific-historical paradigm, knowledge 
becomes the subject of (a subject’s) “production” rather than Divine “revelation,” and 
with it emerges the conception of real agency: “the idea of humans wanting and being 
able to change and transform the world.”61 It is worth recalling that Tarr himself stresses 
– as in the above monologue - that the corruption of our world is of a human origin, that 
if there is an evil cast to our cosmos then it is of our own making. From this new 
epistemology emerges “fiction,” the manipulation of knowledge, as well as “feigning” and 
acting in character, where such states of deception can no longer be reconciled against 
the notion of a spirit, or animation, inhabiting material form.62 In this last instance, the 
physical intimacy and logic of the medieval theatre – based in gesture, interaction, the 
production and playing out of unscripted situations – was overwritten in the separation 
of stage from audience by a curtain, and the refocusing through narrative textuality upon 
the unfolding of individual psyches, or subjectivities, in relation to a narrative telos.63 
Following Lukács, we might also place the novel within this relation. Tarr’s rejection of 
story, and differentiation of film from literature, can be read in the same vein. It is not 
with regard to the completion of a narrative arc that his cinema is concerned, but with 
                                                          
60 Gumbrecht, pp.29-30. 
61 Ibid, p.26. 
62 Ibid, p.27. 
63 Ibid, p.30. 
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the experience of, and attunement to, the material presence of the world; and, in this 
way, to a meaningful realisation of the human situation within a cosmic order. 
These are but a few among the complex of phenomena which demonstrate the 
transition to what Gumbrecht calls a “meaning culture,” one that no longer views 
essence as inherent in, or strictly contingent on, a substantial material. This is, in a 
progressive sense, the supersession of a “primitive” outlook – held under the sway of 
religion, magic and symbology – by the critical rationality of empirical thought: that which 
looks to produce knowledge, rather than preserve those ideas that were seen to 
originate from inspiration, revelation, that was non-human (divine) in origin. It is, at the 
same time, the beginning of a new, anthropocentric order of the Western world, which 
has been increasingly questioned in the 20th and now 21st century. What is particularly 
novel in Gumbrecht’s reading is the notion that this metaphysical thinking and its mode 
of knowledge-production has shaped a contemporary culture that predicates itself on the 
interpretation of a meaning that transcends the concrete presence of the things of the 
world.64 In Gumbrecht’s view, the implications of metaphysical thinking – which divides 
subject from object, mind from body, essence (or spirit) from substance (or matter) – 
inheres in the implicit hermeneutic bent of theory in the humanities.65 That is, in much 
the same way that a subjectivity or interiority is parsed from objective materiality, the 
progression “beyond” (“meta-“) the physical dimension in metaphysics determines the 
search for “meaning” (and its effects) in advance of what Gumbrecht calls “presence 
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effects.”66 “Meaning effects,” in this view, transcend the substantial opacity of the object 
of inquiry, to relieve the “silence” or “mute presence” of materiality in a transition to 
transmissible knowledge; in contrast, “presence effects” produce lived-experience of an 
object in its material, temporally-present and “thingly” aspect. Indeed, it is with 
reference to both Gumbrecht’s discourse and this intrinsic connection between presence 
and duration that Asbjørn Grønstad posits the ethical-existential claim of slow cinema’s 
temporality. As Grønstad puts it, 
The temps morts of slow cinema…[is] something more than just empty time, empty shots; it is an 
attempted visualisation of that which cannot be visualised, presence…the process of making 
duration visible is a stylistic means by which to trigger an empathetic investment in the world 
depicted on screen. 67 
This notion - of the spectator’s empathetic investment in, or attunement to, the 
temporality of a filmic world - resonates powerfully with the current argument. In Tarr, a 
realisation of the materiality of time - the affective experience of duration, or temporal 
presence - implicates the spectator’s entrance into a certain situation and experience of a 
state of being. Furthermore, the central narrative dynamic by which this duration 
becomes extended is one in which belief, or the search for meaning, is shown to be a 
fatal illusion (if not an obstruction to meaningful experience). This melancholic 
disposition responds to what Gumbrecht refers to as our contemporary “meaning 
culture,” in which what is to be discovered of a phenomena is always etched beneath the 
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surface, so to speak, and in which it is only from abstraction of what is re[present]ed that 
an understanding of it may be “truly” achieved. As Gumbrecht illustrates, there is an 
implicit bias in our language toward a value of depth, where surface effects are 
“superficial”;68 this is a designation which no one or thing inclines toward being. On the 
other hand “presence,” to Gumbrecht, refers to the impact that “present” objects, the 
world of perception or “the things of the world,” can have on human bodies.69 
Gumbrecht does not argue for a disavowal of meaning culture so much as a renewed 
emphasis on the meaning or “truth” to be found in the presence of things of the world, 
our contact with them, and to the way in which they present themselves to us. To him, it 
is not so much that presence effects and meaning effects are to be considered in 
isolation, or for that matter be conflated, but that these phenomena oscillate in flux 
through lived-experience.70 This is particularly the case as far as he sees presence effects 
as epiphanic “moments of intensity,” which can be the bearers of meaningful experience 
(that cannot, however, be repeated exactly).71 It is against the predominance, rather than 
the existence, of the meaning effects of what he calls “the hermeneutic field” that 
Gumbrecht stakes this space.72  
 
 
                                                          
68 Gumbrecht, p.21. 
69 Ibid, pp.xiii-xiv. 
70 Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, p.xv. 
71 Ibid, pp.98-99. 
72 Ibid, p.28. 
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Observation, and the Poetic Quality of the Real 
The shift in human self-conception described by Gumbrecht constitutes a decisive cog in 
the cosmic revolution that is thematised in the work of Tarr (and Krasznahorkai). That is, 
the background to their work presents the loss of a vital human element that is grounded 
in an integral spiritual/essential connection with the material world, a correspondence 
which had appeared as a natural condition in pre-modern culture. The director calls it 
“dignity,” and positions it as the central value of his work. The fading trace of this more 
“dignified” attunement is the spectre that animates the melancholic disposition of Tarr’s 
gaze, the observation of a material environment by which is reflected the pervasive 
spiritual-existential deprivation in which its inhabitants are mired. By way of a 
comparison carried over from the last chapter, if Pasolini’s early “reverential style” 
sacralised the tragic fates of sub-proletarian “sinners”- made-“saints,” Tarr’s “cosmic 
perspective” encounters a similar milieu with a more universal aspect, seeking to realise 
an impression of the “dignity” of its figures in the face of a fatal hopelessness. As with 
Pasolini’s subversion - or inversion - of Catholic culture, it is with reference to this central 
concept of Renaissance Humanism that Tarr resists that teleology of modernity set in 
motion by Humanism’s central ideas, those which gesture toward the vocational 
perfection, elevation, or completion, even, of (metaphysical) “man.” As suggested above, 
it is from this point that the idea of agency in effecting change in the sphere of fate 
emerges, a transcendence of divine destiny and creaturely life at one and the same time. 
In other words, the idea of the exceptional “dignity of man” that was central to Humanist 
thought establishes the ground for individual subjectivism, furnishing unique privilege to 
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human perspective and placing it at the centre of the universe. Rather than part of 
nature, one of its myriad forms, the human becomes its “interpreter”73 and master. It is 
significant, in this sense, that the director frames one of his clearest appeals to the 
concept of “dignity” as a countermovement to such uncritical Humanism, suggesting 
that, “if we are always forcing our stupid hegemony and our stupid dominance, then we 
lose something which is part of our dignity.”74 This worldview underlies diverse aspects of 
the Tarr-Krasznahorkai universe. It refers to a loss (or transience) of order and meaning, 
and in terms of a more primary communication of, or communion with, the world of 
perception. The notion of loss (and particularly where it pertains to order) becomes 
particularly significant in terms of the figurations of melancholic perspective that 
structure our entrance to, and poetic experience of, this uncanny world. The scission 
between natural being and historical consciousness implicated by this perspective is 
given its clearest form through the dual protagonists of Krasznahorkai’s The Melancholy 
of Resistance - the central section of which was “adapted” by Tarr as Werckmeister 
Harmonies. In the film, we closely follow the “idiot”75 Janos, observing his inability to 
reconcile between an astrologically inclined vision of cosmic magnitude (by which the 
human pales in significance), and the conditions of his terrestrial being within the 
corruptions and machinations of the human world. Less prominent, though still 
significant, is the Sisyphean efforts of Janos’s confidante, Mr. Eszter, to re-vitalise a 
                                                          
73 Often attributed to Francis Bacon, but already referred to by Pico della Mirandola in his “Oration on the 
Dignity of Man” as an existing discourse centuries earlier. See Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, 
trans. Charles Glenn Wallis (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), p.3. 
74 Tarr, interview by Levine and Meckler (2012). 
75 Which originally, in Ancient Greek, meant “private person”, and was linked to the vision of melancholic 
mania; a vision of the world not shared by others. See Földényi, Melancholy, p.189. 
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“natural,” Pythagorean tuning (which ultimately destroys the coherence of modern 
musical achievements). Their obsessions with celestial splendour and universal musical 
harmony - conceptually and historically related in a way that is marginalised in the 
modern age - structure both texts at a thematic level. The mysterious omnipotence of 
the giant stuffed whale deposited in their town centre seems to echo within this 
figuration of a loss of, or losing-touch-with, such orders of meaningfulness.  
The title of the film speaks to this conception, but in an ambiguous way. It refers 
to the Baroque composer and theorist – Andreas Werckmeister – who developed the 
“well temperament,” famously associated with J.S. Bach. This tuning (and other similar 
musical temperaments) sought to moderate the issue of those dissonances which 
naturally reside within the “pure intervals” of the Pythagorean octave. The Pythagorean 
system was grounded in a mathematical ideal of ratio, of the proper intervals between 
harmonic tones (in regards to the length of string which produces them). The relationship 
between these tones was thought to emulate the “harmony of the spheres”: a cosmic 
balance and its resonance, the tenor of which affects the constitution of earthly life; it is 
from this theory that the idea of disposition and of temperament initially emerges. 
Musical temperament, on the other hand, is a pragmatic solution which compromises the 
nuances (and imperfections) of musical tone, which are tweaked into a homogeneous 
congruence. Instruments could then be pitched in such a way as to equalise and 
adequate those natural dissonances, flattening them out, so that a player could transition 
between keys and scales without ever falling perceptibly “out of tune”; where, before, 
musicians and composers adapted themselves to “nature,” to the constraints inherent in 
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“pure” tone. In the film, Mr. Eszter describes this convenience as an “illusion,” during a 
sequence where he dictates the basis of his “research” into a microphone. The camera 
circulates around his person as he delivers this lengthy speech, at once centred by the 
gravity of the speaker while exhibiting a free-indirect consciousness that opens the frame 
beyond: inspecting the notes in his hand, or pausing while pulling focus to the 
background, where Janos sits, transfixed by talk of an errant cosmic harmony. It shows 
the tendency in Tarr to mediate the “inside” and “outside,” where we do not interpolate 
into the Eszter’s perspective but instead rotate around its centre, so that his presence is 
joined - within a single form of movement - to the presence of the world surrounding 
him. The shot begins with Eszter’s face framed in close-up, from which we zoom in 
further still, beginning to orbit the scholar’s body as he pontificates on an “indisputable 
deception,”  
…music and its harmony and echo, its unsurpassable enchantment is entirely based on a false 
foundation…Here we have to acknowledge the fact that there were ages more fortunate than 
ours, those of Pythagoras and Aristoxenes, when our forefathers were satisfied with the fact that 
their purely tuned instruments were played in only some tones, because they were not troubled 
by doubts, for they knew that heavenly harmonies were the province of the gods. Later, all this 
was not enough. Unhinged arrogance wished to take possession of all the harmonies of the gods. 
And it was done in its own way. Technicians were charged with the solution, a Praetorius, a 
Salinas, and finally an Andreas Werckmeister… 
The path outlined by Mr. Eszter is, by this stage of the argument, a familiar one. It traces 
a “fall” into abstraction, into mediating structures that seek to order and rationalise the 
irregular – taking (and projecting) possession, rather than becoming attuned to the 
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aberrant in nature. It is equivalent, in this sense, to the above quote from The Turin Horse 
which speaks of a process of “touching, debasing, acquiring.” That the title, Werckmeister 
Harmonies, refers to Werckmeister’s abstraction in the plural is significant for this reason. 
It intimates a multiplicity of systems (or tunings, attunements: Stimmungen) which seek 
to impose a kind of order. This is clearly implicated in novel and film alike, where the 
outsider figures, Mr. Eszter and Janos, are caught in the manoeuvers of a larger struggle 
taking place between Mrs. Eszter and “the Prince”: agents of (law and) order and of 
nihilistic destruction (or disorder), respectively, and both of them wielding authority 
through violence. But if each of these figures can be said to “represent” a form of order, 
a kosmos, then each is equally implied – by reference to Werckmeister – to rest on the 
presupposition of false premises. Indeed, it is only Mr. Eszter and “the Prince” who are 
able to recognise this artifice, and both of them are defeated by Mrs. Eszter. The one 
calls for total destruction as a way of completing the principle of decay – “in ruins, 
everything becomes whole” - while the other seeks a return to a disposition wherein 
imperfection, inaccessibility and gratuity were considered the natural condition of human 
being.  
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In Werckmeister Harmonies, Janos and Mr. Eszter are legibly connected to the historically 
diverse representations that have accrued to the idea of melancholy, and particularly 
where it relates to the theory of temperaments. That is, these figures relate to a 
cosmological worldview in which medical, scientific and spiritual theories alike were 
based upon a concept of harmony (the Ancient Greek armonia) and balance, understood 
in musical terms – from which the idea of Stimmung descends. Of these 
“temperaments,” which have either been diminished or transformed through the 
modern era, melancholia remains a privileged example for reason of the diversity of its 
representations, which relate to both positive and negative connotations. As Benjamin 
shows in his study of the Baroque, the figure of melancholy can be read allegorically, as 
an expression of a historical relation. In other words, how a historical period regards the 
melancholic temperament can be read as a condition of that period’s conception of 
worldhood. It is significant in this sense that Földényi chimes with concepts from Bazin 
and Gumbrecht in suggesting that (the) “modern [interpretation of] melancholia,” among 
whose foremost symptoms is a recognition of - and inability to reconcile with - the 
instability of order, “spread at the same time that experimentation with perspective 
did.”76 The kinds of expression of the world available in pre-modern image-making, for 
example, in manuscripts and tapestry, tended to represent figural types within a plane of 
existence, rather than with reference to the receding depth of a singular point of vision 
(that might be replaced by any other). Földényi suggests that,  
                                                          
76 Földényi, Melancholy, p.124. 
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As painting in perspective evolved, the standards of collective experience started to 
disappear…there is no common intellect, no common judgement of the world, and therefore no 
commonly shared world can exist. The world breaks up into worlds…77  
This is, perhaps, another way to position the title, Werckmeister Harmonies, and its being 
rendered in the plural. With reference to this new device of aesthetic representation, 
categories of common human experience become fragmented into the experience of 
individual subjects, each with their own perspective – their own interpretations and 
observations of the world. This is a decisive stage in that transition from Erfahrung to 
Erlebnis, from ethos to pathos, discussed in the first chapter – an occlusion of the 
commonplace by novel subjective experience. Gumbrecht suggests - via Foucault - that 
the modern conception of ex-centric world observation leads in this way to an eventual 
“crisis of representation” and a new “second order observer” that emerges in the 19th 
century.78 This new subject of experience was “condemned – rather than privileged – to 
observe himself in the act of observation...”79 Already in the previous chapters, we have 
encountered figures that imply this (or our own) “second order” of observation – our 
watching (of the watching) of Karrer in Damnation, and the Doctor in Satantango. It is 
with reference to the proliferation of these figures throughout the Tarr universe that we 
can refer, as in the previous chapter, to a discursive, rather than a purely proximal mode 
of being-with – one which formalises (in depth) a cosmic, melancholic way of seeing. 
While Bazin views perspective as an “original sin” of Western aesthetics, and Földényi 
                                                          
77 Ibid., pp.125-135. 
78 Gumbrecht, p.38. 
79 Ibid, p.39. 
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posits its role in democratising the worldview of melancholia (a recognition of existential 
solitude and the transience of meaning), Gumbrecht sees the “self-reflexive loop” 
initiated by perspectivalism for another potential. It allows, Gumbrecht says, for, “the 
question of a possible compatibility between a world-appropriation by concepts 
(…”experience”) and a world-observation through the senses (…“perception”).”80 Indeed, 
Gumbrecht refers to “presence effects” as taking place through lived-experience 
(erlebnis), which he positions in the fissure between (direct) perception and (grasped) 
knowledge.81 This idea gives fuller expression to the experiential quality of Tarr’s cinema 
as a bi-directional translation between pathos and ethos: a mediation between the 
happening of an immanent lived-experience unfolding in (and as) time, and the state of 
being revealed within this experience, the total affective milieu which structures a mode 
of “dwelling.” The experience of melancholic perception – a perspective that shows up 
the instability of worldhood, of meaning  – may in this sense be both cause and cure for a 
renewed mode of relation to the presence of the world, and one which can, potentially, 
offer new shape to a future humanism. This, perhaps, is what Krasznahorkai refers to as 
Tarr’s, “certain luminosity, those flashes of light that show another way.”82  
Where Tarr insists that the “very definite and simple scenes” captured by his 
cinematic objectif refer to nothing allegorical or otherwise symbolic, but only to the 
“concrete” material presences realised within them, he does so with reference to what 
                                                          
80 Idem. 
81 Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, p.100. 
82 Krasznahorkai, interview by Hopkins. 
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he calls “the quality of life.”83 This “quality of life,” for Tarr, is “essential” to human being. 
Certainly, the way in which this cinema seeks to realise and materialise an impression of 
atmosphere, tonality, texture and temporality, appears responsive to the essential 
qualities of presence – more so than for any direct indexicality. The camera seeks to 
mediate the polarities opened up in the modern (or melancholic) mentality: between 
“subject” and “object,” “psyche” and “materiality,” as well the “concrete” and its 
“essence.” The director himself speaks of exploring “the tension between human being 
and world.” The recognition of this gap between the individual and the “objective” 
(collective, or material) world - an incompletion significantly implicated by the 
melancholic mindset - conditions the formal quality of Tarr’s cinema. This is reflected in 
the formal foregrounding of perceptual attunement in the course of the director’s long 
takes, which is then doubled and redoubled by characters while being connoted through 
our own viewing position. In this way, it resonates closely with Deleuze’s classification of 
free indirect subjectivity as a category of “perception-image,” or image-of-perception. All 
of Tarr’s second period films are - to variable degrees – formed in the observation of the 
perception of characters who are themselves observer-figures, watchers and seers, 
around whose vision situations are drawn and structured.84 There is therefore something 
of a confrontation between the world-views (ex-centric/in-tegral) described by 
Gumbrecht being played out, but not reconciled, between the camera and the bodies it 
films. Tarr himself has spoken of his camera being “inside and outside at the same 
                                                          
83 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
84 It must be said that many of these figures are drawn more or less directly from Krasznahorkai – whose 
universe is filled with such archetypes, which are transferred to Tarr’s cinema. 
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time.”85 This is a statement the director makes in terms of The Man from London, and in 
which he speaks to the mode of our being “constantly by [protagonist] Maloin’s side; we 
see the world through his eyes.”86 This resonates with the structure of both Stimmung 
and, particularly, the poetic vision of free indirect subjectivity. More than this, it is made 
in connection with an archetypal observer-figure. The surveillance tower from which 
Maloin overlooks the harbour is a locus that serves as a figuration of the self-reflexive 
loop of Tarr’s melancholic perspective, by implication of the camera’s autonomous 
perception of the solitary observation of its protagonists. This locus is our entrance to the 
film-world, and it is from here that the dynamic common to all of Tarr’s films – where a 
hope or belief is very slowly revealed to be fatal illusion – is first encountered. The 
director says that he was drawn to this story – the only scenario among his second-period 
oeuvre not originating with Krasznahorkai – “because it deals with the eternal and the 
everyday at the same time – with the cosmic and the realistic...the totality of man and 
nature.”87 The author of the source text, Georges Simenon, was an unconventional 
detective novelist, in whose works characters and their milieu take precedence over plot. 
The milieu invariably speaks to the natural banality of crime and corruption, and the 
actual “detection” of the crime – which is rarely seen – is secondary to representing its 
happening within a world in which such acts appear fated to happen. As Simenon puts it,  
                                                          
85 Béla Tarr, “Temptation Harbour,” p.55. 
86 Idem. 
87 Idem. 
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Like the great naturalists, I would like to focus on certain human mechanisms. Not on grand 
passions. Not on questions of ethics or morality. Only to study the minor machinery which may 
appear secondary.88  
So far, so Tarr (or, for that matter, Krasznahorkai). And yet, on the level of those narrative 
events taken from the original detective novel, the cosmic themes suggested by Tarr are 
barely legible in the way that they appear through Krasznahorkai. While the director’s key 
themes (and narrative dynamic) of belief, illusion and fate are certainly evident, it is the 
director’s treatment of events surrounding the relevant crimes, their prolongation, 
enstrangement, and elision, which projects this narrative world toward the “cosmic 
perspective” that characterises Tarr’s “image of the world.” It is worth recalling here that 
we are introduced to the second-period Tarr by entering into the position of our 
protagonist in Damnation, slowly receding from the depths of perspective and towards 
the realisation of his presence as an observer. To this end, it becomes clear that, where 
the representation of outsider-figures is essential to the program of Tarr’s cinema from 
its outset to completion, the character of these outsiders and their particular modes of 
being take on a new aspect in the second-period, with reference to boredom, to waiting 
and watching the world.  
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Quoted in John Gray, “The stark moral world of Georges Simenon,” Feb. 16, 2016, 
www.newstatesman.com/culture/books/2016/02/stark-moral-world-georges-simenon 
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Figure 2 
 
Personal Presence 
Tarr’s world-observers reflect a melancholic cast of existential solitude. The director says 
that, along with the “question of dignity” and “the tension between the human being and 
the world,” the other major theme of his films is “the loneliness and solitude of human 
beings.”89 As discussed, our introduction into the Stimmung of Damnation is through the 
above image of Karrer at his window, a figure we later follow through a number of 
situations of (pathetic, rain-soaked) espionage that serve to disclose his situation, or 
existential situatedness, within a material environment. This environment becomes 
realised, as both concrete reality and existential atmosphere, in the spectator’s 
experience of such encounters: in being interpolated into his watching of the world, we 
enter the atmosphere and duration which conditions his state of being. This is likewise 
for the Doctor in Satantango; we might add Irimias in the same film to a list of observer-
                                                          
89 Tarr, interview by Robert Chilcott (2007), p.10. 
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figures, a prophet-informant who disperses the farm collective under the guise of a 
reconnaissance mission, of “observation,” and paints himself as a “partisan of human 
dignity” in so doing. And while not strictly an “observer” in the same sense as the others, 
our chief protagonist in Werckmeister Harmonies is an idiot savant with a cosmically 
inclined vision, a way of seeing that transcends terrestrial being. In the director’s final 
film, The Turin Horse, the watching of the world with which Damnation introduces us into 
the formal disposition of the second-period Tarr is re-figured through the coachman 
Ohlsdorfer and his daughter. Repeatedly (with repetition especially apparent in this film’s 
world), at different times and from alternating perspectives, each are shown sitting 
silently at the window, staring out into their shared horizon - a bare hill, on which stands 
a single tree; they take turns, without communication, to inhabit this perspective. In 
contrasting these equivalent shots, the increasing intricacy of Tarr’s camera movements 
and their length in time over the course of the director’s career - which Kovács 
demonstrates – becomes apparent. At the same time, this comparison signals the 
development of Tarr’s second-period cinema around the staple trope of vision, 
observation, perception and, by their implication, a vicarious attunement. Again, Tarr 
draws his use of the filmic “objectif” toward both of Stimmung and the free indirect 
where he posits, in this direction, that, “The camera is an observer that captures the 
atmosphere of a moment and reacts to life. I don’t want to give the audience a message, 
I want to show viewers my image of the world.”90 But where in Damnation the camera’s 
                                                          
90 Béla Tarr, interview by Konstanty Kuzma, https://eefb.org/archive/february/bela-tarr-on-the-turin-horse-
2/ (Accessed November 3, 2017). 
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retreat is stemmed on becoming positioned behind the human figure, the first among 
Tarr’s second-order observers, in Turin Horse it recedes now further, quite literally 
examining the mode of being which inhabits this ever-darkening dwelling. It responds to 
the repetition of routines and habits over the course of the six days leading up to a final 
exit of all light, revealing more of a “quality of life” that is diminished with each 
increment. Where “the world has gone to ruin,” the only recourse for this last family, this 
last man and woman, is to continually observe the world outside from within the 
increasingly oppressive, contracting boundaries of their existence. Against this apparently 
ex-centric world-watching, in Tarr’s cinema there is a sense in which the mobile camera 
works to open up an intrinsic integrity, to revolve around the centres of these ways of 
seeing in order to take them in and seek their involution. Another shot, later in the film, 
suggests this process of inversion in a distinct sense. After their failed flight to venture 
beyond the horizon seen through the window, and after unpacking their cart in front of 
it, the woman returns inside the house and resumes her position at their aperture onto 
the world. Now viewed from the outside, we slowly approach the window through a 
gathering storm of dust, to focus in on her dead-eyed, grief-stricken face. We never find 
out what lies beyond the horizon, except for what is said (earlier) in the Krasznahorkian 
monologue, and from what is written upon this singular, particular visage. We are drawn 
into the world-watching of characters, their waiting and observing, or their singular vision 
of the world, while at the same time having opened up for us the ground of its possibility 
– “life” as a material “quality,” the stuff of everydayness. 
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Tarr frames the apprehension of the “quality of life” in his films in terms of the 
kind of indexical realism that was crudely applied to Bazin. To Tarr, this is because cinema 
is a “concrete” and “primitive” language – that repeated distinction he makes especially 
against philosophical proposition and literary expression, and explicitly in relation to 
Krasznahorkai. As the director puts it: 
Filmmaking is a very ‘concrete’ job, because you have a camera, and the camera has an objective 
[lens]. The objective is, of course, objective. It records reality – always. The real job of the 
filmmaker, it’s very simple; you have reality and everything is very concrete. The table is a table, 
the ashtray is an ashtray, the window is a window. It’s about how you combine these realities; this 
is the only way you can elevate the movie above a concrete reality.91 
To paraphrase the extension to this view, and one that the director states elsewhere: the 
man Tarr calls “our writer” could apparently compose reams of description about the 
same table, but for the filmic artist there is only the concrete instance of its material form 
with which to work.92 Krasznahorkai himself reaffirms this impression, taking it a further 
step toward Tarr’s own praxis in suggesting,  
In the movies, you can only photograph concrete things, and concrete things have a story. If you 
make a film about this table, this table has a story; you cannot do any different things, and we 
wanted, with Béla, to find a new form.93 
                                                          
91 Béla Tarr, “The Big Wave,” excerpt of interview by Derek Thomson, www.someslashthings.com/online-
magazine/bela-tarr-in-somethings-magazine-chapter004.html 
92 Stated a number of times and in a number of forms, but perhaps best in Tarr, interview by Ballard (2004). 
93 Krasznahorkai, interview by Hopkins. 
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Viewing the statements by director and writer as complementary (and their using the 
same analogy, which Tarr does elsewhere also, suggests correspondence), there is no 
apparent difference between Tarr’s “realities” and Krasznahorkai’s “stories.” Elsewhere, 
Tarr has referred to such phenomena as purveyors of “metacommunications,” with 
recourse to the same table: “other things are happening. We don’t know, for instance, 
what is happening under the table, but there are interesting, important and serious 
things happening.”94 Speaking about The Man From London, Tarr repeats the idea that 
what is important is not what’s on the table, but what is under it.95 It is perhaps 
significant that, in this formulation, Tarr paraphrases another great, misunderstood 
theorist of cinematic realism: Siegfried Kracauer, who was a noted contemporary of 
Adorno and Benjamin. With reference to the original notes for Kracauer’s Theory of Film 
– the so-called “Marseilles Notebooks,” written while awaiting transport out of war-torn 
Europe (alongside the ill-fated Benjamin) - Miriam Hansen writes that, 
Film “enacts the historical turn to materiality,” Kracauer asserts throughout the Marseilles 
notebooks, because like hardly any other art form it has the ability to confront “intention with 
being,” with existence, facticity, and contingency. The direction of this confrontation is downward 
(“film looks under the table”…), with the effect of deflating myths and ideals, conventions and 
hierarchies that have lost their material basis, if they ever had one, in social reality…96 
There are echoes of Benjamin in Kracauer’s film theory, as Hansen points out – little 
surprise, perhaps, given their friendship of more than 15 years, and their almost daily 
                                                          
94 Tarr, interview by Ballard (2004). 
95 Tarr, interview by Chilcott (2007), pp.10-11. 
96 Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Introduction” to Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: The Physical Redemption of 
Reality (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.xvii. 
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visits in this period, between Benjamin’s arrival in Marseille and his attempted escape 
and suicide.97 This is evident in the above line concerning the confrontation of 
“intention” with “being” (the latter of which could suitably be substituted for Benjamin’s 
“truth”). Hansen further points out that Kracauer makes explicit reference to the work on 
Trauerspiel, with regards to shock, allegory, and melancholy.98 Indeed, the melancholic 
perspective of Tarr-Krasnzahorkai is possibly closer in spirit to Kracauer than Bazin, 
inclining more toward the “redemption of physical reality” that is proffered in the 
former’s decidedly materialist outlook of cinema’s realist potential. Echoing Lukács’ idea 
of “second nature,” Kracauer suggests, in the epilogue to Theory of Film, that, “physical 
reality is revealed out of a desire to pierce the fabric of conventions.”99 In that text, 
Kracauer’s socio-historical critique parallels that of many of his contemporaries, framing 
a disenchantment with the ideological outcomes of Enlightenment rationality, and with 
the ubiquity of a scientific-technological worldview that colours language and experience. 
In a similar sense to Heidegger’s notion of technological “enframing,” Kracauer asserts 
that, “Whether we know it or not, our way of thinking and our whole attitude toward 
reality are conditioned by the principles from which science proceeds.”100 These 
principles are seen as abstractions from the meaningful encounter with physical reality, 
materiality. “The remedy for the kind of abstractness which befalls minds under the 
                                                          
97 Miriam Hansen, “”With Skin and Hair”: Kracauer’s Theory of Film, Marseille 1940,” in Critical Inquiry 19 
(Spring, 1993), p.444. 
98 Idem. 
99 Kracauer, Theory of Film, p.308. 
100 Ibid. p.292. 
192 
 
impact of science is experience,” Kracauer suggests: “the experience of things in their 
concreteness.”101  
Tarr himself sees the “concrete” and “primitive” art of cinema as one that seeks 
to respond to this existential address of the phenomenal world – its material presence - 
prior to its inscription (and, so, abstraction) in language, logos. Film, he seems to suggest, 
is a language that does not abstract from material presence, but which can animate the 
essential qualities which give meaning to the experience of the world. What he calls “the 
genre of cinema,” and which can be taken to refer to his own work above all else,102 
would then, and contrary to the logic of narrative convention, present a means by which 
we ourselves might co-respond with these material intensities and the affective tonality 
produced by their disclosure. It is significant that where the writer and director concur 
that the separation between literature and cinema inheres most meaningfully in the 
concrete materiality of filmic representations, it is, paradoxically, on this same point that 
their respective practices most significantly re-converge. Speaking to art more generally 
than his literature in particular, Krasznahorkai again comes close to Tarr: 
 
 
 
                                                          
101 Ibid. 296. 
102 Tarr has stated regularly that he doesn’t really watch other people’s films with any frequency at all. Tarr, 
by Daly and Le Cain (2001). 
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…I hate symbolism. Because this is also the case instead of something, instead of presence. This is 
artificial: a true face on the screen, on the cinema, a true weeping face or happy face on the 
cinema, on the screen, on the stage, is much more variable than every wonderful role on the 
screen, on the stage, for me. Because it’s an artificial way to make art. This is so far from my idea 
about art, about literature, about movies…103  
Returning this notion to the genesis of this discussion, the writer goes on directly to 
state: 
I try to find a way between reality and fiction, between the weight of existence and fiction. The 
right proportion is the main problem in art today, I think, between fiction and reality. Perhaps this 
is an unsolvable problem, but I try to solve it, in my case, in literature.104 
Where not strictly equivalent, there is a real sense in which this proportioning of the 
fictive and the real is, in the visual field of cinema, akin to that dialectical fusion of reality 
and artifice, or the concrete and the essential, to which Bazin often referred. It is 
significant that Krasznahorkai links this to the idea of presence, to a rejection of symbolic 
meaning, and with reference to the importance of the physical existence, experience, 
and bearing of a performer (in theatre) as constituting their significance in a role. He calls 
this – in a form that echoes the director - “the weight of the person…the weight of their 
lives.”105 Not only do we find a route linking the interiority and exteriority of a corporeal 
presence, an almost “Medieval” indivisibility of matter/spirt, of body/mind, but in such a 
way that it refers directly to Tarr’s practice. It is through an intimate being-with of bodies 
                                                          
103 Krasznahorkai, interview by Cardenas (2013). 
104 Idem. 
105 Idem. 
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and faces, in the course of their being-in and reacting to situations of existential 
hopelessness, that Tarr is best able to evince something of a psychological portraiture. A 
key example is seen in the wordless amble taken by our “heroes,” Janos and Eszter, in 
Werckmeister Harmonies. The camera tracks beside the pair in profile, slowly zooming in 
over the course of the shot’s duration, examining their strain against the wind and the 
expressions that pass over their faces. In the background, at a close remove, the facades 
of houses and shops - graffittied, battered, or boarded-up - pass by as a gritty texture 
that is abstracted and made fluid by movement. There is another superb shot of a walk 
later in the same film, the unleashing of “the Prince’s” mob, which is perhaps the inverse 
image of the one in question. There, the camera slowly flows over the sea of faces, 
descending upon and scanning across rows of grave countenance that march silently 
onward in an uncanny, undulating mass. As is the case in many scenes in Tarr, the camera 
concerns itself with the corporeal bearing of persons, the gravitas of their faces, and their 
being within an environment, rather than with the rational causality of their actions. 
These human presences – their physical-material qualities, or corporeal being – are 
encountered within a duration which materialises their existential condition, or state of 
being. They are subjected to a free indirect examination of bearing and behaviour, 
through which is condensed the affectivity of an environment and the possibilities that 
structure it. This tendency is comparable, on the one hand, with Robert Bresson’s  
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position on (or against) “acting,” where he chooses to film not “actors,” but what he calls 
“models”: “the use of working models, taken from life.”106 Bresson explains this method 
using two points of contrast with direct bearing on Tarr. The first concerns, “BEING 
(models) instead of SEEMING (actors),” the second contrasting, “HUMAN MODELS: 
Movement from the exterior to the interior,”107 against, “(Actors: movement from the 
interior to the exterior.)”108  
On the other hand, Kovács reveals that, for Tarr, the intention towards these 
characters (and those that “model” them) is regarded by the director as, “the expression 
of love.”109 Kovács doubts that this notion of “love” is that by which we ordinarily 
understand the term, and takes it to instead constitute an ethics, “a political conviction, a 
subjective and emotional translation of a social responsibility for the outcast, the helpless 
and the poor which is so strong it becomes a personal engagement.”110 Where this 
certainly goes some way to describing Tarr’s ethos, the idea of “love” can be explicated in 
another direction, with reference to Bazin’s view on the relationship between actor and 
director in Italian Neorealism. Discussing Vittoria de Sica’s films, Bazin regards their 
“source” as “his tenderness, his love…De Sica’s inexhaustible affection for his 
characters.”111 George Kouvaros builds on Bazin’s understanding of this “affection” 
                                                          
106 Robert Bresson, Notes on Cinematography trans. Jonathon Griffin, (New York: Urizen Books), p.1. 
107 Idem 
108 Ibid. p.2. 
109 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.167. 
110 Idem. 
111 Andre Bazin, “De Sica: Metteur en Scene” in What is Cinema? Vol.2, p.69. Cited in George Kouvaros, 
“’We Do Not Die Twice’: Realism and Cinema,” in The SAGE Handbook of Film Studies, eds. James Donald & 
Michael Renov (Los Angeles; London: SAGE, 2008), p.385. 
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between director and actor, through which acting becomes, “the physical manifestation 
of being” or “the presentation of states of being.”112 Kouvaros suggests that, 
the imperative for the actor to be rather than to express an emotion places an emphasis on 
external manifestations of comportment, faciality and ways of walking that suggest an existence 
prior to the commencement of filming.113 
In Tarr’s cinema, comportment, faciality and walking become vital presences and means 
of expressing a “state of being.” For this reason, life experience is an all-important factor 
in Tarr’s casting. Tarr suggests that he looks for presence and personality most of all, 
which he links to the concept of dignity that is central to his work. The director suggests 
that, 
it may easily happen that a really professional actor will fail with us just like that. Because here you 
can’t play but you have to be present and that presence, so to speak, is very different from 
acting.114 
It is in this way that one can “show the internal human dignity.”115 Tarr connects, “the 
personal being-present of the actors and actresses,” to the expression of 
“metacommunications.”116 The director stresses at multiple points that he does not work 
with actors, but people, personalities (whether “professional” or not), who can “be” 
                                                          
112 Kouvaros, “We Do Not Die Twice,” p.385. 
113 Ibid. p.386. 
114 Béla Tarr, interview by Julia Ranki, January 4, 2005, 
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115 Béla Tarr, “A Human Statement,” interview by Adam Nayman in Cinema Scope no.34 (Spring 2008), 
p.28. 
116 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
199 
 
rather than “act.”117 It is for this reason that he does not draw a distinction between 
professional and non-professional actors. Star attractions like Tilda Swinton and Hanna 
Schygulla are given no more privilege by Tarr’s camera than their unknown counterparts. 
The director’s tendency to repeatedly deploy the trusted presence and personalities of 
lesser lights is testament to this claim – of which there is no better example than Erika 
Bók, the cat-torturing child-suicide of Satantango with such a disquietingly magnetic 
presence, who returns in The Man from London and The Turin Horse; it is the same 
thousand yard-stare that confronts us in Estike’s death march and in the shot, described 
above, where Ohlsdorfer’s daughter stares out the window after a failed escape. Tarr 
says that he only conceived of making Werckmeister Harmonies after having encountered 
a “real-life” Janos, in the figure of German musician Lars Rudolph.118 In his cinema, there 
is a predominance of expressions of gestural movement and faciality, as signs of a 
psychological dimension that is rarely vocalised so much as embodied or objectified, 
even, and the focus of which is drawn into equivalence with the location in which their 
situation unfolds (through lived-time). As Jonathon Romney points out in relation to 
Damnation, “it’s not just story – it’s about place and it’s about people’s faces.”119 To 
which, following Tarr’s own repeated view, we might add that it is about music, nature, 
and most of all time – in their essential co-presence, their belonging together and 
bringing each other into a more profound definition of the world, or of a state of being. 
                                                          
117 Idem. 
118 Tarr, by Daly and Le Cain (2001). 
119 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
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Realising Worldhood 
In returning to Gumbrecht’s “production of presence,” then, his reading of Heidegger 
allows us to draw together the idea of presence with that of poetic disposition. 
Specifically, and in a way that returns us to Bazin’s “true” realism, the model of “truth” 
that informs Heidegger’s “aesthetics” – that of the Ancient Greeks, Aletheia or 
“unconcealment” – is poietic or productive, rather than factical or indexical; ontological, 
rather than ontic.120 It is active, a mode of revelation or realisation, rather than a matter 
of certitude. In this, “un-concealment” is viewed as an event or happening, a double 
movement of veiling and illuminating,121 in which something like the “concrete” and 
“essential” become co-constitutively substantiated. In the “artwork” essay, Heidegger 
draws on the work of art as a privileged site for this event of Aletheia, unconcealment – 
“the clearing and concealing of what is”122 - which takes on the form of an essential, 
indivisible “strife” (streit) between “world” and “earth.”123 As has already been intimated 
in its relation to Stimmung, “world” in Heidegger refers to the “open space” (or 
“clearing”) of human being, the historical contexture of understanding into which Dasein 
is thrown (geworfen). “World” forms our opening to a sensible horizon of meaning and 
possibility, with relation to which things take on their particular significance – hence, the 
primary sense in which Heidegger finds human being, the ek-sistence of Dasein, to 
essentially constitute a “being-in-the-world”; “we always already move about in an 
                                                          
120 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” p.50. 
121 Ibid, p.47. 
122 Ibid, p.70. 
123 Ibid. pp.47-48. 
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understanding of being,”124 that is, with reference to world. Seen in this way, “world” 
expresses something approaching (but not strictly equivalent to) historical “culture.” This 
is a common observation that gains its clearest definition through the dialectic of the 
artwork essay, by virtue of which its counterpart, “earth,” takes on the appearance of a 
more universal “nature.”125 Heidegger refers to “earth” explicitly as the “ground” on 
which “world” is founded, but which “juts through” revealingly within the disclosure of 
Aletheia.126 Primordial “earth” grounds the Open of “world” (our opening to existence), 
but fundamentally exceeds the historically conditioned scope of this enlightenment via 
categories of human (perception and) conception. Projecting this dialectical event of 
truth onto that of Bazin’s “true realism,” we might view “earth” as corresponding to the 
“essential,” where what shows up as and in “world” would be the “concrete.” Such a 
schema, invoking a coterminous relation between culture and nature, the concrete and 
essential – despite, or perhaps because of, its metaphysical overtones – is implicit in 
Gumbrecht’s reading of Heidegger, but in a way that accords it a more central role in the 
“question of [the meaning of] Being” (Seinsfrage) by which Heidegger situates his 
philosophical project. As Gumbrecht asserts,  
Being is that which is both unconcealed and hidden in the happening of truth. Due to this position 
in the happening of truth, Heidegger leaves no doubt, Being, as it is being unconcealed, for 
example, in a work of art, is not something spiritual or something conceptual. Being is not a 
                                                          
124 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p.25. Macquarrie and Robinson translate as “we always conduct our 
activities in an understanding of Being.” This gives a similar impression, but several commentators have 
used the above translation as a more fitting statement. See Christina Lafont, Heidegger, Death, and World-
Disclosure, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.253. 
125 For instance: Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (London: UCL Press, 1999), p.137. 
126 Heidegger, “Origin of the Work of Art,” p.47. 
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meaning. Being belongs to the dimension of things…If Being has the character of a thing, this 
means that it has substance and that, therefore (and unlike anything purely spiritual) it occupies 
space.127 
Which is to say, in Gumbrecht’s reading, Being has a substantial presence – it is “earth” in 
an almost, but not, literal manner. Heidegger himself is sure to distinguish “earth” from a 
“mass of matter…or…merely astronomical idea of a planet”128 – its presence is not only 
physical (but much less metaphysical) – it is not matter to be formed by or as human 
equipment. “Being” thus stands for an objective world (or world of objects) which 
essentially exceeds the horizon of our understanding or historical mode of being – it is 
“the being of beings,” the world prior to its encounter with “world”: preceding its 
integration within a semantic network or concrete cultural-historical 
situation/interpretation.129 And yet, as Heidegger makes clear, it is only human Dasein - 
whose existence is characterised by its proximity to world - that has a special proximity to 
Being, who can open up to this evasive presence, who is its guardian or (elsewhere) its 
“shepherd”130 – who can “preserve” its truth in works of great art.  
To Heidegger, the “true” work of art is poietic in essence. In the time of the 
Ancients, and of Aletheia, all art was considered from within its technical aspect as a form 
of poiesis – of “bringing-forth-into-being,” or “production into presence.”131 Poiesis is 
                                                          
127 Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, pp. 67-68. 
128 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,” p.41. 
129 Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, p.70. 
130 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper 
& Row, 1977), p.221 
131 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” p.57. 
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that form of production that brings being into presence (from out of nothing).132 The 
artwork makes present, substantial, an event of ontological “truth,” which discloses the 
co-incidence of “earth” and “world” that structures the space of Dasein’s dwelling – the 
clearing of a common-place, and projection of a mode of being particular to it; what we 
have referred to in the first chapter as ethos. In the artwork, the “world,” the Open, is 
“set to work” in such a way that “Being” can become present in/as its material – each of 
a concrete world and its essential grounding in earth lift the other into the fullness of 
their natures, allowing them to be encountered as such.133 As constitutive of this model, 
and as against prosaic language – which has a propositional or communicative function - 
poetry calls attention to itself as a presence, one that resists assumption under the 
categories of instrumental knowledge or use. The poetic word is thus disruptive, 
functioning in the sphere of language like a broken tool does in the sphere of equipment. 
Matthew Abbot says of such experiences that they invoke, 
…the mute ‘thereness’ of things, in which they show up in their ‘thatness’ as opposed to their 
‘whatness’. The very being here before me of things jumps out in this experience, and shows itself 
as something with no inherent regard for or connection to human Dasein…134 
Such disruption from our immersion in world (being-in-the-world) allows us to see things 
not as what they are (which is always conditioned by relation to the context of prior 
interpretation into which we are thrown), but purely in the terms that they are, as such 
                                                          
132 Idem. 
133 Ibid, p.54. 
134 Matthew Abbott, The Figure of This World: Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p.45. 
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(existing independently of our valuation). Likewise, what is most fundamental about the 
happening of truth in the work of art is that, in its essential strife between concealing and 
revealing, our ordinary interpretation of the world is interrupted, placed in question – 
made strange, even, or uncanny. As Heidegger says, “It is due to art’s poetic nature that, 
in the midst of what is, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is 
other than usual.”135 This is an observation shared by the Russian Formalist Viktor 
Shklovsky, who posits against contemporary poetry’s “thinking in images” the notion of 
“ostranenie” – enstrangement or de-familiarisation – by which the uncanny experience 
of poetic language (language in its material dimension) becomes the model for 
understanding art as the formal technique of “enstrangement.”136 This term defines a 
certain modality by which the material content of an artwork is presented to perception 
as novel, strange or uncanny. It is a mode emphatically opposed to imagistic symbolism, 
which, Shklovsky suggests, operates on the level of a familiarity with a logic of second 
order meaning internal to a culturally attenuated frame of understanding, rather than 
one which is formally produced (which is to say, brought into presence) through aesthetic 
device.137 Art, Shklovsky asserts, consists at once as such formal device and as the quality 
of perception enabled by it, through which the sensation of “things” becomes intensified: 
“The goal of art is to create the sensation of seeing, and not merely recognizing, 
things.”138 It is through this dichotomy of (renovated) “vision” and (the presupposition of) 
                                                          
135 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” p.70. 
136 Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Device” in ed. & trans. Alexandra Berlina, Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader (New York: 
Bloomsbury academic, 2016), p.73. 
137 Ibid, p.80 
138 Idem. 
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“recognition” that Shklovsky locates the significance of “enstrangement,” in which 
perception is “its own end in art and must be prolonged.”139 It is a means of resistance to 
everyday perception and to the (unthinking) automisation entailed by it, in which the 
concurrency of cultural-historical aesthetic forms accumulates into coded structures, 
conventions of affect and of meaning which overlay direct experience. We might draw 
further comparison, in this sense, with the uncanny essence of Stimmung, its central 
unheimlichkeit and tendency toward displacement, in the sense by which the German 
unheimlich connotes the feeling of “not being at home.” Stimmungen disclose our 
existential tonality, our sense of being “thrown” into a historical context of understanding 
and exposed to a mode of being that is, by its nature, culturally constructed. 
Enstrangement might, in this way, be seen as such a mode of displacement, the 
disposition particular to art – especially insofar as it would not constitute a Stimmung in 
itself, so much as the means of attuning our perception to a certain way of encountering 
the material presence of the world; which is to say, to a primordial source of 
meaningfulness that cannot be subsumed within propositions that seek to define its 
meaning, or whose essence can only be encountered through concrete presence.  
We can turn directly to Tarr to give form to the way in which a poetic experience 
of the world might illuminate this “limit of the human,” in an encounter with “the 
materiality of existence.” Indeed, we can say that the ostensive “symbolism” and 
“allegory” of his cinema can be read as presences that serve to rupture the fabric of our 
                                                          
139 Idem. 
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ordinary comprehension, to draw and to frustrate our reading of them. Tarr’s foreboding 
monochrome can be viewed in such a light, as can the oppressive materiality of the time 
of watching and waiting that structures our experience of these films. More instructive, 
perhaps, are the “seers” around whose private visions our own become structured, 
around whom we orbit, and through whom we can glimpse another way of seeing, and of 
being – “flashes of light that show another way.” I refer most of all to Janos in 
Werckmeister Harmonies, who speaks most clearly to the sense in which human being is 
an insignificant part of a greater creation  (perhaps, even, a failure within it) which 
undermines the harmony of the cosmos. This is a cosmic vision he sets in motion, makes 
present, in the sublime opening scene of the film – both as the play of bodies he 
conducts, and in its initiating the Stimmung of, or our attunement to, the world of the 
film; at its climax - the “eclipse” of the sun, where all becomes stilled – a melancholic 
theme on piano and strings, rising and falling in a minor key, swells up to complete a 
sense of mysterious wonder. Janos’ is a distinct perception that forms his own horizon of 
what is possible and meaningful, both emerging from within “world” and projecting far 
beyond it, to the exclusion of its contemporary concerns. For this, he is an “idiot” – a 
private person, one with their own perceptual world. The entrance of a giant stuffed 
whale into his provincial hometown - hauled, along with a deformed “Prince,” in the back 
of a hulking lorry to the market square, and bringing with it a violent and nihilistic mass 
movement - is viewed by our protagonist with a similarly profound sense of wonder. As 
he says to the musician Eszter,      
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Uncle Gyuri, let’s go towards the market square and then you can see for yourself the giant whale, 
as long as twenty metres and you can see into its throat, and it really stinks. All a man can do is 
look upon it and see how great the Lord’s creative impulse and power, and how omnipotence is 
reflected in that animal. That’s what has to be looked at, must be seen, Uncle Gyuri. 
A few scenes before, we accompany Janos first through the crowds amassed around the 
“circus” and then follow him in to see its apparent attraction, this stinking Leviathan. As 
we proceed through the darkened chamber housing the giant, and in response to our 
intimate being-with Janos as he takes in its presence, the same musical theme plays as 
we proceed with him. On his disembarking from the truck, we remain inside as Janos 
crosses the square and is intercepted with a question about what he has just seen, the 
response to which (“this mysterious creature….from the far-off oceans”) invokes Tarr’s 
own - and most “symbolic” -view of the film, 
The whole fucking film is about three main characters. All three of them have some kind of a 
relation to eternity. Valuska [Janos] has a connection to cosmos, Ezster…to clean voices and the 
whale is coming from a far ocean.140   
Which is to say, if they are said to represent or indeed to “symbolise” anything, it is the 
unrepresentable itself, that which exceeds human comprehension exactly because it lies 
beyond a historical consciousness, beyond historical time; that is, beyond human being 
as we experience it. And, as Janos asserts, “that’s what must be seen.” The whale, rather 
than standing in for something other, might instead be seen as a disruption in the fabric 
of experience – a fabric that is, by film’s end, torn asunder. The same could be said for 
                                                          
140 Tarr, interview by Kudlac (2016). 
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the frail, naked elderly man – bordering the corpselike and angelic at once - whose 
revelation stems the tide of mute violence that descends upon the town’s hospital at the 
climax of the mob’s advance.141 Both can be taken as poietic objects whose simple 
presence gives form to what George Steiner, in speaking to this line of aesthetic 
experience, calls, “the continuum between temporality and eternity, between matter and 
spirit, between man and ‘the other.’”142 At the end of the film, Janos is rendered mute, 
institutionalised, and is visited by his friend Eszter, who admits defeat in his quest for 
natural harmony to his silent companion. On leaving, and in the film’s closing sequence 
shot, we follow Eszter as he takes Janos’ earlier advice, finally encountering the whale, 
the equally mute presence of this poietic object, now loosed from its destroyed 
container, from the circus, the Prince, and his crowd of followers.  
 
 
                                                          
141 The director himself insists that the mob stops not in response to this image of human vulnerability, but 
instead with relation to the presence of a wall behind – although, in the context of the film and the 
presentation of this scene, it is difficult not to see this as another of his rhetorical devices.  
142 Cited in Gumbrecht, The Production of Presence, p. 59. 
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Bazin suggests that, “the impassive lens, stripping its object of all those ways of 
seeing it, those piled up preconceptions, that spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes 
have covered it,” is, “able to present it [the world] in all its virginal purity to my 
attention.”143 In terms more specific to Tarr, and returning to Heidegger, Abbott posits 
such perception, or experience, as poetic, and asserts that, “everyday being-in-the-world 
                                                          
143 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” p.15. 
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can itself be suspended by a poetic experience of the world/world as such, which is a kind 
of touching against the materiality of existence.”144 This “world as such” is the “world” as 
a phenomenon, as event, what Heidegger calls in Being and Time “the worldhood of the 
world.”145 It is significant, in this sense, that Gunning posits Bazin’s “central theoretical 
claim about cinematic realism” to be found in what the earlier theorist calls, “an integral 
realism, a recreation of the world in its own image,” and which Gunning relates to the 
distinction between a true- and pseudo-realism.146 Gunning sees this image as an 
attempt “to overcome the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and even 
between materialism and idealism” in a way that speaks to our current concerns.147 As 
Gunning asserts, there is a sense in which “the world in its own image” in Bazin’s (myth 
of) total cinema can be taken as equivalent to the phenomenological concept of “the 
worldhood of the world”;148 the imaging of the world as phenomenon, or as such. In the 
artwork, the site of unconcealment, the world is set to work – the “world worlds” – 
showing itself as the opened clearing of (and opening to) human understanding, as the 
means through which earthly phenomena become known as what they are, are made 
sensible and meaningful. At the same time, it gestures toward that which always-already 
precedes the interpretations that structure the way this openness opens, this being 
“earth,” concealed or buried beneath the human world. It is significant, in this sense, that 
several of the examples provided by Shklovsky for the experience of ostranenie, and 
                                                          
144 Abbott, The Figure of This World, p.53 
145 Heidegger, BT, p.91. 
146 Tom Gunning, “The World in Its Own Image: The Myth of Total Cinema” in Opening Bazin, p.123. 
147 Idem. 
148 Ibid, p.125. 
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particularly those from Lev Tolstoy, are in the mode of free indirect discourse (or erlebte 
Rede). In particular – and in a mode that we will have recourse to refer to again in 
regards to the figure of the animal in Tarr - Tolstoy uses the perspective of a horse as a 
vehicle of his own social commentary, a mirror to the human world149 (in a way that 
resonates, tellingly, with Kafka’s figure of Red Peter, the learned ape of “Report for an 
Academy”). That Heidegger elsewhere distinguishes animals as being weltarm, or “poor 
in world,”150 might indicate how such devices are of particular use in giving form to 
Aletheia - which discloses “world” as such – in that human being is seen from uncanny 
perspectives. In a form that itself touches against Pasolini’s definition of im-signs as 
standing “at the limit of the human,” Abbott calls poetic experience, “the emergence that 
lies on the boundary of the linguistic/equipmental world of Dasein.”151 These limit 
experiences allow one to glimpse the uncanny contingency of the human world, its 
gratuity, as it stands upon “earth,” the non-objectified objective or the Being of beings. It 
is in this sense an attunement to the world that is at once, or alternately, melancholic 
and wonder-full (in the mode of Thaumazein, shock or wonder, which was discussed in 
the previous chapter). With our understanding of the way in which Aletheia - 
unconcealment - works to disclose the “being of beings,” the grounding of “world” on 
“earth,” we might view Bazin’s appeal to “true realism” under a similar light. Where the 
“myth of total cinema,” or of indexical realism, might centre on the idee fixe of an 
objective duplication of the world, this attempt to disclose the always fleeting and 
                                                          
149 Shklovsky, “Art as Device,” p.82. 
150 Heidegger, FCM, p.186. 
151 Abbott, The Figure of the World, p.35. 
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retreating illumination of the mysteries of “the real” essentially meets with a resistance, 
of which Bazin was aware. This difficulty in achieving a “total cinema” is thus not only or 
primarily a technical matter – of achieving greater or “total” likeness – but instead part of 
the conditioning of our historical experience, our ways of seeing and mode of being. The 
worldhood of the world is the opening of “the Open,” that which is elevated and brought 
near to us, alongside its “earthly” origins, in the unconcealment of art – or, in “the world 
in its own image.” The great significance of art in this view is that it can make present the 
horizons of our understanding, as well as expand upon them, through the happening of 
unconcealment. As Bazin seems to suggest in his discourse on the medium, the cinema is 
a privileged mode of the realisation of the event of such truth. And as Tarr might add to 
this, it is a primitive language, very simple where adequately observed, for it can be seen 
even – or especially – by “idiots.” 
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4. “Movements Speak”: Rhythm and Gesture at the End of Time.  
 
In the progression of my argument through the issues of mood, language and presence, 
as well as in the broader critical discourse surrounding Tarr, there are a number of key 
terms that appear naturally and recurrently. The sequence shot that underpins Tarr’s 
style is intrinsically linked to movement and animation, and is frequently accorded a 
“choreographic” character. Its gravitation toward material presence is most often 
effected by relation to the movement (or repose) of human bodies, and with a reticence 
toward directive speech in favour of metacommunication, through which an inclination 
toward the corporeal and “gestural” emerges. And it is with regard to Stimmung and its 
totalising affective atmosphere that the suggestion of musical and tonal qualities of 
experience becomes a significant association, in which the corporeal and choreographic 
intersect. It is in this connection that the final chapter will take the concept of rhythm as 
its initial subject, in order to draw together the underlying ideas of music, movement and 
gesture. 
It is a common sense that rhythm moves us, that it forms a movement that 
impresses upon bodies and consciousness, setting them in motion. This is evident in 
music and in our dance to it, and has a corresponding currency in the plastic arts. It also 
remains the case for rhythms that are not essentially poietic in kind, or human in origin. 
The rhythms of life, of nature, of modernity or industry, or of whatever else pertains to 
the term, are perceived by us as rhythms exactly for the reason that the motion they give 
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form to is meaningful or expressive, whether directly or analogically. Indeed, it seems 
apparent that these phenomena and our experience of them provide models for our 
aesthetic conception of rhythm. This is perhaps best shown in that etymological account, 
now discredited, which took the idea of rhythm to originate in the perpetual cycle of 
breaking waves, the (ebb and) “flow” of which figures a discrete pattern of repetition 
with/in a fluid continuity.1 Even where disputed, a gleam of insight flashes in this wave-
image: that we do not speak of rhythm without considering, at some level, what its 
pattern of movement gives form to; what its figure displays, reflects, accentuates or 
animates. To this end, the status of rhythm in Tarr’s cinema is of special significance, 
where these films seek to realise an experience of – and attunement to – the expressive 
qualities of presence, the “metacommunications” of movement, materiality and time. 
These are joined together in a vital formalism that loosens the binds of narrative 
economy and motions instead in the direction of phenomenal associations. This 
suspension of “story” (and, in extension, history and ideology) gestures toward a state of 
being, or an existential situation. Its distancing effects a displacement of those filmic 
conventions which ordinarily accentuate the dramatic exigency of narration, through 
montage, onto an almost exclusive use of long-takes. This is a displacement, moreover, 
that implies a certain dis-position, and our dislocation into a time, space and perception 
that is not our own; and, more than this, into a “cosmic perspective.” Tarr calls the 
                                                          
1 This is the starting point for Emile Benveniste’s analysis of the concept of rhythm – one that begins from a 
similar point of principle of the current argument, but which ultimately follows a different etymological 
path. See Emile Benveniste, “The Notion of “Rhythm” in its Linguistic Expression” in Problems in General 
Linguistics (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971), p.281. 
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construction of this perspective a “circular dance,” and speaks of a “rhythm” through 
which space, place, and movement are joined together –and revealed, together - within 
the duration of mobile sequence shots. Editing (“mobile editing”) is subsumed into the 
choreography by which the dynamic integrity of a shot is realised, a mediation of relative 
movements presided over by co-director Ágnes Hranitzky. This “dance” is set to music in 
real-time, and is a method which grounds the realisation of - and correspondence 
between - these presences, while further strengthening the impression of a balletic 
incorporation of time and space. All of this suggests a complex staging of situation, the 
disclosure of event and atmosphere in a mediation of the relative motions of bodies and 
of the camera within an environment, to music.  
Indeed, the idea of a “circular dance” is a specific precedent for the notion of 
choreography, and one which refers directly to rhythm in its original form, as rhythmos. 
In its first recorded usage, rhythmos refers to an ethical principle, to a bind that “holds 
men.”2 More generally speaking, it implies a dynamic structure, the perceptible form 
taken by a mobile element – the figure of a movement, or the disposition of those 
elements that characterise it. It is with regard to a combination of rhythmos and 
harmonia – orders of movement and of sound - that the “round-dance” of choreia is 
formed, and by this same token that rhythmos comes to be regarded as the “measure of 
dance,” its metre.3 This is reflected in a common contemporary interpretation of rhythm 
                                                          
2 Archilochus is widely cited as the earliest known use of the term, with slightly varying translations; a 
discussion of the translation and interpretation of the text can be found in Vincent Barletta, “Rhythm as 
Form” in Dibur Literary Journal 2 (Spring 2016), pp.49-50. 
3 J.J. Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History, and Terminology (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1974), p.224-225. 
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as “measured flow,” a concept that harmonises ostensibly opposing principles, of “order” 
in consideration of “flux.” But the idea of a “measured flow” also speaks to a tension at 
the heart of rhythm, a tension with a specifically temporal character. For where the 
instrumental measure of rhythmic regularity originates the formal display of clock-time, 
and, so, our chronometric time concept, rhythm can also be regarded as an affective 
presence which resists this time: at once a displacement of and in regulated temporality. 
Agamben, in particular, speaks to an element of rhythmic presence that “throws” us into 
a more original dimension of time, which opens a more original form of measure – that of 
our “dwelling,” in “what binds men.”4 Indeed, he associates the “measure” of rhythm 
with logos, ratio and articulation, rather than with reference to metron.5 This is not logos 
as language or logic, however, but as that principle of “gathering-together” to which later 
derivations respond.6 It is in this sense that rhythm is to be regarded as the disposition of 
a work’s elements, the being or animus of a work. In a way that speaks to the notion of 
metacommunication, rhythmos thus connotes a certain legibility of that which is 
conveyed by movement and material form.  
The idea of rhythm as animated disposition follows from an alternate etymology 
to that which refers to the root rheo-, “flow.” A more luminous path has been traced by 
the German philologist Eugen Petersen, starting from the prefix ern-, “draw.”7 Seen in 
                                                          
4 Agamben, The Man Without Content, pp.98-100. 
5 Ibid. p.98. 
6 I follow here the translation offered in Heidegger’s analysis of the word in Martin Heidegger, Introduction 
to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried & Richard Polt (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000), 
p.131. 
7 I have been unable to find a translation of Petersen’s influential article, and refer to the outline of it in: 
Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art, pp.222-223; Pollitt cites the article as follows: Eugen Petersen, 
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this way, rhythmos gestures instead toward the notion of a “drawn form,” a form that 
binds and articulates. It can be situated within the productive polysemy of the word 
“drawing,” which denotes both of carriage (transporting) and impression (drafting).8 The 
common notion conveyed by these terms is that of “bearing,” as in the form or 
comportment which manifests “character.” By this reference, the development of 
articulated rhythmos into the measured flow of rhythm runs parallel to that of ethos. In 
each case, “dwelling” and “drawing” become incorporated into a notion of perceptible 
manner or legible form. Intriguingly, it is with reference to a breakdown in the sphere of 
bodily conduct – the integrity of corporeal bearing – that Agamben positions a novel 
theory of cinema. He does so with regard to gesture, read as the dynamic element of the 
image that breaks the bind of the still;9 and which, more than this, draws it away from 
“narrative power,” toward being encountered as such.10 Where Agamben has an 
experimental montage cinema chiefly in mind, he opens a ground for thinking about 
Tarr’s poetic experience of metacommunications in terms of gesture. This is particularly 
the case in that gesture, in Agamben’s view, is to be regarded as a communication of 
communicability – of language as a medium – which does not transcend into word or 
concept. It is language encountered as a “pure means” (without ends), as an “incurable 
                                                          
“Rhythmus,” Abhandlungen der Kön. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, N.F. 
16 (1917): 1-104. 
8 Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art, p.223. 
9 Giogio Agamben, “Notes on Gesture” in Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics trans. Vincenzo Binetti and 
Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p.56. 
10 Giorgio Agamben, “Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films” trans. Brian Holme in Guy Debord 
and the Situationist International: Texts and Documents ed. Tom McDonough (Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
London, England: The MIT Press, 2002), pp.317. 
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speech defect.”11 The Benjaminian notion of pure means holds a central place in 
Agamben’s ethics, where it refers to the mediality of human being, its lack of a historical 
or transcendental endpoint – of any “vocation” to be fulfilled. In this, it gestures toward a 
notion that Tarr suggests is part of a lost human dignity, a displacement that emerges 
through a corruption in or by our use of language. That this is the site to which gesture 
responds is another point of connection with the understanding of being in Tarr’s films, 
which will be explicated with specific reference to the figurations of dwelling in The Turin 
Horse, and of animal “life” throughout Tarr’s oeuvre. It is in this direction that we might 
identify a new “rhythm” that can hold men, within a logic that extends beyond the 
categories of “life” and “man” as we ordinarily understand them.  
 
Flow and Bind: Rhythm as Disposition. 
The idea of animation is central to the important role accorded to rhythm in the 
phenomenological aesthetics of Mikel Dufrenne. He suggests that the rhythm of an 
artwork is “a disposition of the elements which articulate and order its movement – a 
movement by which the work is temporalized…and becomes an animated being.”12 
Rhythm is a “spatialization of time and a temporalization of space,”13 a movement into 
which space and time are enfolded, in which they become formed into a figure of 
                                                          
11 Ibid. p.60. 
12 Mikel Duffrene, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. Edward S. Casey, eds. Albert A. 
Anderson, Willis Domingo and Leon Jacobson (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1973), p.308. 
13 Ibid. p.247. 
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duration. Regarded in this way, rhythm is at once the (perceived or implied) movement 
that animates the work and the experience of duration opened up by it. With reference 
to Dufrenne’s definition, we can say that rhythm is that in which the being of the work, 
its essential dynamic, energy or animus, is - to paraphrase Heidegger - “set to work,” or 
(with Gadamer, for instance) into play. As it comes to cinema, where an impression of 
time is fundamental to any tangible articulation of world (let alone being-in-the-world), 
rhythm is most readily identified in the way that temporality is implied through images 
and their combination into narrative structure. In other words, it is associated with 
dramaturgy and the pacing of events, the movement effected in a dynamic interchange 
between shot and plot through editing. Yvette Biro observes, however, that more diverse 
aspects of presence are transformed and temporalised according to rhythmic 
configuration. Biro suggests that, “although the order of a recognisable pattern 
presupposes regularity, this consists of contrasting elements…,” in which,  
…the physical movements of a film’s actors, together with alternation of light and shadow, the 
vitality of the camera, and, moreover, the elements of sound and silence, the accents and the 
beats, all express content and emotion, and these devices stand in a complex, dialectical 
relationship with each other. The sole ground of any richness is the tension within the ensemble 
of these dynamic factors.14  
Viewed in these terms, rhythm’s operating principle would not be cyclical regularity but 
instead confluent difference, in the forming of a system or dispositif with a Gestalt 
                                                          
14 Yvette Biro, Turbulence and Flow in Film: The Rhythmic Design, trans. Paul Salamon (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), p.232. 
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character, wherein the form in toto impresses something other than its constituent parts 
in sum. This impression can take place just as well at the level of single images as it does 
in the flow effected between them by montage; or both as “form” and by virtue of its 
“contents.” More than this, and more pertinent to my discussion of Tarr, cinema can 
achieve novel rhythmic modalities through the mobility of the camera. Movement is 
embodied by and disclosed through the passage of its gaze, is imparted upon matter and 
revealed by this animation. At each stage, rhythm is the dynamic ensemble of a 
productive tension, the meaningful commerce between the movements, materialities or 
(con)textures of relative phenomena as they are joined into a sensible form. Rhythm can 
in this sense be regarded as the spatio-temporal architectonics of cinema’s realisation of 
“worldness.” For cinema and for art in general, rhythm is the distribution of movement 
(and corresponding non-movement, repose), both perceived and implied, through which 
a work’s being is articulated and staged. It is the animated structure of material presence, 
what Andrew Benjamin calls mattering, to describe the way that artworks work to make 
materiality matter (to us);15 or in other words, how the form of its activity is structured 
and accentuated, made present.  Indeed, as Benjamin makes clear, in much the same 
way as Gumbrecht in the previous chapter, this presence speaks to, “a founding 
inseparability of the work of matter, on the one hand, and meaning as its aftereffect, on 
the other. Those hands are always already joined.”16 Significantly, this binding of meaning 
                                                          
15 Andrew Benjamin, “Matter and Movement’s Presence: Notes on Heidegger, Francesco Mosca, and 
Bernini” in Research in Phenomenology 42 (2012), pp.345-349. 
16 Ibid. p.348. 
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to the experience of material presence – and, more than this, only and always as an 
aftereffect of this encounter – reflects an original conception of rhythm. 
In reading rhythmos as stemming from ern-, “draw,” a new emphasis is placed on 
the suffix    -thmos as signifying an active “doing,” rather than the more passive 
“happening” implied by “flow.”17 Rhythmos can be seen, in this sense, as “drawn form” – 
as that form which draws phenomena together into a dynamic figure of animation. J.J. 
Pollitt suggests that this Greek “drawing” signifies the same double meaning found in 
many languages, including contemporary English, in which “to draw” can denote either a 
pulling (of a mass) or a drafting (of pictorial line).18 Where both invoke motion, the 
former implies movement as its essential function (transport, carriage), whereas the 
latter’s movement serves to delineate a form - an impression, image, or figure.19 This 
etymological polysemy of “drawing” sustains a significant relation between the 
movement implied by “carriage” and the manifest “character” conveyed through this 
movement, embodied by it; “convey” is itself an evident expression of this connection 
between “transport” and “impression” with regard to a manner of bearing, as are the 
way people “carry themselves,” their “comportment.”20 Pollitt suggests an alignment 
between the idea of rhythmos, in terms of bearing or disposition, and the Greek term 
                                                          
17 Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art, p.223. 
18 Idem. 
19 The Standard English etymology of pictorial “drawing” is derived from the more general case of physical 
exertion, and cites the “dragging” of a point across a surface as the root of pictorial “drawing.” See “draw, 
v.,” OED Online, January 2018 (Oxford University Press), 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/57534?rskey=UPc7jm&result=1&isAdvanced=false (Accessed January 29, 2018). 
20 It is more distinct still in the German verb tragen, which shares a common derivation with the English 
“draw”, via “drag,” and which denotes at once the acts of “wearing,” “bearing,” and “carrying.”   
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charakter, which originally referred to inscription - a mark or imprint – but had already 
been extended during ancient times to denote “a defining quality.”21 In each case there 
occurs a familiar doubling that connects incorporated character to personal 
characteristic, which stems from the notion of a significant forming or arrangement – a 
disposition of distinctive marks or accents. A step further in this direction opens up the 
perspective that rhythmos, as characteristic form or figure, corresponds to the extension 
of ethos from “dwelling” toward “mode of being.” Indeed, the first known inscription of 
Greek rhythmos appears at what Vincent Barletta calls an, “intersection of poetry and 
ethics,” in a call to moderation, or measure.22 The poet Archilocus, in character as a 
victorious soldier, compels himself to, “come to know the rhythm that holds men.”23 This 
idea of rhythm’s hold, as binding force, is one that remains in currency for some time 
thereafter.24 Rhythm regarded in this sense is that which holds or joins, an articulated 
“form” or “modality” (of movement) made-manifest. But the original, “ethical” status of 
rhythmos is itself transformed, displaced and tethered to its opposite (a-rithmos, 
number), in a transition to the sphere of aesthetics. Plato applies rhythmos to describe 
the metron of choreia, or “measure of dance.”25 The order of steps (and, more 
particularly, the dancer’s pause upon planted foot) generates the scheme of a numerical 
                                                          
21 Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art, p.223. 
22 Vincent Barletta. “Rhythm as Form,” p.50. 
23 Ibid. p.49. 
24 Several commentators make particular mention of its usage in Aeschylus’ Prometheus, in which the 
eponymous figure - chained to a rock, so that an eagle may daily devour his ever-regenerating liver – refers 
to a “rhythm” in which he is “bound”; for this reason, Heidegger, following Thrasybulos Georgiades, 
emphasises a notion of rhythm – of being “rhythmed” – that configures an unusual semantic space, 
signalling between Gepräge and Fesseln, “character” and “fetters.” See Martin Heidegger & Eugen Fink, 
Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67 trans. Charles H. Seibert (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1979), 
p.55. 
25 Benveniste, “The Notion of “Rhythm” in its Linguistic Expression,” pp.286-287. 
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notation, its meter. With this position, rhythm becomes the meter that forms musical 
structure according to dance steps, tying them numerically. With this “new” sense, 
rhythm comes to be regarded as the timing of movement: its formal schema becomes a 
measure through which temporality is made manifest. As Sylviane Agacinski observes,  
Any rhythm can provide a unit of time (for example, the pulse). Any regular movement can be 
used to construct a unit of movement and time. These units remain approximate as long as 
instruments could not guarantee the perfect regularity that, today, adds to the illusion of pure 
time.26 
Seen in this way, the “pure time” of our contemporary chronology is approximate with 
that regular definition of rhythm as a “measured flow.” The irreversible stream of 
homogeneous instants made-present by the clock are a sensible “measure” of the “flow” 
of phenomenality, the form through which flux can be apprehended.  
Rhythmic movement, as a perceptible pattern of repetition (and our anticipation 
of it), embodies a unit of measurement by which the course of time is displayed. But 
while rhythm can be regarded as that which originates our measure of time and, so, our 
contemporary chrono-metric time-concept, it is at the same time fundamentally resistant 
to the homogeneity of “clock-time.” This tension between rhythm and (clock) time is 
recognised also by Daniel Yacavone, who suggests that the latter, “never varies, 
bespeaking of a mechanism in contrast to what is organic and living.”27 Indeed, and re-
                                                          
26 Sylviane Agacinski, Time Passing: Modernity and Nostalgia trans. Jody Gladding (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), pp.44-45. 
27 Daniel Yacavone, Film Worlds: A Philosophical Aesthetics of Cinema (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015), p.207. 
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echoing concepts from my first chapter, notable debates on technological modernity in 
the early 20th century had centred on notions of rhythm, with Karl Bücher’s study Work 
and Rhythm – on the relation between industrial labour and the body – particularly 
influential.28 Jean-Claude Schmitt suggests that, for Bücher, “industrial civilisation and 
mechanisation jerk humans out of their bodily rhythms,” and maintained that, “the 
rhythms of collective work and dance are the genesis of poetry, song, music and even 
language.”29 This vein of thought closely parallels the dialectic of boredom in Walter 
Benjamin, and his description of the communal, habitual rhythms that are a condition for 
constructive boredom in “The Storyteller” – a connection toward which Schmitt 
gestures.30 For Bücher, the problem most affecting modern working conditions lay 
primarily with tempo – where, as Michael Cowan puts it, “the rhythms of industry had 
left those of the body behind.” A similar notion was registered in the first chapter, where 
repetition as a quality of experience (schock-erlebnis/pathos contra erfahrung/ethos) was 
seen to be affected by the pace of recurrence.  
Another influential work on the subject of rhythm, Ludwig Klages’ essay Nature of 
Rhythm (1923), also uses the body as its model for a consideration of the difference 
between rhythm and repetition. Klages posits an organic consistency (without uniformity) 
that characterises natural rhythm, or Rhythmus, against the continuity effected in the 
fixed pulse, or Takt, of the mechanic; the latter, a measure that he associates with “the 
                                                          
28 Michael Cowan, “The Heart Machine: “Rhythm” and Body in Weimar Film and Fritz Lang’s Metropolis” in 
Modernism/modernity 14, no.2 (2007), p.228. 
29 Jean-Claude Schmitt, “A History of Rhythms in the Middle Ages” in The Medieval History Journal 15 no. 1 
(2012), p.11. 
30 Ibid. p.9. 
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ordering and segmenting activity of the intellect.”31 As Cowan shows, these discussions of 
rhythm – which centred around the effect of technology on the body, of the mechanic on 
the organic - very quickly entered concurrent theoretical debates around the cinema.32 
For cinema’s articulated animation of duration, it could justifiably lay claim to status 
among the temporal arts, along with (intrinsically rhythmic) music and dance. The idea of 
a corporeal rhythm underlying techno-rationalised order was taken up by theorists and 
filmmakers who aspired to the utopian vision of film as a universal language. Advocates 
of abstract film, in particular, regarded the construction of “optical rhythms” as means to 
“appeal directly to the emotions, bypassing rational intellection, as it were, by eliminating 
the conscious content of plot.”33 But the definite nature of cinema’s rhythms remained 
(and remains) a point of contention, and especially given the diminished role of avant-
garde formalism in contemporary film culture. Rhythm in narrative film does not, or not 
only, serve to bypass rational intellection, but to give form to an expression of world. 
More than this, a central ambiguity inheres in the distinction between the periodical 
durations of Rhythmus and the segmented seriality of mechanically repeated movement 
– of Takt – which remains difficult to define exactly.34 Both remain measurable quantities 
that can, with the correct instruments, become regulated or rationalised, as per the 
above quote from Agacinski. It is in their affective significance that the difference is felt 
between rhythms: where serial repetition expresses only its regularity, the flux of rhythm 
                                                          
31 Cowan, “The Heart Machine,” p.231. 
32 Ibid. p.234. 
33 Ibid. p.226. 
34 Ibid. p.231. 
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admits anomaly and coheres heterogeneous elements into a meaningful form of 
experience. Agamben accords a comparable ambivalence to the temporal quality of 
rhythm, which, “grants men both the ecstatic dwelling in a more original dimension and 
the fall into the flight of measurable time.”35  
Seen in this way, as the other side of the phenomenon described by Agacinski, 
rhythm is the principle both of an instrumental measure of temporality, and of the 
suspension of its “measured flow.” There is thus a tension at the heart of our experience 
of rhythm as a temporal phenomenon. It is that which makes time manifest as a form of 
movement, in a configuration of relative movements, the regularity of which presents a 
quantity for temporal measure. But it is, at the same time, an affective presence which 
resists the fugitive time that clocks measure and display, which opens a more original 
experience of significant duration, an encounter through which time as we ordinarily 
conceive it tends to disappear. This is an observation that is central to Agamben’s 
elevation of rhythm to the status of art’s essential structure, its fundamental 
architectonics.36 Agamben gestures toward an “original” experience of art in the sense 
used by Heidegger - where art is itself the origination of disclosive truth, the being “set to 
work” of the “strife” between “earth” and “world.”  Agamben’s model for this experience 
is exemplified by the temporality of musical rhythm. It is,  
                                                          
35 Agamben, The Man Without Content, p.100. 
36 Ibid. p.101. 
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…something that escapes the incessant flight of instants and appears almost as the presence of an 
atemporal dimension in time…as though we were suddenly thrown into a more original time.37 
The original experience of art is this experience of a break from the linear stream of 
measurable time, from its ordinary progressive “flow,” an encounter Agamben 
characterises as our being “thrown” (into an assumption of presence, of the “present 
space” of a “present truth”).38 This recalls Heidegger’s geworfenheit, our “thrownness” 
into “world,” the exposure to a historical context that is not our own. It is for the reason 
of our being essentially “not-at-home” in “world” that the structure of experience 
denoted by Stimmung was drawn, in the first chapter, toward a notion of disposition as a 
mode of productive displacement. In this direction, Agacinski makes a perceptive 
suggestion about the cinema with reference to the Benjaminian figure of the flaneur. Like 
the strolling idler of 19th century Paris who “embraces the time of things” in 
contemplative observation, who experiences “other” times, with cinema the viewer, 
“yields to a rhythm of a movement that is not their own,” “loses time,” and can (in 
leaving the world of the film) become “suspended between two times.”39 Such an 
experience is, as per a notion used elsewhere in Agacinski’s study of time in modernity, a 
mode of displacement.40 It is the experience of a perception that is not (or not only) our 
own, a rupture with the continuity of our “subjectivity” that dispositions one in an 
affective proximity to the space-time of an-other person and/or world. This notion of a 
                                                          
37 Ibid. p.99. 
38 Idem. 
39 Agacinski, Time Passing, p.56. 
40 Ibid. p.18. 
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coercive rhythm returns us to a consideration posited in the first chapter – that such 
films as want to make a claim on us as participants dispose us to their particular mode of 
disclosing “world,” which we mediate as a relation to our own experience. This alterity of 
rhythm and its ability to displace us is referred to by Emmanuel Levinas, where he states 
that, “in rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of passage from oneself to 
anonymity.”41 Levinas views rhythm as a mode of self-forgetting “participation” in a 
continuity which carries one away from oneself and into “anonymous” pleasure, an 
otherness that we are drawn into or borne away by, rather than one which we encounter 
(as “face” or “other”).42 According to his ethics of responsibility, the supposedly 
harmonising affect of rhythm and our participation in it assert a hold over us in a negative 
sense. But Levinas also, like Agamben, propounds a “negative aesthetics,” and equates 
rhythm with the being or functioning of art works as such.43 Moreover, Levinas likewise 
views the essential significance of art experience in its rupture from continuity (but 
explicitly by way of fragmentation and dissonance).44 The idea of Stimmung – viewed as 
the medium of our exposure to otherness, to “thrownness” – mediates between these 
two positions. As Agamben relates, Stimmung is the product of a dissonance and a 
scission at the same time as it is a means of consonance and harmony.45 When rhythm is 
considered not simply as “flow” but as a dynamic form of experience – a disposition 
                                                          
41 Emmanuel Levinas, “Reality and Its Shadow” in The Levinas Reader ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), p.133. 
42 Gary Peters, “The rhythm of alterity: Levinas and aesthetics” in Radical Philosophy 82 (March/April, 
1997), p.15 
43 Ibid. p.14. 
44 Idem. 
45 Giorgio Agamben, “Voice and Vocation,” p.95. 
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which displaces us - it represents not a passive distance from otherness, but an active 
encounter with the “happening” and “mattering” of material presence.  
 
Music, Movement and Measure. 
The contemporary association of rhythm with temporality responds to the use of regular 
movement as a measure of time. As Biro reminds us, however, rhythmic form is a relative 
distribution of elements that, while producing a sense of temporality by the dynamic of 
its form, is fundamentally unaffected by modification in tempo.46 That is, tempo is 
subordinate to the structural integrity of rhythm, the ratio of its disposition. This idea of 
ratio is maintained, but in another form, in Agamben’s discussion of rhythm as the 
“original structure of the work of art.” In The Man Without Content, he suggests that,  
…precisely because rhythm is that which causes the work of art to be what it is, it is also Measure 
and logos (ratio) in the Greek sense of that which gives every thing its proper station in presence. 
Rhythm attains this essential dimension, and is Measure in this original meaning…47 
Rhythm is original Measure, Agamben says, a measure which precedes number, and 
which thus speaks to a qualitative delimitation rather than its quantum.48 Agamben, like 
Heidegger - to whom he is evidently responding – wants to consider a role for art that 
exceeds aesthetics, that can open and orient human being-with, that can “take the 
original measure of [human] dwelling on earth.”49 This is measure in the sense by which it 
                                                          
46 Biro, Turbulence and Flow, p.232. 
47 Agamben, The Man Without Content, p.98. 
48 Idem. 
49 Ibid. p.101. 
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applies to ethos, as proportion, moderation and limit - the bounds of “dwelling,” the bind 
of common-place or “world” - rather than with regards to rule or instrumental rationality. 
This “dwelling” is not (or not only) a spatial category or definite area, but what “holds 
men” (together). It is not ratio as calculation but instead in the sense of logos, which 
Agamben equates with the being of the work: the region it opens to experience. We 
associate logos with language and with logic, but the exact definition and translation of 
the term is not straightforward. As was established in the introduction, etymologically it 
implies a setting out and gathering together, a “gatheredness” which thus implies 
productive multiplicity, or conducive difference. In this, it is much like that binding-
together of “world” and “earth” that is, at the same time, their setting-apart: what 
Heidegger calls “strife.” Indeed, Heidegger reads from Heraclitus an equation between 
logos and polemos, the Greek “conflict,” which serves as a model for “strife” in the 
artwork essay.50 For this reason, Heidegger suggests that logos means originally that 
which gathers-together.51 Moreover, he positions it as a central principle of presence, a 
correlate to physis in the early Greek philosophy – that is, nature in its widest sense as 
that which grows of itself and rises forth into presence.52 Later derivations of logos thus 
appear to respond to this sense of an articulation that allows a significant form (of 
multiplicity or complexity) to manifest, or become present. This relation between logos 
and rhythmos, logic and rhythm, is indirectly referenced by Tarr in responding to a 
                                                          
50 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p.65. 
51 Ibid. p.131. 
52 Ibid. p.64. 
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question about the expressive significance of his films’ camera movements – the way 
they “speak.” The director suggests that such movements are “natural,” responding to, 
…a logic in a certain kind of space…a face of the location that we’d like to show, and…a natural 
desire of or movement of the situation itself, the way the actors move in that particular 
situation…it’s just a matter of giving a rhythm to the whole thing…53 
Earlier in the same interview, he refers to this rhythm as a “circular dance,” a movement 
which binds together (and makes-manifest) the logic of space, the countenance of 
location, and the staging of event.54 Tarr proceeds to expand upon the dynamics of 
nearness and distance by which the camera in these films “speak” through their 
movement, the mediation of presence through which shot-sequences are given rhythmic 
character.55 In them, camera, actor and environment are drawn into a play between 
movement and stillness, presence and absence, light and shadow, vision and its 
obstruction. In place of a dramatic editing that would generate a schema of story through 
composite-continuity, the autonomy of the camera’s free-indirect consciousness 
engenders an embodied motion that discloses space and distends temporality, drawing 
materiality into animate duration. As we have already seen, this mobility is conditioned 
by a resistance to the logic of action or causality, which gestures in the direction of 
another logic. It is a logos which articulates our encounter with the “face” of a situation, a 
disposition of elements which ground the revelation of a state of being. Communicating 
                                                          
53 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
54 Idem. 
55 Idem. 
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in this way, the camera opens our awareness of environment and draws various aspects 
of the milieu, of presence, into a mutual articulation.  
The “active” drawing of rhythm allows phenomena to “happen” together – it is 
their gathering-together, their being set to work or play. This chimes with Tarr’s “circular 
dance,” which is positioned by the director with reference to the reductive narrative 
schema of Damnation. It is, he says, a distancing from “human” story that motions 
toward metacommunication, where, “the wall, the rain, the dogs have their own 
stories,”56 which are brought “close to you.”57 We have already observed that Tarr 
considers weather, landscape, and time, along with noise and music, to play significant 
roles within his particular mode of storytelling – what the director calls, “a complex or 
total movie which isn’t only the story.”58 This “totality” takes its form as a pervasive 
environment or milieu, the character of which is articulated by an assemblage of affective 
phenomena, their being grounded by and reflected in one another. This partly recalls 
Heidegger’s artwork essay - the polemic “strife” between “earth” and “world” - but even 
more so the notion of the “fourfold” (of earth, sky, divinities and mortals) that supplants 
it as the model of truth’s happening in the philosopher’s later work. In it, a structural 
polarity is maintained, but given a new form and momentum, a rhythmic movement that 
assuages the implication of violence in polemos or “strife.” Indeed, Heidegger suggests 
that “world,” the open space of our understanding of being, is gathered into presence as 
                                                          
56 Idem. 
57 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
58 Tarr, by Daly and Le Cain (2001). 
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a composition of this fourfold schema.59 With regard to the fourfold and our dwelling in 
it, things are brought into a relation of “nearness” which “does not consist in shortness of 
distance,”60 and which is contrasted to the “distanceless” effected by the “enframing” of 
technological modernity.61 This recalls Tarr’s repeated insistence upon his cinema’s 
intended motion and affect, to “show something that is close to you,” to “understand 
and get closer to the real things.”62 While there is little space here to account for the 
shifts in Heidegger’s later thinking through its increasingly poetic “turn,” it is significant 
that the notion of the fourfold subsumes the earlier “strife” into a cosmic co-implication 
which is referred to as a “mirror-play” or “round dance.”63 Certainly, the idea of a dance 
that figures something like an essential correspondence between materiality and 
spirituality, temporality and eternity - as a form of “play” that makes the “world” present 
to our experience – touches upon issues of the current argument. In Tarr, this “circular 
dance” implies a departure from the exigency of story in the direction of the animated-
being of a world, its rhythmic disclosure of presence and “nearness.” In practical terms – 
those which are stressed most of all by Tarr – the role of Ágnes Hranitzky is accorded a 
central significance in this form of “dance.” She is co-director and editor for each of the 
films in question,64 combining between these roles the profilmic event with its 
                                                          
59 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” in Poetry, Language, Thought, pp.177-178. 
60 Ibid. p.164.  
61 Heidegger makes only passing reference to the idea of “framing” in “The Thing,” but gestures in the 
direction of the concept of “enframing” in its opening section (p.163). “Enframing” (Gestell) refers to the 
modern technological worldview, in which all things are seen to be viewed as potential resources. For 
Heidegger’s discussion of the concept, see “The Question Concerning Technology,” pp.3-35. 
62 Tarr, interview by Selavy (2012). 
63 Heidegger, “The Thing,” p.178. 
64 The latter title was coined after Krasznahorkai’s entrance into the circle, where before she was listed as a 
“co-author”. This is a matter of semantics, perhaps, but one with a certain significance given the writer’s 
“authorial” presence, as conceptual pretext with limited practical contribution. 
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postproduction – and, more than this, drawing them together. As Kovács describes this 
process,  
Each shot consists of an entire narrative sequence and represents a temporal unit that is fixed at 
the time of the shooting…Much of the process of editing is dissolved into the process of planning 
the time sequences of the story, and the rhythm of the film is also fixed in the shooting stage.65  
Hranitzky observes the relative movements of camera and actor within the space of a 
scene, directing their pacing according to an innate understanding of the form or “feel” 
of the projective work; as Tarr suggests, “If you feel the whole rhythm of the movie, then 
you know…if you know what you want, you always feel the whole movie…”66 Thus 
Hranitzky mediates between the three stages of production, and through roles which 
directly condition the “rhythmic design” of the film. In this regard, she appears as a – if 
not the – most significant quarter to the fourfold of key contributors which structures the 
Béla Tarr project, along with Krasznahorkai and the musician Mihály Víg.  
To this end, it is all the more significant that a central method for establishing 
rhythm in Tarr’s films – the playing of musical score in real-time - was, according to Gábor 
Medvigy,67 an innovation of Hranitzky’s. This use of music gestures beyond dance and, by 
extension, toward choreia – the root of both chorus and choreography – as the condition 
of a pro-filmic event that stages a mediation of movements. The practice of playing the 
soundtrack aloud during the filming of scenes is used, according to Tarr, to “get the 
                                                          
65 Kovács, The Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.17. 
66 Tarr, interview by Daly and Le Cain (2001). 
67 The cinematographer for Damnation, Satantango, and the majority of Werckmeister. Cited in Kovács, The 
Cinema of Béla Tarr, p.19. 
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rhythm right in terms of camera movements.”68 The director speaks of how, “Like a main 
character, the music’s always present.”69 Indeed, Mihály Víg’s scores are themselves vital 
to the preconception of these films in rhythmic terms, appearing as something of a 
bridge between idea and its realisation as event. It is significant, in this sense, that Víg 
suggests that music is, “the most important force for finding common ground.”70 This is a 
compelling statement, in thinking about attunement and ethos, situatedness and tonality. 
Tarr has suggested that his impression of location and of the music for these films 
precedes their being scripted, following the logic of landscape and music as primary 
actors and, so, pre-conditions of the work.71 Víg is given some impression of the film – 
according to the novel and/or screenplay – and composes themes in response.72 As for 
the use of Víg’s themes, they present not only a form of movement by which the camera 
takes its measure of the environment, but an atmosphere and a rhythm to which actors 
are attuned, to which they, too, respond in their motions. Music becomes the “common 
ground” for a mediation of the space and time which these people inhabit, drawing their 
milieu into an affective environment. It is fitting, in this sense, that Víg’s musical motifs 
are so often based upon arpeggios and other cyclical refrains that invoke a “round 
dance.” We can refer here to a paradigm that Deleuze and Guattari formulate in A 
                                                          
68 Tarr, interview by Andrew (2007), p.19. 
69 Tarr, interview by Daly and Le Cain (2001). 
70 Mihály Víg, “The Music of Béla Tarr,” interview by Ludmila Cvikova, trans. Panni Pinter, Feb. 7, 2017, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=BREYFIPyiAs&t=2143s 
71 Víg is afforded a significant degree of freedom to work independently on musical themes prior to 
production, basing these on a reading of the relevant novel and/or screenplay, and discussion about, “the 
film [Tarr] has in mind, but not a lot, not in detail.” Béla Tarr, Fred Kelemen & Mihaly Víg, “Filmmaking as a 
collective project,” interview by Michael Guarneri, December 2, 2014, 
http://bombmagazine.org/articles/bela-tarr-fred-kelemen-mihaly-vig/ 
72 Idem. 
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Thousand Plateaus, called the ritournelle.73 It is translated into English as (musical) 
“Refrain,” but stems from “return,” and refers indirectly to a form of (round) dance. In 
this context, “refrain” refers to the way that a physical space or existential “territory” is 
generated and demarcated by song, or drawn into being by other poietic activity (with 
Paul Klee provided as an example in this respect).74 The refrain outlines an order or 
pattern – perhaps a “world,” even - that represents a bulwark against “chaos.”75 Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest that the refrain “always carries earth with it; it has land…as its 
concomitant.”76 They describe this notion of “refrain” with relation to the shared 
semantic ground of nome and nomos, referring to music and law - a rule of melody and a 
customary bind, respectively – and by extension toward ethos, as “Abode” (or 
dwelling).77 There is little room here to delve deeper into the dense terrain of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus, but only to pursue the sense by which this notion of 
refrain refers “to any kind of rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territory,” as Ronald 
Bogue succinctly puts it.78 Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari situate this ritournelle with 
relation to Rhythms which join together, and pass between, elemental Milieus (regarded 
as “blocks” of “space-time”).79 Seen in this way, refrain’s delineation of a space or 
territory (or, for that matter, an ethos) can be viewed in terms of (original) “measure.” 
Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to “Greek modes” and “ancient cosmogonies” gestures 
                                                          
73 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.312. 
74 Idem. 
75 Idem. 
76 Idem. 
77 Idem. 
78 Roland Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts, (New York: London; Routledge, 2003), p.17. 
79 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.313. 
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in this direction, as does their distinction between “critical” rhythm contra “dogmatic” 
meter.80 As it comes to Tarr, both the “flow” of the camera’s movement (its “passage”) 
and the way that this draws (or “joins”) the milieu into animation, into a “dance,” is 
figured with reference to musical refrain. Where in most cinema the score accompanies 
or responds to narrative movement as tonal “background,” Víg’s themes co-determine 
the form of Tarr’s mediation between absence and presence, concealment and 
revelation, in the course of integral camera movement. With reference to the central 
musical refrain - a rhythmic figure - the path of bodies and camera alike are bound 
together as a round-dance.  
Quite apart from the choreography through which this production of milieu is 
staged, Tarr’s analogical invocation of dance is reflected in the significant presence of 
dance within this oeuvre.81 It is most evident (and most evidently circular) in the 
communal dance that takes place toward the end of Damnation, and in the grotesque 
carnival of Satantango’s pub scenes (a more restrained version of which occurs in The 
Man from London). All of these are set to accordion-based tunes played in diegesis, 
which are structured by the noticeably cyclical repetition of a motif. But dance is 
implicated through figures of movement that are not “dance” per se, and which are 
formed to a rhythm that is not diegetically present. I am thinking here most particularly 
of the establishing scene in Werckmeister Harmonies, referred to in the previous chapter. 
There, Janos sets drunken bodies into a play of orbits, a choreography staged in diegesis, 
                                                          
80 Ibid. pp.312-313. 
81 Dance is, however, a presence that precedes the films that are our current area of concern – in the early 
Tarr films, and as late as the final scene of Almanac of Fall, there are a number of representations of dance. 
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which is disclosed in a corresponding “dance” of complex cinematographic manoeuvres. 
As the scene begins, the camera is fixed in close-up on flames flickering through the grate 
of a heater. A hand enters the frame, opens the grate, and throws a beer mug full of 
water upon the fire, before restoring the grille. The camera rotates to open the frame, 
scanning past the hand and the mug, and slowly draws back and across as the figure 
possessing them proceeds forward into the space of a rundown bar. The basic décor of 
the setting and the scattering of slumped (and legless) forms that populate it are then 
revealed to us, as the bartender calls for a general exit. A figure at the far end of the 
room asks for a moment longer, to “let Valuska show us.” He shuffles his way forward, 
towards the camera, which slowly advances to meet and frame his face in a close-up; the 
man beckons Valuska (Janos), who enters from behind and is led back into the common 
space, which is cleared in preparation. Positioning his unsteady petitioner as the sun, at 
the centre of the room, Janos enlists two other men to render the orbits of the earth and 
moon in their rotations around the solar body. He then proceeds to enact, “an 
explanation that simple folks like us can also understand about immortality,” asking the 
men assembled to “step with me into the boundlessness, where constancy, quietude and 
peace, infinite emptiness reign.” The camera hones in on his face as he speaks these 
words, but remains mobile throughout this sequence – drawing back and forward, and 
being drawn into the rotations of the “cosmic” bodies that Janos sets into orbit. This play 
of orbits is suspended, however, as Janos demonstrates a “total eclipse.” The camera 
returns to a central position, approaching the wide-eyed earnestness of the “idiot” as he 
describes the air turning cold, the darkening of the sky, the howling of dogs, the panic of  
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animals, an “awful, incomprehensible dusk…and then…complete silence.” After these 
words, Valuska’s musical theme begins to play – a simple, melancholic tune on piano that 
rises and falls in circular repetition - while the camera draws back to its fullest depth, 
behind a light fitting that casts angelic fluorescent light upon the stilled scene. But, as 
Janos then offers after a moment’s reflection, “its not over”; and as he narrates the 
breaking bind of this eclipse, the camera alights to take its place among the orbit of 
silently shuffling bodies, a ritournelle that now incorporates the remaining bystanders 
into an unruly cosmos, around which the camera rotates. It comes to rests at the far end 
of the bar as the universe disperses at the behest of the bartender, who stands at the 
door opposite. We track forward as Janos approaches, remarking as he leaves, “but Mr. 
Hagelmeyer, it is still not over.” In the following shot, the string section that accompanies 
the staccato piano of the “Valuska” theme enters as the camera tracks ahead and away 
from Janos, venturing alone down a black road segmented by bands of street-light, his 
huddled form slowly receding into distance and darkness. 
Werckmeister Harmonies’ opening scene effects our being-with, and being-
drawn-into an attunement to, the “idiot’s” “cosmic perspective.” It conveys the refrain 
that describes the space of Janos’ dwelling, the perspective of wonder and terror that 
conditions his being-in-the-world. It is with regard to this sense of awe that Rancière 
suggests Janos is “not only a dreamer,” but, “the character that dares take the measure 
of the extraordinary, be it the harmony of the planets, the eye of the dead whale or the 
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unleashing of the mob.”82 The play that he orchestrates in the opening scene manifests 
and animates his universal vision, bringing it to a material presence. The camera 
circulates with, and amongst, the materialised motions of these “heavenly bodies.” It 
draws their stumbling forms into its passage, binding their relative movements together. 
In this sense, it is an emblem for the way that the camera operates in Tarr: to take a 
deliberated measure of situations, and give meaningful form to a milieu and mode of 
existence in so doing. The way that Janos brings his vision to manifest presence while 
setting it into motion closely reflects Rancière’s description of “what Béla Tarr does 
himself”:  
…he takes characters abandoned by history, living in an aftertime of mean and grotesque stories, 
and he gives them back their capacity and their dignity by a certain way of making them turn and 
of turning with them…83 
The embodied gaze of Tarr’s sequence shots seeks out the texture, character, and 
significance of a milieu, by relation to a mediation of bodies and of the space between 
them, environing and conditioning them; as well as in the record of bodies during their 
mediation (or habitation) of space. For Biro, in Tarr “everything moves in a closed time 
and space…oppressive and grim hopelessness permeates the movement of humans and 
the camera alike and define the play of light and shadow.” This space and time are 
opened to us, made present as a substantial existential material, with reference to the 
bodies that dwell within them. The bearing of bodies is a central focus of the camera’s 
                                                          
82 Rancière, “Béla Tarr: The Poetics and Politics of Fiction,” p.260. 
83 Ibid. p.259. 
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excursions, opening our access to environment. More than this, as Biro recognises, these 
movements set into motion a play of light and shadow, of vision and its obstruction. 
Rancière, too, reflects on this play as a consequence of the sequence shot, its 
incorporating a total environment into a continuum; this, against the logic of cause and 
effect, of shot and reverse, which fragments space and time. For Rancière, the 
continuum of the sequence shot forms a “rhythm for making the rounds of all the 
elements composing the scenery of a place… In this manner it establishes an infinity of 
miniscule variations between movement and immobility.” It is as a relation of the relative 
movements (or non-movements) of bodies, and of the camera’s mediation of them, that 
we encounter the texture of their material environment. Regarded in this way, 
corporeality is among the vital sites (or media) for those metacommunications that 
characterise Tarr’s retreat from “story” and toward material presence. This is recognised 
by the coat-check lady from the Titanik Bar during Damnation’s dancehall scene, when 
she suggests that “movements speak.” Indeed, it is in response to a question referencing 
this line that Tarr offers the above belief in the logic of space, the revelation of a 
location’s countenance, and the potentiality of movement. As the director suggests, 
these are drawn together (and disclosed) as a matter of a rhythm, as the round-dance 
that animates the meaningful presence of a world. 
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“The Apocalypse has already commenced”: The Turin Horse 
With the final film in this oeuvre, the gravitation toward material presence becomes 
axiomatic, as does the choreographic staging of movement, music and perspective 
through which this presence is disclosed. The large majority of The Turin Horse takes 
place in observation of the quotidian routines of a destitute father and daughter as they 
face an ostensible end of days. It unfolds as an extensive consideration of “dwelling” in a 
quite literal sense, taking place almost entirely within a domestic space (and its 
immediate surrounds), the only departure from which is both abortive and obscured 
from our view behind the hill which figures the receding horizon of their world. The film 
presents an attunement to a form of life in the face of its imminent dissolution, a mode 
of being revealed in greater depth and detail over the course of six days of de-creation. 
Routine undertakings - such as drawing water, boiling and eating a potato, sitting at the 
window - are encountered each day from new perspectives, within gradually extending 
courses of movement that serve to expand our familiarity with this (mode of) dwelling. 
Among Tarr’s films, The Turin Horse is by far the most reductive in terms of narrative 
content, the most repetitious, with a minimal cast of characters, among whom minimal 
words are shared. It is the only one among these films that the director does not believe 
to be a comedy, the only instance not set in the 20th century, and the only one in which 
its conclusion is final; unlike the six steps of Satantango, or those of the ritournelle, there 
is here no “return.” The Turin Horse also has the longest average shot length, fewest 
edits, and a uniquely reductive soundtrack among these films, consisting of a single 
musical theme. It is titled “Horse,” and displays structural features that are common to 
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Víg’s scores. These are often formed as or around arpeggios – that is, as chords “broken” 
into a succession of notes. In other words, they are structured by a sequence of steps 
that schematise the underlying structure of tonal harmony, in a rhythmically recurring 
pattern that does not extend toward the linear progression of melody, nor the 
consonance of a full chord. Where such chords appear, they are almost invariably 
dissected by an arpeggiated accompaniment which gestures back and forth in rounds; 
where there is melody, it tends to be rambling and repetitive, as in the (Satan’s) “tango” 
that Víg plays upon a synthesised keyboard. “Horse” itself unfurls in repeating, 
intersecting cycles, as a play between contrasting tempos that come together to trace a 
singular figure. It is wrought upon crudely hewn double-bass steps that form lumbering 
root notes, its meter, a loping alternation of bow-drawn beats between which the six 
steps of an arpeggio on cello and organ ebb and flow. Rising over it at half-speed, a 
lament on rasping strings likewise proceeds as three tonal steps (with the last doubled) 
and their return, twice forward and then twice back. Further layers of temporal contrast 
are gradually introduced, with lilting flurries of high-strings and loops on the organ that 
redouble the sense of an uneasily balanced momentum. The motion of the piece evinces 
an awkward gait that is urgent and laboured; it is a slow plodding onward borne by an 
agonised flux of minor dynamics, a chaotic struggle taking a perceptible form into which 
we are drawn. This vital aural presence animates the film’s world as well as the choreia 
through which it is disclosed. The rambling momentum of “Horse” is introduced in 
tandem with the movement that is its thematic inspiration – that of the eponymous 
beast of burden and its one-armed driver; they ford through an environment typical to 
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Tarr, a desolate landscape encountered within a pervasive climactic resistance, in this 
case a buffeting windstorm. The dynamic opposition sustained by this image of tempest 
is joined, and joined together, by a third element - the freeform tracking shot which 
forms and transforms this flux of movement into image. The camera rotates back and 
forth, from portrait to profile, and at an oscillating proximity that responds to the 
movement and texture of this struggling procession. The presence of this carriage is at 
points heavily particularised, tactile and near to hand, while at others revealed from 
distance as a whole, an assemblage of moving parts. This independent coursing of the 
camera discloses the evident strain of the convoy, and the sinews stretching beneath the 
matted hide of the weather-beaten horse. It figures a contraposition of corporeal gait to 
the momentum produced by it in the regular turning of the cartwheel, the bending of 
ropes and jolting of the wagon that joins horse-power to this revolution, and which joins 
beast to man. And, against all this, it gives form to the force of the wind that blows clouds 
of dust and debris against them, obscuring our vision and theirs, sending mane, hair and 
clothing adrift in violent arabesques. It is only as the shot comes toward its conclusion, 
and the pace of the procession slows down, that we are introduced to diegetic sound. 
The howl of this apocalyptic gale and the creak of the wooden cart gradually enter the 
sound track. In this establishing sequence, a world is drawn into animate being by a 
straining, grinding refrain, which articulates the form and figure of a certain quality of 
experience, if not existence. 
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Prior to this introduction to the Turin horse and its musical theme, the film begins 
with a monologue over a black screen: a gravelly male voice describes the infamous 
scenario of Friedrich Nietzsche’s descent into madness. The text of the monologue was 
written by Krasznahorkai, originally as the introduction to a short essayistic reflection 
titled “At Latest in Turin.”84 To summarise the anecdote: Nietzsche encounters an 
uncompliant horse being mercilessly beaten by its driver in the street, whereupon – in a 
seemingly ironic contravention of the thinker’s own life philosophy – he is overcome with 
a fit of compassion, the blow of which renders him senseless and mute for the remainder 
of his days. Rather than with Nietzsche, or with his famous last words – “Mutter, ich bin 
Dumm” – Krasznahorkai’s script that introduces both essay and film concludes with the 
assertion that, “No one knows what happened to the horse.”85 The after-life of this 
fabular beast of burden inspired intermittent discussion between the writer and Tarr 
after he first heard Krasznahorkai read “At Latest in Turin” in 1985, eventuating almost 
two decades later in Krasznahorkai’s preparation of the scenario for The Turin Horse. In 
the second paragraph of “At Latest in Turin,” however, Krasznahorkai already questions 
the authenticity of the Nietzsche fable (and so, perhaps, that of the horse itself), but 
suggests that,  
the natural tendency at such times to believe strong narratives lends it a certain credence and 
casts a particularly intense light on the last acts of the spirit according to a dramatized model of 
the intellect.86 
                                                          
84 László Krasznahorki, “At Latest in Turin,” p.24. 
85 Idem. 
86 Idem. 
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The writer pursues this thought, proceeding from the street scene and toward a 
consideration of the Nietzschean philosophy in its contradistinction from (ostensibly 
“Christian” values of) compassion, communion, and “the spirit of the moral law.”87 Of the 
latter, Krasznahorkai gleans the following lesson from Nietzsche’s apparent demise: “I 
may live counter to the spirit [of moral law] but that does not release me from the 
mysterious and truly unnameable power that binds me firmly to it…it is the sad 
prerogative of freedom to negate freedom.”88 In these terms, the writer is speaking to 
much the same form of “bind” as did Archilocus in his invocation to “come to know the 
rhythm that holds men.” Krasznahorkai gestures toward a certain ethos, “a sense of 
communion” that will be realised “in ten…or in thirty years’ time”, or, coming full circle, 
“at latest in Turin.”89  The film, by contrast to the essay, leaves Nietzsche mute and well 
alone after the monologue,90 proceeding immediately to the “rhythm” of that 
establishing sequence described above. A “script” is available on Krasznahorkai’s personal 
website, with the dedication: “created with Béla Tarr’s thoughts and ideas, for his 
spiritual recovery.”91 More than just the product of their discussions, then, this scenario 
is influenced by Tarr’s own practice and formed – figuratively, at least – in the director’s 
                                                          
87 Ibid., p.25.  
88 Idem. 
89 Idem. 
90 Although a second monologue, delivered in diegesis and referred to in previous chapters, has distinctly 
Nietzschean overtones 
91 Krasznahorkai also lists multiple works of his own on which the script is based. Available (in Hungarian) 
at: www.krasznahorkai.hu/docs/A_torinoi_lo_forgatokonyv.pdf. Above translation by Szusza Selyem, “How 
Long and When,” p.106. 
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image (as much as for it). In an illuminating intertextual analysis that positions The Turin 
Horse between Krasznahorkai and Tarr, Szusza Selyem suggests that the “script,” 
presents day-to-day living as concretely as possible...Krasznahorkai’s famous long sentences, with 
their specific rhythm and repetitions, here, deprived of all poetry, gives us only the mere rhythm 
and repetition itself. If they are still beautiful, it is not because of the composition but because of 
the feeling that the repetitiveness of bare material existence is still beautiful…It is beautiful 
compared to the pervasive darkness.92 
In other words, Krasznahorkai renders the scenario prosaic in preparation for its poetic 
substantiation into the affective materiality of concrete presence. The rhythmic pulse of 
his prose is joined to rhythms of everydayness, the deformation of which is the subject of 
our intimate observation. Indeed, rhythm is another significant way to think the 
difference between Krasznahorkai and Tarr. However much writer and director share in 
the length of respective “utterance” (whether sentence or shot), the rhythm produced 
through an accretion and assonance of words and sentences is of a different quality to 
that which is formed in the sequence of Tarr’s “mobile editing.” The scenario for The 
Turin Horse (and its realisation) signals in the direction of a central claim of Tarr’s 
filmmaking, that of the metacommunication of phenomena and the vital significance of 
our attunement to it; an attunement accorded, here, a firm and final gravitas. It is a 
scenario written specifically for film, and for Tarr, in a way that seems to gesture toward 
that crucial point where this beauty of “the repetitiveness of bare material existence” 
outstrips the words that would seek to define or conceptualise it. Or, in other words, the 
                                                          
92 Selyem, “How Long and When,” p.106. 
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point where this beauty is better described in the round-dance of bodies and things as 
they are joined together as an expressive form, animated and articulated as rhythmic 
disposition.  
 
 
Figure 9.1 
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This disposition is invoked first of all in The Turin Horse’s initial sequence, in a play 
between manifest movement and musical motif. But it is where the music is withdrawn 
that this disposition is accorded a new character. Indeed, it is here that we are 
introduced to another rhythm that structures our experience of this world, and toward 
which we are attuned. This is the alternation of the soundtrack between musical theme 
and atmospheric noise, between this rolling dirge of strings and a droning constancy of 
howling wind, between “horse” and “storm.” It is also one way by which a passive 
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engagement is displaced, where the exchange of information in dialogue is replaced – 
almost entirely – by these vital aural presences which condition our encounter with 
presence. Ordinarily in Tarr, our entrance to the film’s world is one that attunes us to an 
atmosphere, temporality, or disposition that is sustained in a general sense thereafter. 
This is the case even where the scene is seemingly only tangential in its relation to 
subsequent events, such as with Satantango’s cows, or Janos’ cosmic choreography; both 
of Damnation and The Man From London, on the other hand, clearly initiate our 
situatedness in a milieu and mode of observation. The prologic sequence of The Turin 
Horse establishes, and articulates, a form of movement apparently conveying the 
animate being of the beast, the straining momentum of its carriage as an audio-visual 
rhythm. And yet the particular bearing of this motion is not extended or sustained 
beyond this image; or, at least, not as a manner of equivalent movement. This is partly 
the case for reasons of narrative, revolving as it does around the suspension of natural 
order, of which the horse’s refusal to move or eat is a central issue. But this asymmetry 
between initial sequence and subsequent events - between a threshold of attunement  
and the “dwelling” that becomes the site and subject of our experience thereafter – is 
not, or not only, a matter of narrative. It does not represent a juxtaposition, but a 
correspondence that is figured in rhythmic terms, through music. The “First Day” begins 
with a single shot of around five minutes which more clearly figures an entrance than 
does the prologic sequence preceding it. We follow closely behind as the driver, 
Ohlsdorfer, with greatcoat billowing out from his slumped shoulders, leads horse and 
carriage by a short length of rope. They approach and then round a simple stone building 
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– a stable, adjoining a dwelling – whereupon a woman hurries from across the yard to 
join and, with the driver, proceeds to unharness the horse; to prepare its food; to bring 
the cart inside. They cross back over the yard to take in some laundry, passing beyond 
our point of perspective on their return, while the camera becomes stationary (but wind-
shaken) in looking out into the distance of their barren, gale-blown horizon. No words are 
exchanged, and no music plays – we hear only the tactile sounds of their industry amid 
the howl of tempest. Throughout, the camera gravitates toward vital motion, trailing and 
intercepting the lines of their sensible movement among the chaos of windblown debris, 
but also pausing to observe these trails from temporary positions of repose. Crucially, it is 
only with the cut to their domestic space that the “Horse” theme resumes. There, the 
plod and pull of this lament no longer resonates with the momentum of the horse, but 
instead extends the pathos of its dynamic - of struggle and endurance - toward our 
encounter with an uncanny quotidian. The form of life that we observe is reduced almost 
entirely to movement and gesture, almost entirely without verbal exchange. Banal tasks 
become acts of resistance against the coming cataclysm, that are repeated with only 
minor variation – according to their possibility - across six daily instalments. These are 
articulated by the circulation of the camera’s embodied gaze, and enveloped within a 
constant aural milieu that ebbs and flows between a rhythmic refrain and the 
unremitting tumult of the roaring gale.  
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The use of the “Horse” theme thus connotes a certain figural homology, a way of 
producing correspondence between man and animal in the face of a disaster that is at 
once environmental and, by its turn, existential. Its refrain guides a methodical revelation 
of the substantial time and space of a dwelling, the rhythm of a milieu. Rather than with 
reference to the loping gait that it appears, at first, to simulate, the roundel of “Horse” 
accompanies the minor tasks that constitute the texture of a daily life that is cast in stark 
relief against an “end of days.” Man, woman and horse are drawn together in the 
“common ground” of Víg’s refrain, one that stakes the space of their common exposure 
to a storm enveloping the world – a world that, the Nietzschean neighbour asserts, has 
“gone to ruin.” We might recall here Benjamin’s allegory - read from Klee’s Angelus 
Novus - concerning the angel of history, whose wings are caught in the storm of progress. 
Propelled into the future, but with his face turned toward the past, the angel perceives 
history not as a “chain of events,” but as “one single catastrophe which keeps piling 
wreckage upon wreckage.”93 Benjamin links “the concept of historical progress” explicitly 
to the notion of “progression through homogeneous, empty time”;94 that is, with the 
uniform, linear time-concept, the continuum of historical progression. Against this, 
Benjamin opposes the revolutionary potential of Jetz-zeit, or “now-time” - “time filled by 
the presence of the now.”95 This is a moment pregnant with possibility, seized by it, in 
which “time stands still and has come to a stop.”96 Agamben adopts this model, first 
                                                          
93 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, p.259. 
94 Ibid. p.263. 
95 Idem. 
96 Ibid. p.264. 
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under the name of kairology, and then as the concept, taken also from Benjamin, of 
“messianic time.” This is a messianism that must be distinguished from eschatology and 
from millennial prophecy, such as would be projected toward a future upon which we 
wait, but instead has its site in the present. Agamben suggests, for this reason, that the 
messianic is the “revocation of every vocation,”97 which will take place at the “end of 
days, that is, every day.”98 This peculiar placement of the “end of days” within the 
everyday, the quotidian, responds to the idea that, “the sole possibility we have to truly 
grasp the present is to conceive of it as the end.”99 Kafka, too, suggests that, “the Day of 
Judgement is the normal condition of history.”100 A similar idea is intimated by Adorno 
with reference to “redemption,” where he suggests that, “Perspectives must be 
fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, 
as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light.”101 
Krasznahorkai himself echoes this line of thinking, suggesting that, 
In general for creatures living in nature and in humanised nature, life gains momentum only in 
times of crisis. There is no peace. Living under the conditions of war is natural. Instead of 
expecting apocalypse to come, we need to understand that we are already living in it. The 
apocalypse has already commenced.102 
                                                          
97 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: a commentary on the letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia 
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.23. 
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It is an intriguing idea with respect to the enstranged worlds and “apocalyptic” quality of 
Tarr and Krasznahorkai, our displacement in their disposition, and more so where this 
end of days is consummated by their ultimate collaboration. The revelation of this final 
film’s “apocalypse” is not oriented toward the future, dystopian or otherwise, in that 
there is nothing to be seen after it – in a literal sense. All light, all flame, is irreversibly 
extinguished on the fifth day; at the end of which, the voice with which the film begun 
describes a final “dead silence” that falls on the house, joining the final darkness that 
now pervades, and which marks the end of the storm. On the sixth and final day, the 
refrain of “Horse” returns and draws this world into a final image with final words to 
replace those of Nietzsche, with which the film begun. “Eat,” says the father, while 
scratching at a raw potato in darkness, “we must eat.” The daughter sits, unmoved and 
unmoving. Our view slowly fades for a final time as “Horse” rolls on and then, as slowly, 
fades out. We can paraphrase Krasznahorkai to suggest that The Turin Horse casts a 
particularly intense light on the last acts of the spirit according to a dramatised model of 
existence, cast in the messianic light of “the end.”  
 
Figure 11 
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Cinema, Gesture and a Messianic Rhythm 
Tarr’s emphasis on the practical choreography of corporeality leads us away from a 
conventional treatment of image and toward that which Agamben identifies as the more 
proper “element of cinema”: gesture.103 This claim is made within an apocryphal essay 
that proceeds from an intriguing point of argument. Agamben suggests that, “[B]y the 
end of the nineteenth century, the Western bourgeoisie had definitely lost its 
gestures”;104 it is perhaps significant to note that this context corresponds exactly to the 
historical moment in which The Turin Horse is set, as well as more broadly to the 
sociological interest in rhythm discussed above. The “loss” of gesture taking place at this 
time is exemplified, for Agamben, by a contemporary proliferation of disorders of the 
motor-nervous system – “a generalised catastrophe in the sphere of gestures” – a 
proliferation that can be read as a common response to the shocks of technological 
modernity.105 Where for centuries the legible character or personal disposition of the 
body had been a commonplace ideal, the fracturing of bearing – first as disorder, then as 
the attempt to record and analyse this disorder scientifically – engendered new 
encounters with the corporeal. Indeed, and in a way that speaks to my reading of Pasolini 
and Gumbrecht, Agamben suggests that this disorder is one which drives Western society 
toward interiority and psychology, in the face of “life” (or, in this context, ethos) 
becoming “indecipherable.”106 One response to this crisis that is identified by Agamben is 
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104 Ibid. p.49. 
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the proto-cinematic breakdown of the body into segments, such as can be seen in the 
medical studies of the gait of de la Tourette’s patients, but also in Muybridge’s motion 
studies.107 Both re-compose a recorded event for an observation of the order of motion 
in a way that directly anticipated the “movement-image” of the cinematograph. Building 
on Deleuze, Agamben proceeds to suggest that gesture (“and not image”) is at the centre 
of cinema.108 It is the dynamic potential of images, the figure of movement that is at once 
effaced and preserved within the “still.”109 This is the “antinomic polarity” that animates 
the image and its “mattering” (and, by turn, our investment in it).110 The cinema, 
however, “leads images back to the homeland of gesture”, that is, back to animate being 
– a “liberation” of the animus and dynamis contained within the “mythical rigidity” of 
imago.111 Agamben’s antipathy toward the bind of the image can be viewed with 
particular regard to Guy Debord’s theory of the “spectacular society” of advanced 
capitalist culture, in which the relation between humans – as well as between humans 
and the world of things - is mediated by images; or replaced by representation, what 
Debord calls “the spectacle.” “All that was once directly lived,” Debord proclaims, “has 
become mere representation.”112  This spectacle is in many ways akin to the idea of 
“second nature,” an edifice of historical conventions that are experienced as mythic or 
permanent. As was the case with the idea of natural-history, a “change of perspective” or 
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“shock of insight” is required in order to break its bind, to suspend the “rhythm” of the 
“flow” of a world apprehended as image. It is for this reason that the suspension of the 
status of the image in modernity – and, so, its corresponding stasis – is considered by 
Agamben to be the cinema’s most significant potential. Indeed, Agamben examines 
Debord’s cinematic practice as one that realises the gestural potential of the medium, 
which takes the disruption of the bind of image as its central function.113 In doing so 
Agamben situates “gestural cinema” with relation to the avant-garde experimentation of 
non-narrative films, in which montage is the central element. These enact repetition and 
stoppage upon the image, techniques that Agamben takes to reveal the conditions of 
montage and, so, of cinema and its representation.114 The medium itself no longer 
“disappears” into the expressive act of narration, but is shown as constructed and 
contingent. Stoppage “pulls” the image “away from narrative power to exhibit it as 
such”;115 or, in Debord’s terms, to, disrupt the flow of the spectacle: to interrupt its 
ostensive consistency and reveal its status as image, as representation. The special 
significance of interruption in the context of gesture – which would seem, at first glance, 
to be antithetical to a notion of corporeal vitality – can be viewed with reference to 
Benjamin, whose idea of gesture’s interruption is informed by Brecht and Kafka. With 
Brecht and his “epic theatre,” gesture is positioned with regard to the 
Verfremdungseffekt, which seeks to interrupt the continuity of dramatic action in order 
                                                          
113 Giorgio Agamben, “Difference and Repetition,” pp.313-319.  
114 Ibid., p .317. 
115 Idem.  
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to disrupt the audience’s passive engagement with it.116 As Benjamin writes, “discovery 
(alienation) of conditions takes place through the interruption of happenings.”117 In that 
this “distancing effect” was inspired by Shklovsky’s “ostranenie,” it is significant that 
Benjamin’s other prominent example is also known to “make-strange.” The uncanny 
presence and indetermination of figures in Kafka, Benjamin suggests, “divests the human 
gesture of its traditional supports and then has a subject for reflection without end.”118 
The resistance of these gestures to definite meaning or interpretation, as symbols 
without codes, opens them up to an unending reflection.119 Likewise, it is with regard to 
an occlusion of “ends” (or teleological determination) that Agamben’s concept of gesture 
is formulated as a “pure means.”120  
Pure means is an important concept for Agamben. He takes the idea from 
Benjamin and places at the centre of his ethics. It refers to the mediality of human being 
as ethical potential: the unrealised freedom of our being “without ends” in a historical or 
transcendental endpoint. This is an idea discussed in the first chapter, with reference to 
boredom, ambivalence and awakening. In a short essay titled “Ethics,” Agamben asserts 
that, 
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no 
essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or 
                                                          
116 Benjamin, “What is Epic Theater?” in Illuminations, p.152. 
117 Idem. 
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Krasznahorkai, interview by Szirtes (2013). 
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realise. This is the only reason why something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if 
humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would 
be possible – there would be only tasks to be done.121 
It is in this sense that gesture becomes a model for politics and ethics, as well as for this 
certain kind of cinema. To this end, it is significant that the idea of gesture emerges 
through an etymology with parallels to that of rhythm, where both embody an “ethical” 
character. Gesture denotes originally the notion of “bearing,” via “carrying.” It is by this 
same token that Agamben suggests,  
What characterises gesture is that in it nothing is being produced or acted, but rather something is 
being endured and supported. The gesture, in other words, opens ethos as the more proper 
sphere of what is human.122  
What is endured in gesture, held open by it, is being-in-language: language encountered 
as a medium, as “means” without transcendence into the formal definition of word or 
concept; a logos without a structuring logic.123 In this view, gesture exhibits 
communicability and its “mattering,” but “says” nothing. “It is essentially always a 
gesture of not being able to figure out something in language”: an expression of “non-
sense,” or a “gag” in the place of speech.124 It is for this reason that Agamben draws a 
parallel, via gesture, between cinema and philosophy, as means to encounter that which 
is irreducible to definition by the word, and which “speak” to an “essential silence” (if not 
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the unsayable). As Benjamin Noys suggests, cinema and philosophy are in this view both 
“practices that suspend our relation to communication all the better to reveal 
communicability as such.”125 In this, a useful comparison can be made with poetry – or 
poetic experience – by a relation that Agamben suggests elsewhere. As with the current 
argument, he asserts that cinema is closer to poetry than prose, modifying Paul Valery’s 
definition of the poem as, “a prolonged hesitation between sound and meaning,” and 
locating the hesitation of “a certain kind of cinema” as one that intervenes between 
“image and meaning.”126 Agamben is referring here to stoppage, as in the montage 
experiments of Debord’s “gestural cinema,” but we can consider the central gesturality of 
Tarr’s cinema – which is, after all, a narrative cinema – to be shaped by its poetic 
formalism: the “cosmic perspective” that suspends the linear time of “story.” Where it 
invokes the dynamics of repetition and stoppage, it does so at the level of narrative, and 
not image; that is, it suspends narrative drive, and encounters the presence of 
everydayness in its stead. This suspension is formed as, and in, a rhythmic movement, 
the articulation of another kind of “bind.” “Story” itself becomes a gesture suspended 
within the figure of a circular time and shown to be the medium of second nature, of the 
historical transmission of represented ideas. Indeed, it is for this reason that Tarr’s 
cinema is not “gestural” in Agamben’s terms (where this seems to imply a break with 
immersion in world), so much as it takes gesture to be among its thematic elements and 
modes of metacommunication. In the first place, this refers to the intimate consideration 
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of being and presence that is central to Tarr’s practice, engendering its formal character 
as a free-indirect being-with. As with Muybridge and Tourette, the gestural disposition of 
gait and bearing is a vital subject in this cinema, observed in extended sequences that are 
often without specific arrival or evident narrative “purpose.” This speaks in part toward 
the historical context by which Agamben situates his essay – in which, “an age that has 
lost its gestures is, for this reason, obsessed by them”127 - and of which he takes the 
contemporary emergence of silent cinema to be exemplary; we can situate Bücher and 
Klages’ discussions of rhythm within the same context. But, as Agamben goes on to state 
by the essay’s end, the essential “silence” of cinema “has nothing to do with the 
presence or absence of a soundtrack,” but instead with the exposure of gesturality.128 In 
Tarr, such exposure is a primary method of unseating the conventional logic of story, by 
distending the time of our “being-with” and suspending the progression from image to 
meaning, from pathos to ethos, Erlebnis to Erfahrung. 
Agamben’s theory of gesture and Tarr’s cinema both respond to questions of 
representation and transmission, both seeking the disruption of a bind that takes place as 
and in language. In this, they run parallel to the idea of “poetic experience” discussed in 
previous chapters. As with the poetic word that is the model for an experience of the “as 
such,” gesture is a suspension of regular diction that exhibits what Agamben calls, “being-
in-language itself as a gigantic memory loss, as an incurable speech defect.”129 The non-
sense of the gestural points toward this apparent defect of speech, which is central to 
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human being - characteristic of it, even. It refers, in other words, to the ontogenetic 
passage from the immediacy of natural voice (phone) and into that mediality of speech 
(logos) in which the domain of man (polis) is secured.130 This is a central subject of 
Agamben’s thinking. Language is, in this view, the site of an elemental rift that founds 
human community - as polis and ethos - on the ground of a lack of an essential nature (a 
voice or vocation). At the same time as allowing for the common-place of ethos, language 
is the site of a politics whose occupation is to articulate a human “nature” and to define 
the community and historical tasks proper to it; in this, it displays a similar bivalency to 
that rhythm which is at once a fall into clock-time and a means of release from it. It is for 
this reason that Agamben finds politics to be, at its origins, a biopolitics and a 
metaphysics – to have the administration and qualification of human “life” as its 
fundamental subject.131 At its core, he finds a shifting logic of inclusion and exclusion, 
acceptation and exception, which determines what is “sacred” and what “profane”: what 
gains entry to the domain of “man” as a qualified form of “life” (bios).132 Indeed, 
Agamben explicitly connects language to the powers of religion and law as exercises of 
judgement.133 This resonates tellingly with a familiar theme in Tarr, the corruption 
inherent in human being that finds its place in and through language. For the director, 
“story” is a principle agent of the transmission of a misguided historical authority which 
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must be encountered from perspectives outside the binding logic of its representation. 
The pre-conceptual expression embodied in gesture operates in suggestively similar 
terms to that of metacommunication, to the “concrete medium” of Tarr’s “primitive 
language.” 
This invocation of gesture is shown in a distinctive sense by the concluding 
sequence of Damnation – soon after the coat check lady has suggested to Karrer that 
“movements speak.” Having left the dancehall and made a declamatory confession to the 
authorities, Karrer is walking through a landscape of mud and rubble when he comes 
upon a feral dog. Aggravated by this animal opposite - or, perhaps, entreated by an 
animal inside - a moment of apparent breakdown provokes our protagonists’ taking to all 
fours in a snarling, barking confrontation between man and beast. This prolonged 
standoff traces a circle in the mud through which there arises an indeterminacy between 
their corporeal beings, man and animal, each creaturely existence bared and bearing 
down upon the other, broken only as Karrer looms up over his antagonist; the dog 
retreats in recognition of the power potential in its adversary. On regaining this 
composure, Karrer continues on into the shot’s distance while the camera draws back, as 
he passes into the beyond of this wasteland, a liminal zone bordering the town, the polis 
of man. Tarr’s description of this conclusion is one that speaks directly to Agamben, 
where he states that “he just goes into nature. He does not want to speak any more, 
because his life is over.”134 
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This figuration of an exit from language, into nature, is an exemplary gesture toward the 
issue of “life” that holds a central value in Agamben’s excavation of Western metaphysics 
and/as biopolitics. To this end, our entrance to existential boredom in Damnation’s 
establishing sequence – that which is broken in Karrer’s return to nature - can itself be 
directed toward the caesura between “language” and “voice,” which is considered by 
Agamben to be the site of our experience of Stimmung.135 This follows a relation we have 
already observed, where Stimmung resonates within a semantic ground shared with 
voice (Stimme) and with tuning (hence “attunement”); Agamben also intimates its 
connection to Bestimmung, a call of “destiny,” or vocation.136 To Agamben, 
Man has a Stimmung, he is passionate and anxious, because he…stands in the opening of being 
and of language without a voice, without a nature: he is thrown and abandoned in this opening, 
and from this abandon he must make his world, from language his own voice.137 
Stimmung is thus positioned with reference to that same lack of voice and “nature” that 
Agamben takes to be the site of human ethics; our lack of vocation is an invocational call 
to ethical experience.138 This “thrownness” into a contingent historical “world” is further 
explicated in The Open, with reference to what Agamben calls “the anthropological 
machine,” the operation of biopolitical judgement which is, he says, “the motor for man’s 
becoming historical.”139 In this view, the domain of “man” as political institution is 
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constituted most specifically as an articulation of the difference between the human and 
the animal.140 The “anthropological machine” names the complex of mechanisms (of 
power, in discourse) that produce and preserve the terms of this dichotomy, that 
maintains its operation as an historical task. Agamben mobilises the wider context of 
Heidegger’s “Profound Boredom” in this direction. Heidegger’s discourse on the 
fundamental attunement of Langeweile is grounded upon a distinction between the 
“poverty” of the animal world against the capabilities for “world-forming” available to 
historical humanity141 (most significant of which is understanding, in language). In 
Heidegger’s view, the animal’s “world” (“poverty-in-world”) is characterised by a direct 
relationship to a sphere of essential immediacy which delimits the animal’s inability to 
interpret its own or other beings. It is suspended (“between itself and its 
environment”)142 in a life that is never revealed to it as such. Agamben suggests that the 
animal, in Heidegger’s model, is thus captured, or captivated, in a mode of non-revelation 
that functions in a markedly similar fashion to that which characterises his analytic of 
boredom; that is, in an openness to closedness, or a total and immediate refusal of 
possibility.143 Agamben extends this idea to assert that, 
Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has awakened from its own 
captivation to its own captivation. This awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, 
this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human.144  
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In this sense, it is not only temporal- and historical-consciousness that are at issue in the 
attunement of boredom, but the original becoming-temporal and, so, -historical, of the 
human. It is only by deactivating our captivation in immediacy that something like 
“human” emerges out of the broader category of “simply living being” (zoe) and into 
“world,” recognised as bios, as a “life” to be administered by the polis. But it is here as 
well that Agamben turns Heidegger’s notion toward a new ethos, one that might render 
the anthropological machine inoperative in an awakening to our fundamental lack of a 
biological or historical destiny. Directed back toward Heidegger – and the polemic ethos 
of his artwork essay in particular - Agamben thus positions the animal “not-open” as that 
“concealed” centre which lies at the heart of unconcealment: the lethe of aletheia.145  
Given that what is disclosed in unconcealment stands “at the limit of the human,” 
as per the previous chapter, this reference to a concealed ground can be regarded with a 
new complexion. “Earth,” the undisclosable Being of beings upon which human “world” is 
grounded, is identified as the animality of human being – that which is excised by the 
operation of the anthropological machine.146 “The decisive political conflict, which 
governs every other conflict,” Agamben suggests, “is that between the animality and 
humanity of man.”147 In this view, the rhythm that binds the human – that which sets 
them apart while joining them together – has always been the attempt to articulate a 
nature proper to “man,” to complete a displacement in historical time, to repair the 
fissure between language and voice: the unrecognised grounds of our separation from 
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the animal, from (our) nature. Whether in terms of historical progress or divine 
providence, the projects of humanity and their temporal projections can thus be viewed 
in this light: they are oriented toward a utopian future in which the separation of the 
human from “nature” is completed, or repaired. It is significant, in this sense, that The 
Turin Horse – the final statement of Tarr’s oeuvre – inverts the hierarchy of 
determination that is produced by the anthropological machine. What is shown by this 
inversion is the absolute dependency of human life upon an ecology of which we are 
part, if not integral (but not as a position of command) – and, more than this, of an 
existential deprivation that emerges in the failure to recognise our ground in this nature. 
This film presents a judgement day that suspends all judgement, opening in the space of 
human abandonment by an errant nature. The world of The Turin Horse is progressively 
disclosed and joined together into a rhythm that is articulated in terms of its pending 
arrhythmia. We are drawn into a choreography that brings certain qualities of human 
being into greater relief against the fatal retreat of nature, in a final submission of order 
to chaos, darkness, or nothingness. But as the director is keen to stress, even The Turin 
Horse, “is not a real apocalypse, because an apocalypse for me is a big TV show, a big 
attraction.”148 The idea of apocalypse, of definite ends or a transcendental realm beyond 
them, is an image – a spectacle, even - which distorts our relation to the historical 
present, and to the “life” within it. Tarr further suggests that, “We have just one life and, 
day by day, life is getting shorter and shorter. It’s incredible and unacceptable, of course, 
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but it’s coming…”149 This is an idea that gestures toward individual, existential concerns, 
but which takes on a broader scope when Tarr speaks about this same film in terms of 
“our partners in life.” Completing a quote that has already been referenced with regards 
to the central concept of “dignity,” the director suggests, 
The animals, vegetation, and the people, together. If they do not fit together, if we are always 
forcing our stupid hegemony and our stupid dominance, then we lose something which is part of 
our dignity.150 
Our grasping of the nature of human “life” - its gratuity and finitude - is thus projected 
beyond (or before) language and history, or whatever else might take on the appearance 
of “second nature.” Indeed, it is with a return to the idea of natural-history in Benjamin 
that we might identify a new “rhythm that holds men,” a renovated ethos based not on 
the eternal or futural but instead with regard to the “eternal transience” which forms the 
“now” of worldly existence. In his “Theologico-Political Fragment,” Benjamin suggests 
that, 
… the rhythm of this eternally transient worldly existence, transient in its totality, in its spatial but 
also in its temporal totality, the rhythm of messianic nature, is happiness…151 
In this view, the “happy life” that is the goal of politics may take its model from nature 
and from the “nihilism” of its eternal transience – a nihilism fully directed toward an 
encounter with the present.
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Conclusion 
There is a video clip on YouTube titled “KUHINJA: Béla Tarr Interview.”1 It is a segment 
from a local TV arts program (Kuhinja, or “kitchen”), showing a conversation conducted 
at a café during the occasion of the 12th Sarajevo Film Festival, 2006. The clip is of low 
visual quality, with subtitles that do not appear in alignment with the words spoken (in 
English), and with a soundtrack that also gradually loses synchronisation. It is a 
conversation sketchily edited into 8 minutes, with abrupt jumps between passages of 
speech that are sometimes presented without context, and which cut as abruptly to still 
images from Tarr’s films. In spite of its rough quality and heavy editing, this clip is 
nevertheless an important document of Tarr’s central ideas. The director speaks initially 
and familiarly of the “primitive language” of film. He speaks of his relation to the 
medium as a means to express a vision of the world, to show “what is around us.” This 
is, he says, “emotional stuff.” He briefly gestures toward the central significance of 
human emotions in this relation to the world, but turns on the same point to suggest 
that the brain is equally important, and that “the human body” is - by this combination 
of heart and brain -  “a good construction.” When his interlocutor frames this idea in 
terms of “living in this duality world in a way,” Tarr rejects it out of hand, insisting “this 
is one together.” We then cut to the director speaking about the unique perspective 
afforded by the heterogeneous cultural currents that have shaped his Hungarian 
homeland. He refers to its intermediate position between Eastern and Western Europe, 
and its Slavic, Balkan, and Ottoman-Turkish influences. The historical vicissitudes that 
brought these diverse powers to impress themselves upon the Hungarian people has 
                                                          
1 Béla Tarr, “KUHINJA: Bela Tarr Interview,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=kZCQ0s2ZGew (Accessed 
January 30, 2018). 
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regularly been viewed as the source of a widely recognised melancholic character, of 
which Tarr and Krasznahorkai are held to be contemporary exemplars.2 Where Tarr is 
not speaking about melancholy per se, he does gesture toward the semantics of 
attunement when he offers: “that is why we could watch something maybe in a 
different way.” This impression is extended where he goes on to assert that “this is our 
life. This is our kind of reality.” It is revealing that the director extends this outsider 
status (“similar but a little bit different”) to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country of his 
interlocutor. That the director relocated to Sarajevo after The Turin Horse in order to 
open a film school (that has recently been closed) is perhaps no coincidence. The 
particular Stimmung of the city may have been familiar. The most emblematic Bosnian 
music genre, for instance, is melancholic in name and nature: sevdalinka. 
Etymologically, it is related to the “untranslatable” Portugese concept of melancholic 
longing, saudade, forged from a common root in the Arabic word sawda, which refers 
to “black bile” (itself a translation of the same concept from the Ancient Greek melaina 
chole).3 It is worth noting an anecdote offered in this connection by László Földényi, 
who “wrote the book” on melancholy. The Romanian-born philosopher Emil Cioran, 
who had grown up among Hungarians and knew the language, “asserted that there are 
three melancholic nations in Europe: the Russians, the Portuguese and – the 
Hungarians, of course.”4 Cioran himself was a notorious pessimist and a melancholic, for 
whom Krasznahorkai offers admiration: “If I was very down, on the floor, it was enough 
                                                          
2 Nicky Loomis, “Happy with Tears: On Melancholy as a Hungarian Condition,” July 20, 2016. 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/happy-with-tears-on-melancholy-as-a-hungarian-condition/#! 
(Accessed January 29, 2018). 
3 Amra Toska, “Traditional Music as the Sound of Space: Examples from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in 
Muzkoloski Zbornik (Musicological Annual) 52, no.2 (2016), p.108. 
4 László F. Földényi, “Are Hungarians Melancholic?,” June 8, 2016, 
blogs.yalebooks.com/2016/06/08/Hungarians-melancholy/ (Accessed January 29, 2018). 
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to look at the titles by Cioran – ‘The Temptation to Exist’ – even the title is such a good 
joke, and I’m very grateful to Cioran.”5 Tarr must share in this particular sense of 
humour, given that he considers his films, bar the final installment, to be comedies.  
As significant as this generative background context, however, is the content of 
the interview to follow. The director refers to several lines of thought from his discourse 
with which we are already acquainted. He speaks of dignity (“a nice word. And now it’s 
totally forgotten”) and its corruption (“It’s together with us...It was always…Just read 
the Old Testament.”) He also offers that his favourite story as the tales of Baron von 
Munchhausen: a figure known as a famous falsifier, but whose lies, Tarr insists, 
illuminate the truth. These tales are, he suggests, “not only a human story,” and the 
director says that he views his films in similar terms, as a “totality.” Tarr extends this 
idea in a way that invokes the cosmic perspective for which I argue, suggesting, 
…we do not want to be judging what is more important, the nature or the human life or the 
society or, you know, because everything is together. And we have to watch everything together 
and we have to watch everything all the time, when is happening, and of course the way, how is 
happening [sic].  
These are all important ideas in a consideration of Tarr, and especially through his 
conscious repetition of them. It is in relation to such an environmental totality that the 
idea of Stimmung acquires its special gravity, as an enveloping presence that comprises 
an “indissoluble unit.” It is with relation to a disregarded mode of “dignity,” or in a 
fixation upon the apparent corruption that inheres in the self-representation of 
Western civilisation, that the melancholic character of this attunement can best be 
                                                          
5 Krasznahorkai, interview by Hopkins. 
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positioned. It is in contradistinction from this corrupted mode of representation that 
the director seeks to make “stories” present, in the presence of non-anthropocentric, 
pre-verbal “metacommunications.” These emerge through encounter with uncanny 
worlds that seek to represent a “truth” gained through artifice and displacement. But 
this clip concludes with a novel statement that, as far as I know, appears nowhere else 
in the director’s discourse. In the final shot of the interview, severed from context or 
response, Tarr claims, “I am very profane, you know? Do you understand this word, 
profane? Surely.”6 What exactly is meant by this notion is, however, not immediately 
clear. The profane stands as an antinomy to the sacred, in a dichotomy that has been 
inherited from Roman religious law.7 Religion had been discussed earlier in the 
interview, as the subject of Tarr’s self-distinction from Tarkovsky: “because I don’t 
believe the God. But I believe the people.” Even with this pretext, however, it is difficult 
to determine whether Tarr’s assuredness over his interlocutor’s understanding of the 
“profane” is contextual or rhetorical, much less whether the director believes a 
common understanding of a person’s being “profane” would arise from a shared 
cultural-historical consciousness, or a melancholic perspective of the world entailed by 
it. 
In its most basic sense, the profane is simply that which is not sacred. As a verb, 
“to profane” is equivalent with “to desacralise.” What is sacred are those things that 
have been set apart, judged fit for exclusive use by the gods, in an observance of rites 
that articulate the separation between the sphere of the human and the sphere of the 
                                                          
6 The director is enunciating the word “profan,” which is the Hungarian equivalent to English “profane”; 
the subtitles, in Bosnian, confirm this usage. 
7 Giorgio Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation” in Profanations, p.73. 
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divine.8 As Agamben shows, sacralisation (and, by turn, profanation) is thus an 
articulation of proprietary right and the rites of propriety at one and the same time. It 
operates on the logic of inclusion and exclusion, of judgement, at an intersection 
between law and religion. Agamben insists that the word religion itself does not derive 
etymologically from religare, to bind (as in a rhythm connecting humans to divinities, 
the temporal to the eternal), but from relegere, which refers instead to re-reading and, 
by implication, to scrupulousness in observing the separation of the sacred and 
profane.9 He thus defines religion as, “that which removes things, places, animals, or 
people from common use and transfers them to a separate sphere.”10 The opposite of 
religion, then, is not disbelief, but negligence in the observation of this separation. To 
profane, Agamben says, “means to open the possibility of a special form of negligence, 
which ignores separation or, rather, puts it to a particular use.”11 More specifically, he 
suggests that, “if “to consecrate” (sacrare) was the term that indicated the removal of 
things from the sphere of human law, “to profane” meant, conversely, to return them 
to the free use of men.”12 The thing returned to common use, Agamben goes on to 
suggest, “is pure, profane, free of sacred names.”13 
The profane is a concept that resonates tellingly with the idea of messianism in 
Benjamin and, by turn, with Agamben. The idea of a “profane illumination” that 
Benjamin attributed to the Surrealists, for instance, sounds very much like the mode of 
revelation offered by Tarr’s cinema. Of this illumination, Benjamin writes,  
                                                          
8 Ibid. p.74. 
9 Ibid. p.75. 
10 Ibid. p.74. 
11 Idem. 
12 Ibid. p.73. 
13 My emphasis. Idem. 
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No one before these visionaries and augurs perceived how destitution – not only social but 
architectonic, the poverty of interiors, enslaved and enslaving objects – can be suddenly 
transformed into revolutionary nihilism.14 
Here again is the concept of nihilism with which the final chapter concluded, which 
Benjamin positions as the “method” by which we can “strive after” the rhythm of 
eternal transience. Nihilism is, he says, “the task of world politics.” This form of nihilism 
is an ethos, or a rhythm, which is “profane” in its deepest nature. Indeed, Benjamin is 
speaking to “the order of the profane” and its construction “on the idea of happiness” 
when he suggests that this happiness is “the rhythm of Messianic nature.”15 In other 
words, the profane order is not to be formed with relation to a “sacred” realm, but by 
an acceptance of the transience of the world, its “eternal and total passing away.” This 
is a conception of the profane that is taken up by Agamben in an essay titled “Notes on 
Politics,” where it likewise takes on an ethico-political character. Speaking of the “happy 
life” - the point at which philosophy, ethics and politics intersect - Agamben pictures, 
“an absolutely profane “sufficient life” that has reached the perfection of its own power 
and of its own communicability – a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have 
any hold.”16 Elsewhere, he posits the idea that “profanation” is the essential method of 
establishing pure means, such as that which is displayed in gesture, or on which his idea 
of ethics is based. Agamben speaks of a praxis “emancipated from its relationship to an 
end,” which has, “joyously forgotten its goal.”17 Among Agamben’s most suggestive 
uses of the idea is found in the appendix to The Coming Community, where he 
                                                          
14 Walter Benjamin, “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia” in Reflections), pp.181-
182. 
15 Benjamin, “Theologico-Political Fragment,” pp.312-313. 
16 Giogio Agamben, “Notes on Politics” in Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics, p.114. 
17 Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation,” p.86. 
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formulates the idea of “the Irreparable”: “that things are just as they are, in this or that 
mode, without remedy to their way of being…How you are, how the world is – this is 
the Irreparable.”18 In the following paragraph, Agamben relates the Irreparable to the 
profane, in connection with revelation. We might recall here that “apocalypse” is 
synonymous with “revelation” in its original usage. Agamben suggests:  
Revelation does not mean revelation of the sacredness of the world, but only revelation of its 
irreparably profane character…The possibility of salvation begins only at this point; it is the 
salvation of the profanity of the world, its being-thus.19 
The profane character of the world is its “being-thus”; and, more than this, being 
irreparably, irremediably thus. This means: nothing more or less that what is, in 
substance as well as essence, by necessity and as contingency, such that these 
dichotomies become neutralised.20 The possibility of the salvation of the profane 
character of the world – its eternal and total passing way – begins at this point. 
Agamben suggests in connection with the Irreparable that, “We can have hope only in 
what is without remedy.”21 
While conducting research for this project at the British Film Institute’s Reuben 
Library, I came across an interview with Tarr in the journal Vertigo titled: “The More 
Desperate We Are, the More Hope There Is.”22 It is a quote from the director; I had in 
fact just heard Tarr make this statement in an interview that I had been transcribing 
                                                          
18 Giorgio Agamben, “Appendix: The Irreparable” in The Coming Community, p.102. 
19 Ibid. p.90. 
20 Ibid. p.89. Agamben prefaces this Appendix by suggesting it is a response to Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein, and with their attempts “to define an old problem of metaphysics: the relationship 
between essence and existence”; he later frames this relationship as that between necessity and 
contingency.   
21 Ibid. p.102. 
22 Tarr, interview by Chilcott (2007), p.10. 
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from audiotape. There, the director connects the idea to his realisation of “cosmic 
problems,” from the standpoint of which, 
...there’s nothing else to do but to make it total, and to create a complete desperation. And the 
more desperate we are, the more hope there is. It’s quite simple.23 
At the end of the conversation published in Vertigo, the interviewer – Robert Chilcott – 
raises this quote with Tarr, who responds by saying “That’s the truth. I can’t say any 
more than that.”24 As much as the original idea, this response is an evocative statement 
in relation to the filmmaker’s ethos. It is later echoed in relation to Tarr’s “early” 
retirement after The Turin Horse, which has continually been framed by the director in 
the same terms, as his having nothing more to say. This singular “truth” - of a hope that 
appears in light of abjection - can be seen, in this way, as the fundamental character of 
that profane illumination which Tarr’s cosmic perspective casts upon the world and its 
irremediable “being-thus.” As with Tarr himself, this “nothing more” could be an 
appropriate place to conclude the current discussion. And yet, as Janos contends at the 
conclusion of his planetary round dance in Werckmeister Harmonies, “it is still not 
over.” Having finished recording notes from Chilcott’s interview, I continued reading 
Vertigo, and came upon a Rainer-Maria Rilke poem that was unknown to me. To my 
memory, it was situated in the final pages of the same issue as the Tarr interview, and 
could thus be seen as a keen-eyed editorial allusion. My notes and their subsequent 
reconfirmation, however, show that I had continued reading into the following issue 
                                                          
23 Tarr, interview by Romney (2001). 
24 Tarr, interview by Chilcott (2007). 
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(these were bound together), and had found the Rilke poem there by chance.25 In any 
case – and disregarding whether the discovery is more significant for its fortuitousness - 
this poem made a strong impression on my thinking. I have regularly returned to it, in 
order to be sure that its vital resonance with images and ideas in Tarr has not been 
misremembered. To borrow a figure from Benjamin, Rilke has found a place in the 
constellation that forms my idea of this oeuvre.  
In a way that speaks directly to a recurrent figure in Tarr’s films, the title of 
Rilke’s poem is “The Man Watching.” Its subject is an approaching storm, considered 
from the perspective of an observer at a window. For this reason, it most closely brings 
to mind the figures of Ohlsdorfer and his daughter, in The Turin Horse, who take turns 
to witness the encroaching end of the present world from a similar position. But this 
“man watching” speaks, to my mind, of that wider scope of attunement that has been 
called here a cosmic perspective. In its most resonant passage, Rilke writes: 
 
 The Storm, the shifter of shapes, drives on 
 across the woods and across time, 
 and the world looks as if it had no age; 
 the landscape, like a line in the psalm book, 
 is seriousness and weight and eternity. 
                                                          
25 My inattention is also confirmed by incomplete notation of the reference. Thankfully, Vertigo is 
available online. Rainer Maria Rilke, “The Man Watching,” trans. Robert Bly in Vertigo 3, no.5 (Spring, 
2007), www.closeupfilmcentre.com/vertigo_magazine/volume-3-issue-5-spring-2007/the-man-watching/ 
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What we choose to fight is so tiny! 
What fights with us is so great! 
If only we let ourselves be dominated 
as things do by some immense storm, 
we would become strong too, and not need names. 
 
When we win it’s with the small things, 
and the triumph itself makes us small. 
What is extraordinary and eternal 
does not want to be bent by us.26 
 
Here, Rilke refers to human being and being-in-language, with relation to a certain 
recognition that is afforded by the decentralisation of man from the centre of his 
universe. Rilke follows on to say he is referring to “the Angel who appeared to the 
wrestlers of the Old Testament.” That he speaks of wrestlers in the plural is intriguing. 
In the Old Testament, it was Jacob alone that wrestled with a single Angel, who is 
regularly interpreted as being an incarnation of God. Rilke’s reference to the plural thus 
projects this struggle not onto a single event, but toward a stage in the development of 
                                                          
26 Idem. 
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human being in which it was shaped by “what is extraordinary and eternal.” Of those 
thus dominated by this cosmic measure, Rilke writes in conclusion: 
 
 Winning does not tempt that man. 
 This is how he grows: by being defeated, decisively, 
 by constantly greater beings.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Idem. 
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